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Abstract
Unmasking Aircraft and Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings (A/RPC) prior to vehicle entry
into service has been a long standing challenge in the Aerospace Industry. A/RPCs,
often only exposed through unpredictable or very specific circumstances have arisen
throughout the history of manned powered flight, and have required short-term ‘fixes’
to ensure system safety. One of the reasons for this occurrence is th lack of detailed
practice regarding the prediction and detection of RPCs prior to full-scale testing. Of-
ten in simulation, A/RPCs are only investigated once problems have been experienced
during other aircraft qualification activities. This is a particular issue for the rotor-
craft community, where system sophistication is ‘catching-up’ with their fixed-wing
counterparts.
This research helps to extend the state-of-art knowledge surrounding the exposure
of RPCs prior to any catastrophic occurrences, through the introduction of novel tools
for use both in the rotorcraft design process and beyond. Using key definitions and
findings from previous research efforts, objective and subjective measures have been
developed for use in both real-time piloted flight and for pre- or post-flight analysis.
These tools have been designed to compliment one another, in a process that should
reduce the susceptibility to RPC in future rotorcraft.
Novel tools developed have been tested through real-time piloted simulation, with
results allowing RPC susceptibility boundaries and regions to be identified. Application
of all tools developed, both subjective and objective, have been validated through
comparison with existing methods.
This work provides novel methods to quantify both the propensity of pilot-vehicle
systems to RPCs, and the severity of these interactions. Methods have been designed
with simplicity of use in mind, whereby they can be applied to vehicles of different
configuration, are applicable to a wide range of RPCs, and are easily understandable
for prospective users. It is believed that research contained within can contribute to the
realisation of European Commission 2020 objectives, by helping to reduce the average
i
accident rate of global aircraft operators.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What Are Aircraft/Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings?
Causing significant aviation accidents over the past 100 years, unfavourable Aircraft and
Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings (A/RPC), with the specific subcategory of Pilot-Induced
Oscillations (PIOs), have shown themselves to be one of the great problems in the field
of aircraft control and stability. The earliest form of PIOs occurred in the 1903 Wright
Flyer, where static instability resulted in mild longitudinal oscillations [1, 2]. In the
century following, the development of flight control architecture, mission requirements,
and aircraft design have led to increased unfavourable couplings between the pilot and
the vehicle. Ref. [3] states that A/RPCs, “have an unambiguous status as the senior
flying qualities problem.”
Although there is no ‘typical’ example of an A/RPC, all feature some undesirable
coupling between the pilot and the vehicle. The undesirability separates these A/RPC
responses from commanded vehicle responses. PIOs are the most researched and un-
derstood of these unfavourable couplings. These are oscillatory A/RPCs, where the
commanded vehicle response materialises as an oscillation. The oscillation can occur
over a wide range of frequencies, magnitudes, and time periods, but they must be a
result of an active pilot. Oscillations that are neither undesirable nor a result of pilot
control should not be considered as PIOs.
No clear single definition for PIO events exist, as there remains some disagreement
as to what does, and what does not, constitute a PIO event. Here, three definitions
are shown, which are considered to well characterise a PIO event:
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“Pilot-Induced Oscillations are rare unexpected, and unintended excursions
in aircraft attitude and flight path caused by anomalous interactions between
aircraft and pilot” [4]
“Inadvertent, sustained aircraft oscillations as a consequence of an abnor-
mal joint enterprise between the aircraft and the pilot.” [3]
“the pilot generates a sustained oscillatory motion by an active, although
unintended, interpretation of the cues resulting from the motion of the air-
craft.” [5]
Historically, A/RPCs have occurred unexpectedly, sporadically, and have often had
dangerous consequences. However, A/RPC tendencies that lead to catastrophic conse-
quences are rare. If one is observed, it may be years until it is seen again [6].
Some examples of PIO events, predominantly from fixed-wing aircraft, are contained
within Ref. [4]. These display the multitude of variants that can trigger the undesirable
oscillations. One of the most famous PIO events recorded occurred during a display
flight of the YF22. During a planned ‘go-around’, the vehicle entered into a violent
PIO, in the longitudinal axis. The data trace from the incident is shown in Fig.1.1,
and is a good example of how PIO events can materialise quickly, and unexpectedly.
As shown, between t = 0s and t = 2s, the pilot makes small inputs in the longitudi-
nal control, resulting in only small deflection of the control surfaces and little change in
the vehicle trajectory. Between t = 3s and t = 6s pilot inputs become faster and larger,
with the pilot commanding full forward stick at approximately t = 4s and full aft stick
3 seconds later. The increase in control activity causes large and quick changes in pitch
attitude, rate, and control surface deflection. These changes materialise as oscillations,
which are shown to occur with varying magnitude and frequency. As shown, oscilla-
tions in the horizontal tail exhibit ‘saw-tooth’ behaviour, a result of sudden reversal of
control. This type of behaviour materialises through system quasi-linearities. The term
quasi-linear refers to a system that only exhibits non-linear behaviour when reaching
certain limits or conditions. Therefore, non-linearities in the configuration are not nec-
essarily exposed during regular operation. Many previous events have materialised in
this way through system rate or position limiting. The control demand exceeds the
allowable response, causing system limiting. This limiting can cause an unexpected
vehicle response, which has been shown to lead to many PIO events [4].
In the investigations following the YF-22 crash, rate limiting was determined as
the cause of the incident. However, it was found that the rate limiting occurred due
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Figure 1.1: Trace of YF22 PIO. [4]
to the change in control sensitivity following the deployment of thrust vectoring. The
event occurred during a planned ‘go-around’. The pilot deployed the afterburners and
raised the landing gear. The YF-22 control command gradients were largely developed
in response to specific mission objectives. The thrust vectoring control was developed
for high angle-of-attack manoeuvring at high altitudes. As a result, the characteristics
were not analysed at low altitude or speed [4]. Therefore, when it was deployed during
the ‘go-around’, the aircraft responds to command inputs was larger than intended for
low altitude flying, which caused the surface rate limiting.
This event can be classified as a PIO as it is in agreement with the definitions
shown above. The oscillations experienced were unintentional, and caused sustained
excursions in aircraft attitude and flight path. Furthermore, the incident appears to be
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unexpected, with the pilot active throughout, displayed by the forces recorded at the
longitudinal control stick.
A further example of a different type of PIO is shown in Fig.1.2. Ref. [4] reports
that, as sophisticated control systems and fly-by-wire (FBW) technology has only re-
cently been incorporated into rotorcraft, there has been significantly less opportunity
to encounter PIO events. However, some early FBW rotorcraft have been shown to
be prone to PIO, through excessive system time delays. For low frequency, corrective
control, time delays in the control path will likely lead to poor vehicle Handling Qual-
ities (HQs) and difficult task performance. However, for tight tracking or stabilisation
control inputs, these delays can cause PIO events. This is due to the phase shift that
is present between the pilot control and the vehicle response. If this phase is too large,
the situation can arise where pilot input control is in the opposing direction to the
vehicle motion. If this is sustained, undesirable oscillations will occur.
An example shown in Fig. 1.2 was recorded from a BO105 in-flight simulator
operated by The German Aerospace Center (DLR) [4]. The impact of control system
delays was displayed through a landing task, where a PIO manifested in the roll axis.
This PIO was sustained at approximately 1 Hz for 4 seconds. Figure 1.3 displays the
elements of the system which combine to cause the overall control delay. In this case,
43 % of the total delay is attributed to the ‘Actuators and Rotor’. As the complexity
of rotorcraft control systems increase, it is possible that larger delays are experienced
at each of the control system elements, causing larger overall time delays.
Figure 1.2: Trace of BO105 PIO. [4]
1.1.1 Classification of Aircraft/Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings
As shown from the preceding examples, pilot couplings in the form of PIOs can materi-
alise in a number of ways. The classification of PIOs was first suggested by Ashkenas,
Jex and McRuer in 1964 [2], with a system devised to give both a ‘class’ and ‘type’ for
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Figure 1.3: Control System of BO105 PIO. [4]
all possible PIO events. Prior to this structured system, there was no unified scheme
for the analysis of Pilot-Induced Oscillations. Ashkenas specified the following;
“PIO’s are classed by the control axis involved, i.e., as longitudinal (pitch),
lateral (roll), directional (yaw), and coupled lateral-directional. The type
is defined by the nature of the physical phenomena (and, incidentally, the
kind of analysis) involved”
Three types of PIO were identified. These were;
I. Oscillations due to linear pilot-vehicle coupling
II. Limit cycles due to one or more nonlinear elements in series in the
primary control loop
III. Limit cycles due to one or more nonlinear elements in vehicle motion
feedback paths subsidiary to the primary control loop.
In 1995, McRuer [3] modified the system by replacing the class and type with Cat-
egories (Category I, Category II, Category III). McRuer retained the meanings applied
to the types defined by Ashkenas et.al in Ref. [2].
At the same time, the term Aircraft Pilot Coupling (APC) was proposed [7], as
a means to avoid attributing any blame to the pilot during PIO events. The term
also allowed for the inclusion of non-oscillitory pilot coupling events, which were not
previously classified in Refs. [2, 3]. During this time, there was a stigma attached to
the term PIO, resulting in a reluctance by pilots to report observed issues, as they did
not wish to disclose that they had trouble commanding an aircraft [8].
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 display hierarchy’s of APC and RPC events respectively, indi-
cating where categories of PIOs exist. The main difference between fixed and rotary-
winged pilot couplings are the frequency ranges of interest. PIOs are considered to
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occur over a larger frequency range in rotorcraft, but retain the same classifications as
given in Ref. [4]. Due to increased vibrations and flexibility in rotorcraft, they are also
believed to experience a wider range of pilot coupling events due to involuntary pilot
control. Referred to as Aeroelastic RPCs, these include high frequency response due to
the passive presence of the human pilot within the control loop. Oscillatory events are
known as ‘Pilot Assisted Oscillations’ (PAO), and can occur through couplings with the
airframe, the engine, or external influences (e.g. slung load, atmospheric conditions).
Figure 1.4: Tree showing division of APC events [9].
Figure 1.5: Tree showing division of RPC events [9].
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1.1.2 Problems Unmasking Aircraft/Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings
The primary reason for the continued presence of A/RPCs, is the unpredictability of
interactions; almost every occurrence of undesirable pilot coupling is unique, caused
by certain combinations of pilot, vehicle and mission requirements. Whilst A/RPC
phenomena have been well researched in the past, there is a lack of a holistic approach
to assist with the design, test, and evaluation process. As a result, and due to no
specific requirements or guidelines, often no test or evaluation of A/RPC tendencies
are conducted. Usually, any investigations are reactive, following problems experienced
in-flight. This has been particularly true for rotorcraft investigations [10].
PIOs are the result of a coupling between three elements; the Pilot, Vehicle and a
‘Trigger’. All three are required for a PIO to occur, but the ‘requirements’ for each
Pilot/Vehicle/Trigger are relatively unknown for every unique aircraft configuration.
Figure 1.6 shows a graphical representation of what happens to cause a PIO; the
intersection of the Pilot/Vehicle/Trigger is the PIO region. However, elements of these
regions are usually unknown and, for this reason, the size of the PIO region is also
unknown. Elements including the operational condition of the vehicle may cause the
unknown vehicle region to increase, changing the size of the PIO region. Furthermore,
a particular pilot may interact with a larger range of vehicle dynamics, again causing
the PIO region to increase. The result will be an increase in PIO susceptibility.
Figure 1.6: Diagram showing unknown elements of pilot, vehicle, and trigger that can
lead to a PIO event.
The pilot is integral in the oscillations. Without the pilot to drive the oscillations,
they will not occur. However, it is important to remember that a PIO is not com-
manded by the pilot. The oscillations must be the result of a ‘mismatch’ between what
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the pilot believes should happen (the pilot’s mental model) and the actual response of
the vehicle. In Ref. [11], the following was used to describe the distinction;
“One way of viewing the crucial distinction between oscillations resulting
from degraded handling and those that can result in a divergent PIO is to
note that in the former case the pilot drives the oscillation, whereas in a
“real” PIO ... the pilot is driven by the oscillation.”
Despite significant research in dynamics and control, it is still impossible to recre-
ate a complete human brain and central nervous system as a mathematical model.
Pilot modelling efforts have led to the development of models which can reproduce the
actions of a pilot during closed-loop control of vehicles [12–14]. However, these can
currently only represent elements of the pilot decision making process.
As each pilot operates differently, using their judgement of the situation and their
individual strategy, it is difficult to predict how the vehicle will be controlled, partic-
ularly in a PIO situation. The experience of the pilot plays a key role in the control
activity; a trainee may over-control the aircraft causing an increase control gain or
aggressiveness. They may also not recognise potentially catastrophic situations. All of
these factors mean that, the response of the vehicle within a simulation cannot confirm
that problems will not occur in flight.
The vehicle is perhaps the most well known of the three contributing factors to
the occurrence of PIOs. This is mainly due to research efforts defining HQ criteria,
and metrics that have been presented in the past 50 years. Although A/RPCs are
not directly a HQ issue, there has been an effort to offer insight to A/RPCs through
Handling Qualities analysis. Both fixed-wing (MIL-STD-1797-C [15]) and rotary-wing
(ADS-33E-PRF [16]) have well established HQ guidelines. If the recommendations
in these documents are followed, the vehicle should have good HQs, meaning that
the vehicle should also be free from PIO tendencies. The linkage between PIOs and
HQs comes through the systems implemented in the vehicle, namely the software and
mechanical limits.
The trigger is perhaps of most concern to engineers investigating PIOs. Without
the trigger, the PIO will not materialise. It is also the most unknown of the three
prerequisites for PIO, due to the infinite number of situations that can cause a PIO.
The trigger is ultimately regarded as the cause of the incident, and rarely are these
the same for different PIO events. As a result, there are a wide range of trigger that
have been found historically. An attempt to distinguish between these types of trigger
is shown in Fig. 1.7.
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Figure 1.7: Diagram showing trigger groups.
The first are triggers caused through the difficulty of the task (through the lit-
erature, these have been classified as Environmental Triggers [4]). Tasks which go
beyond the capabilities of the vehicle and the pilot can act as a trigger. The closed
loop control of the aircraft causes the pilot to work beyond the capabilities of the vehi-
cle, leading to the pilot/vehicle mental-mismatch. These tasks could be in demanding
stressful environments (e.g. war zones), in tasks where limits are of greatest impor-
tance (e.g. nap-of-the-earth) or tasks with poor cueing environment leading to spatial
disorientation (e.g. clouds, brownout). In 1995, McRuer [3, 17] related task perfor-
mance (environmental) triggers to the situation where variable high pilot gain becomes
necessary for desired control. Situations for this include precision landing in turbulent
conditions, air-to-air tracking, flight refuelling, formation flying, landing on the deck
of an aircraft carrier, manual terrain tracking, target tracking and landing in adverse
weather conditions [17, 18]. High pilot gain however could be mistaken for poor pilot
control strategy, and the A/RPC could be seen as a pilot triggered event. One example
where high pilot gain could increase due to the environment is during collision avoid-
ance. Low altitude flying over difficult terrain can cause excessive pilot control gain
and, therefore, cause adverse A/RPC.
The second type of trigger is caused by changes to vehicle dynamics. Many PIOs
through history, particularly in fighter type aircraft, have been caused by a very distinct
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aircraft condition, or a sudden change in the system characteristics (such as a switch
from command system or control sensitivity). A good example of this is the YF-22 case
shown in Fig. 1.1. The pilot was flying a closed-loop approach, when a ‘go-around’
was initiated. When the afterburners were deployed, it caused an automatic change in
pitch command gradients during the transition, causing unexpected and uncontrollable
oscillations that resulted in collision with the runway [4]. This situation is very difficult
to predict, as it is almost unique to every situation; i.e if the pilot had engaged the
afterburners a second later, would the PIO have occurred?
The third type of trigger is the pilot. In some circumstances, it can be unexpected
pilot control that can lead to the PIOs. A common occurrence is the over-control of
the vehicle, leading to tight closed-loop flying where there is no task requirement. This
can then replicate the type of experience found in high-gain, task triggered PIO events.
1.2 The ARISTOTEL Project
In 2001, the European Commission published “European Aeronautics: A Vision for
2020” [19], and later in 2011 published “Flightpath 2050: Europe’s Vision for Aviation”
[20]. Within these reports, goals on safety, environment and European Air Transport
efficiency were set. Regarding safety, the goal was set to achieve a five-fold reduction
in the average accident rate of global operators and the drastic reduction of the impact
of human error.
Due to the concern that A/RPC events may contribute to future aviation accidents,
the ARISTOTEL project (Aircraft and Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings: Tools and Tech-
niques for Alleviation and Detection), was initiated in 2010 [21, 22]. The three year
project was funded through the European Commission (EC), under the 7th Framework
Programme for Research.
The ARISTOTEL project detailed 6 key problems;
•Lack of understanding of what an A/RPC is,
•Lack of specific A/RPC pilot models,
•Lack of proper A/RPC vehicle models,
•No reliable A/RPC criteria,
•No proper simulator practices to unmask A/RPC,
•No coherent design guide for A/RPC.
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The project was an international collaboration between 10 European institutions.
Most of these parters were concerned primarily with rotorcraft specific problems. All
research reported within this Thesis is funded through this project, and results from
this work were reported in project dissemination activities.
The author was a member of the ARISTOTEL consortium, and involved in all
project work packages where the University of Liverpool had involvement. This in-
cluded both investigations of low and high frequency RPC. Primarily, the author con-
tributed to aspects of Rigid Body RPCs, and to Simulation Testing for RPCs. Work
conducted for the project included the creation and validation of helicopter models,
preparation for simulated flight tests, data handling and post-processing, and prepa-
ration of technical reports and joint conference papers. The work reported within this
thesis helped the ARISTOTEL project reach some of the goals, particularly regarding
simulator practices to unmask A/RPCs.
1.3 Thesis Objective
The objective of this research is to respond to the current threat of the ‘unknown’ PIO
phenomena, with a view to answer research questions posed in the subsequent chapter.
•Improve experimental methods and analysis for use in Rotorcraft Pi-
lot Coupling investigations. This includes investigation of processes and
practices that should be undertaken in both a research and industrial envi-
ronment
•Development of novel tools for detection of Pilot-Induced Oscillations, to
provide feedback and protection for the pilot. There should be a way to con-
vey to the pilot the danger of PIO situations, in order to provide alleviation
and safety throughout the operation of the vehicle.
•Improve methods of pilot feedback during RPC investigations, to allow
the engineer to understand what the pilot experiences during completion of
closed-loop tasks.
•Provide novel robust methods for prediction of RPC/PIO tendencies, to
provide more understanding of pilot-vehicle susceptibility prior to real-time,
pilot-in-the-loop flight.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the work contained within the thesis. After
introducing the background to the subject area, the goals of this current work are
presented, along with the novelty of the work conducted.
Chapter 2 presents results of a literature survey of past research in Pilot-Induced
Oscillations and Pilot Couplings. Results presented are aimed at the specific subject
area of prediction and alleviation of Pilot-Induced Oscillations. Although work con-
ducted in this research is using rotorcraft simulation, fixed wing analysis methods are
presented to give sufficient understanding into work that has been completed before.
Chapter 3 details experimental set-up and modelling conducted in order to complete
experimentation in following chapters. Simulation facilities are described, along with
the modelling tools and techniques.
Chapter 4 presents the development of real-time algorithms for prediction of Pilot-
Induced Oscillations. Theory, development and modelling of the real-time tools are
discussed, along with methods of implementation. The chapter presents the results
from a number of experimental test campaigns used to derive and validate boundaries
for real-time PIO detection.
Chapter 5 presents the development of a new predictive tool to assess the potential
for PIO prior to manned flight. This includes a number of methods and assessment
metrics, derived from the real-time criteria developed. The use of the criteria is shown
through a case study, involving a number of simple rotorcraft approximations.
Chapter 6 introduces a novel ratings scale for assessment of Adverse Pilot Couplings.
The development and first use of the scale is shown through results obtained from an
experimental test campaign. Within the chapter, the advantage the novel scale offers
over pre-existing methods is shown through a series of examples.
Chapter 7 uses novel methods described in the preceding chapters to conduct a
case study using data collected from real-time simulation. This demonstrates the use
of previously developed tools to improve understanding of when and why PIO/RPCs
occur during closed-loop flying tasks.
Chapter 8 discusses the key conclusions from the research, and addresses the re-
search questions posed in Chapter 2. Recommendations for future extension to the
work are also proposed.
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1.5 Originality and Novelty
The following are considered to demonstrate the originality and novelty contained
within this thesis:
In Chapter 4, a novel real-time algorithm is presented, as a method to evaluate and
identify PIOs in rotary-wing aircraft. The method has been specifically developed using
data from rotorcraft closed-loop piloted simulations. The ability to use the algorithm
without aircraft-specific tuning is not shown in any previous ‘detection method’.
In Chapter 5, the novel method presented in Chapter 4 is used as a prediction tool.
This demonstrates the utility of the method for use in both the design stage and the
evaluation stage. The utilisation in this way allows for standardised tools for both
prediction and detection. This is not shown through current methods.
In Chapter 6, an original subjective rating scale for the assessment of RPCs is
presented. This scale has been developed through cooperation with test pilots, during
completion of closed-loop simulation trials. This new scale is shown to give more
detailed information than results obtained using pre-existing scales.
In Chapter 7, task performance tolerances are investigated to show how tasks must
be adapted to improve their suitability for RPC studies. It is demonstrated that chang-
ing task tolerances of current Handling Qualities tasks can have a dramatic impact on
the ability to detect RPC tendencies.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
To establish an understanding of previous research regarding A/RPCs, a review of
relevant existing studies was undertaken. This review was used to formulate research
questions, determined through identification of the outstanding issues found.
2.1 Overview
Aircraft Pilot Coupling (APC) events, occurring in fixed wing aircraft, have been re-
ported since 1947 but the first Rotorcraft Pilot Coupling (RPC) was not reported until
1963 [2]. Figure 2.1 displays reported APC and RPC events for each decade from 1940
to 2010. These are combined from cases shown in Refs. [2–4,10,11,21,23–25]
As of 2010, there have been approximately 90 reports of APCs in fixed-wing air-
craft. It is important to note that there is no requirement to report APCs that have not
resulted in an accident. Therefore, these results represent only the most severe APCs
encountered. It is likely that many more events have been disregarded as unimportant
and were not reported at the time [4]. Reported events give a frequency of approxi-
mately 1.5 incidents per year. Since 1963, approximately 35 occurrences of RPC have
been reported. The number of events is difficult to ascertain, as a number of rotorcraft
were reported to experience ‘several occurrences’ of RPCs during their development
and operation.
Concerning APCs, a significant reduction in the number of reported events was
found in the 1980s. This is believed to be the result of extensive research, initiated
following APCs experienced during the 1960s and 1970s. However, reported APCs
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Figure 2.1: APC and RPC events per decade reported from 1947 to 2010.
increased again in the 1990s, suggesting that new problems emerged, which were not
addressed by previously developed techniques. Unlike APCs, there has been a steady
increase in RPCs since the 1960s and, in 2010, the number of reported events per decade
was found to be approaching the reported number of APCs.
Although there appears to be no definitive trend concerning the nature of the APCs,
the database of previous events shows periods characterised by certain trigger events.
In the 1960s and 1970s, some of the first events concerning rotorcraft were caused by
structural interaction between the main rotor and the fuselage. These events continued
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, and were particularly prevalent in the V-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft [10]. Here, interactions were found concerning the flexible airframe and the ro-
tors. In the 1970s-1990s, a large number of events concerning sling-load transportations
were found. Procedural mitigations were put in place to ensure safety during opera-
tions. Finally, more recent events have been found to be attributed to control system
forces, mode switching, system time delays, and lack of pilot experience.
Although there has been a change in the nature of events occurring in rotorcraft,
it does not appear that this change has been driven by design guidelines or criteria.
For example, many slung load interactions were mitigated against only through the
requirement for the pilot to ‘drop the load’ if oscillations were experienced [10]. The
results in Fig. 2.1 also show that there has been no reduction in the number of reported
incidents. Therefore, further research is required in order to reduce or eliminate the
threat of A/RPC.
As A/RPCs have hindered aircraft designs through history (See Fig. 2.1) [4], re-
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search concerning them is extensive. The development of rotorcraft has generally lagged
behind that of fixed-wing aircraft and, as a result, most of the past research has focused
on fixed-wing APCs events [4]. Only limited research has been conducted to investigate
RPCs (recent examples including [9, 26,27]).
The aim of the review is not to restrict the content of research to purely previous ro-
tary research. Therefore, this review covers research both for fixed- and rotary-winged
vehicles. It covers three main topics of A/RPCs: prediction methods, protection meth-
ods, and Assessment/Evaluation Methods. An overview of previous A/RPC research
topics is shown in Fig.2.2. These are discussed in the subsequent sections.
Figure 2.2: Overview of A/RPC research topics
2.2 Prediction of A/RPCs
For almost 50 years, the categorisation of PIOs has been used to develop prediction
tools. As with protection methods, they have primarily been designed with fixed-wing
aircraft in mind. The individual criteria are not however as readily applicable to rotor-
craft as the protection methods, due to the differences in dynamics and flight regimes
of the aircraft. Therefore, not all methods are discussed in detail here, but an overview
of developments is presented.
Following a review of previous criteria, Ref. [4] stated three key requirements for A/RPC
prediction criteria:
16
•Validity: a criterion embodies properties and characteristics that define the environ-
ment of interest and are associated with parameter spaces covering the vast majority of
known cases.
•Selectivity: demands that the criterion differentiate sharply between “good” and “bad”
systems.
•Ready Applicability: requires that the criterion be easily and conveniently applied.
Initially, some of the first attempts to create criteria that followed these requirements
resulted in a number of tools based upon identification of the properties of the closed-
loop pilot-vehicle-system (PVS) [4]. These tools included Neal-Smith (1971, [28]),
Smith-Geddes (1994, [29]), Aircraft-Bandwidth/Phase Delay (1994, [15]), Moscow Avi-
ation Institute [4], and Dropback criteria (1994, [8]). The former two criteria are explic-
itly based upon pilot models relating to compensatory control [4]. The latter consider
the effective aircraft dynamics as an element of the open-loop system, which can be
related to the closed-loop operations for which the pilot’s behaviour is synchronous [4].
All of these tools were initially developed to observe tendencies for linear, Category
I PIO, as these were of most concern at the time. Furthermore, criteria were based
upon the longitudinal axis, due to the database of events available. Criteria including
Aircraft-Bandwidth/Phase Delay and Smith-Geddes were examined using lateral-axis
experimental data. It was reported that the longitudinal criteria could be overly conser-
vative for the lateral dynamics [4]. Some of the criteria developed for observation in the
longitudinal axis are not directly applicable to the lateral axis, such as the Dropback
criterion.
The validity of these criteria is shown through the observation of the PVS dynamics
at the frequency range of interest for A/RPC.
The selectivity of the criteria has been achieved through the application of bound-
aries, designed to encompass the results of pilot subjective opinion. McRuer et. al. [4]
highlighted three points regarding the boundaries used for assessment:
•Boundaries were originally developed to distinguish between Handling Qualities Levels,
and only after development were they used to distinguish between PIO potential
•In principle, the boundaries could be different for different closed-loop task scenar-
ios (e.g., precision tracking and tight regulation, closed-loop manoeuvres, and large-
amplitude corrective manoeuvres) and for different types of pilot behaviour.
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•The boundaries relating to rotorcraft are still a case in point.
The readily applicability of the criteria results from the use of simplified systems, which
are considered appropriate for the observation of linear-type PIO.
With the prevalence of Category II events, novel criteria were required which include
quasi-linear dynamics. A variety of new methods were developed including Time-
domain Neal-Smith [30], the Open-Loop Onset Point (OLOP, 1994-97, [31,32]), Power
Spectral Density analysis (1997, [12,33,34]), Wavelett and Scalargram methods (2006,
[11,35]), and most recently Power Frequency methods (2011, [36]). In order to predict
Category II PIO, the complexity of the criteria, and of the model, is greater than that
required for Category I analysis. As a result, the criteria are not as readily applicable
as the Cat. I criteria. Furthermore, the selectivity of the criteria can be difficult to
ascertain.
As stated above, the boundaries for the application of criteria for rotorcraft are
relatively unknown. This is due to the reason that all previous boundaries have been
developed using fixed-wing databases. It is perhaps for this reason that only two of the
criteria discussed above have been applied extensively to rotorcraft investigations.
Of the Category I prediction methods, only the Bandwidth Phase Delay (BPD)
method has been extensively applied [37]. BPD was adopted within the fixed-wing
specification MIL-STD-1797 [15] in 1997, to act as a method for determination of
flying qualities of piloted aircraft.
Specifically, the BPD is based upon the premise of determining the maximum
crossover frequency that a pure gain pilot can achieve without threatening the sta-
bility [38]. If this frequency is higher than what is expected during closed-loop control,
the vehicle is not likely to be prone to PIO. The determination of the BPD should give
an indication of the ease of pilot control, and the tolerance of variations in the pilot
dynamics close to the region of cross-over [4].
The method uses the aircraft attitude transfer function to determine the frequency
range for which the pilot can exert good closed-loop control without having to com-
pensate excessively. The criterion is easy to apply, and has been used extensively in
fixed-wing research to determine aircraft susceptibility to Category I PIO. As a result,
through studies such as HAVE PIO, it has been possible to draw PIO susceptibility
boundaries for fixed-wing aircraft [39]. Although boundaries were found to reflect Cat-
egory I susceptibility to a good degree, the very limited database of Category II and III
events generally did not correlate well with the boundaries. Predominantly, boundaries
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have been based upon fighter-type aircraft, but include results for some transport-type
aircraft, such as the Boeing 777 and the MD-11 [4].
Due to its success in predicting fixed-wing PIO, and the ease of analysis, the method
was chosen to determine the short-term response of rotary vehicles in Helicopter Aero-
nautical Design Standard 33 in 1985 [40]. Refinements and modification led to the
introduction of ADS-33E-PRF in 2000 [16]. Specifically, within ADS-33E-PRF, BPD
is used as a method to determine the HQs of the vehicle. Although poor HQs are often
a result of PIO tendencies, they are not exclusively caused in this way. Within ADS-33,
boundaries for Handling Qualities Levels (HQLs) are presented. Although not specifi-
cally stated in ADS-33E-PRF, the link between high phase delay, previous fixed-wing
considerations, and the HQLs still exists to indicate PIO potential. Figure 2.3 displays
a comparison of bandwidth and phase delay boundaries. The rotorcraft boundaries
are shown for the roll axis, for Target Tracking and Acquisition (TTA) tasks. The
fixed-wing boundary shows specific requirements for PIO detection.
Figure 2.3: Comparison between rotorcraft and fixed-wing bandwidth requirements
(modified from Ref. [16]).
Specific recommendations for analysis and test procedures for PIOs is not however
contained in ADS-33E-PRF, with recommendations added to the latter produced in a
test guide [41]. In 1994, Blanken and Pausder [38] conducted a comprehensive review of
ADS-33C [42] roll bandwidth boundaries, with the DLR BO105 Advanced Technology
Testing Helicopter System (ATTHeS). Here, it was recommended that an upper limit
of phase-delay was imposed, which was subsequently applied in ADS-33E-PRF [16].
However, no such study appears to have been completed specifically for the helicopter
pitch axis.
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In 2008, Dieterich et. al [43] and Pavel et. al [44] presented results from GAR-
TEUR Helicopter Action Group 12 (AG-12) where research was conducted specifically
to determine the suitability of BPD susceptibility boundaries for prediction of PIO.
Both the roll and pitch axes of a BO105 helicopter model were investigated, with PIO
susceptibility engineered through the use of forward control path time delays. Results
from real-time flight simulation (outlined in Ref. [26]) were used to determine whether
fixed-wing BPD boundaries are directly applicable to rigid body rotorcraft activities.
Theoretical PIO susceptibility was determined for 36 configurations. Overall, it was
concluded that the results from the simulation tests were in agreement with predic-
tions. However, high scatter was found between pilots, and it was recommended that
further investigations should be undertaken and that further guidelines for experiments
be determined [44].
In 2009, Blanken et.al. [45], used BPD to investigate effects of reduced stability
margins on a H-60, H-53, and a Heavy Lift Large Civil Tilt-rotor concept (LCTR).
The study aimed to observe the effects of phase margin on vehicle types which are
larger than traditionally tested. Within the study, a number of PIOs were observed,
confirmed through use of BPD results. From the study, it was concluded that all
aircraft configurations evaluated with the lowest phase-margins (20-23 degrees) were
unanimously rated as oscillatory, PIO prone, and objectionable [45].
In 2011, Mariano, Guglieri, and Ragazzi [27] completed further investigations to
determine the applicability of the fixed-wing BPD boundary to rotorcraft. In the study,
a number of longitudinal configurations were investigated, with the PIO susceptibility
engineered through the use of changes to the actuator bandwidth. The analysis was
undertaken at various airspeeds, from 0kts to 80kts. As in the study reported in
Refs. [26, 43, 44], validation was completed using flight simulation. Findings showed
that PIOs were triggered at much higher bandwidth’s than predicted by BPD (over
double the values expected). It was concluded that the likely cause of the discrepancy
was the sources of mismatch due to the simulator that were not present within the
simulation model, including time delays. It was suggested that future analysis should
be conducted using such a delay within the BPD model.
Only one Category II prediction method, Open-Loop Onset Point (OLOP), has
been applied for analysis of rotory-wing vehicle susceptibility to PIO. Category II PIOs
are usually the result of saturation limits, either hardware or software, within the flight
control system. They may also be caused by repeatable system non-linearities.
In 1997, Duda [31] presented OLOP as a novel method to predict pilot-in-the-loop
oscillations due to rate saturation. The method attempts to determine the susceptibility
to PIO through the observation of the rate limit describing function. Duda stated that,
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although well established frequency domain PIO criteria could be extended to include
the effects of rate limiting, this extension would be complicated. A new criterion
was justified due to the observation that most of the catastrophic PIO incidents are
a result of actuator rate limiting. Duda defined a new point on the Nichols chart:
the point where a phase jump, associated with the closed-loop triggering of Rate-
Limiting Elements (RLE) begins. The OLOP was defined as the frequency of the
open-loop aircraft-pilot system at this closed-loop ‘phase jump’ frequency. This is
shown in Fig.2.4. Duda defined boundaries, for the allowable position of the OLOP,
through analyses of a number of experimental databases, including those from F-18
and YF-16 aircraft conducted in the Lateral High Order System simulator (LATHOS).
The method was proposed as a tool for use in the early design stages of new flight
control systems. However, the main uncertainty with the method was the reservation
regarding pilot behaviour during the onset situation. The method uses a pure gain pilot
model, which provides an estimation for the pilot control strategy. This is based upon
the linear system, and does not account for the RLE within the system. The actual
pilot behaviour during rate limited control is considered relatively unknown [31].
Figure 2.4: OLOP Example (taken from Ref. [46]).
In 1998, Duda [46] used OLOP as a design tool, to illustrate the optimisation of
flight control system elements. In this study, further refinement to previously presented
boundaries was shown, alongside results presented in the previous investigation [31].
Using a number of design parameters, OLOP displayed how a modification to the design
(i.e. employing lower gain control) could be used to avoid system instability. This was
shown for cases where RLEs were triggered, illustrating that in some situations, rate
limiting will not necessarily warrant concern. It was suggested that OLOP could be used
within the design optimisation process, to ensure system stability when encountering
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rate limiting. In Ref. [47], Wilmes and Duda suggested a more conservative boundary
for the use of OLOP. However, this has not been adopted in further studies to date.
In 2000, Duda et. al [48] presented further validation results from 342 pilot-in-
the-loop simulation runs on fixed-wing fighter type aircraft (F-18, YF-16 databases).
Five experienced test pilots completed evaluations in the roll axis. Overall, the use of
OLOP for prediction of Category II PIOs was shown. The use of OLOP for limits in
both the forward and feedback control loops was demonstrated, suggesting the latter
to be a more significant problem. Validation was conducted through an analysis of the
‘change in PIO rating’ awarded for linear and nonlinear vehicles. Good correlation was
found, and reasons were justified for those results that were not found to reflect the
boundary. Reasons included high sensitivity to pilot gain, the use of intentional low
gain from transport pilots, and PIO tendencies for the linear models (for the YF-16
results) [48]. It was concluded that despite results further justifying the use of OLOP,
experience is required when interpreting results, and the criterion cannot be considered
as a ‘cookbook’.
In 2008, Pavel et. al. [44] applied OLOP to rotorcraft models. The analysis was
conducted for both low gain and medium gain pilot models, for configurations inves-
tigated in a roll tracking task. The conclusion from the study was that the boundary
for analysis of rotorcraft lies somewhere between the originally presented boundary (in
Ref. [46]) and the more conservative OLOP boundary, presented in Ref. [47].
In 2008, Tischler et. al. [49] applied OLOP to a model of the XV-15 tilt-rotor,
in the directional axis. The result was calculated for the aircraft FCS loop only, and
did not include any pilot model, as used in previous references. This was to show
stability in the open-loop system when the rate limiter is initially activated. Tischler
et. al. found the method a good compromise in the short term, as they stated the
use of a pilot model tends to severely (and unrealistically) limit predicted performance.
Using the OLOP boundaries, the XV-15 was found to be marginally inside the ‘PIO
unlikely’ region. Further analysis using OLOP was conducted showing the movement
towards the ‘PIO region’ with increases in disturbance rejection bandwidths (DRB).
The primary method for this analysis was to demonstrate how OLOP could be used
within the rotorcraft design loop, and during optimisation. In the analysis, OLOP was
found to be a limiting factor in the optimisation process. Without its use, the design
could meet all Level 1 requirements.
In 2009, Blanken et. al. [45] used OLOP to investigate Cat. II PIO susceptibility
during a rotary-wing hover stability margin investigation. The analysis was conducted
for the H-53 control laws, and was used when tuning the bandwidth of the closed-
loop system in order to obtain Level 1 pitch and roll bandwidth. When tested within
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the NASA Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS), nonlinear actuator rate limiting was fre-
quently found to occur. On at least one occasion, rate limits caused divergence at the
end of a completed test manoeuvre (which was only ended through stopping the sim-
ulation). With the high system bandwidth, the actuators could not adequately handle
pilot commands. Results from OLOP confirmed the PIO susceptibility. The criteria
was used to observe the difference when the natural frequency of the command model
was reduced. For the revised design, completed using results from OLOP, very little
rate limiting was observed. It was commented that the use of OLOP saved significant
time during investigations, and concluded that the tool is a legitimate method for rotor-
craft analysis. However, it was stated that further flight data is required to determine
a more precise rotorcraft boundary.
In 2011, Mariano, Guglieri, and Ragazzi [27] completed further investigations to
determine suitability of OLOP boundaries for rotorcraft investigations. Overall, results
from simulator experiments were in good agreement with those from OLOP predictions.
However, the criterion was found to be very sensitive to stick deflection factor. When
maximum stick travel was used, OLOP over predicted PIO tendencies. A sensitivity
analysis recommended that a value ‘representative of pilot control in normal operations’
should be used.
2.3 Protection against A/RPCs
Due to the unexpected and sporadic nature of A/RPC events, the most immediate
problem for the engineer is to protect against observed A/RPCs, to ensure that they
do not happen again. There have been three main methods for ‘protection’ against
A/RPC, which relate specifically to PIO tendencies. Suppression describes the process
of eliminating a pre-defined tendency for PIO. In this case, the PIO tendency is known,
usually from past experience. Compensation refers to the suppression of a broad PIO
trigger (e.g. rate limiting) through the application of a method. The method is pri-
marily focussed on eliminating PIO tendencies, and results are usually not ‘fed-back’ to
the pilot or engineer. Finally, observation methods are those which attempt to build ‘a
picture’ of oscillations, to allow the engineer/pilot to assess the situation. Furthermore,
these methods attempt to integrate alleviation techniques to the system.
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2.3.1 Suppression
PIO suppression filters were first used in the alleviation of PIOs experienced during
landing of the ALT-5 Space Shuttle in 1977. They are usually intended as a short term
measure when a full redevelopment of control systems cannot be completed [50]. In
1979, the Total In-Flight Simulator (TIFS) investigation examined two PIO suppression
filters that were proposed for additions to the shuttle FCS [51]. In 1980, Smith and
Edwards presented the design of the shuttle adaptive suppression filters [29]. They were
designed to limit the rate limiting by attenuating pilot command path gain near the
cross-over frequency. The nonlinear adaptive method was used to limit applied phase
lags, as seen with linear compensation methods [29]. These filters were implemented in
the shuttle FCS prior to its first flight. The filters attempt to estimate the frequency
of the pilot’s input, and attenuate as a function of this frequency. Ref. [52] states that
the drawback here is that the pilot input is attenuated whether is it required or not.
In 1980, a test programme was initiated to implement filters from the TIFS shuttle
investigation in more conventional aircraft. The F-8 DFBW aircraft, originally used to
investigate effects of time delays, was used to investigate two types of filters. Although
the filters suppressed PIOs in the presence of added transport delay, they did not help
with the configurations that exhibited first order lag [51].
In 1981, Bailey and Smith [53] presented results from an investigation into the use
of suppression filters to mitigate against PIO. This was performed for a fighter aircraft
(NT-33A), during a landing and approach task. Two types of adaptive filters were
tested in the programme; both acting as a function of stick position. Briefly, weighted
stick rate functions were considered. PIO filters were created through variation of the
gain attenuation schedule, and no consideration for pilot input frequency was given.
Both rate and position of the control stick were considered to feed to a gain attenua-
tion schedule. Whilst the experiments clearly showed that the suppression filters could
improve HQs, the recommendation was further follow-up programmes to evaluate dif-
ferences in internal filter implementation, interaction between PIO filtering and short
period dynamics, and the influence of actuator rate limiting.
In 1984, Shafer et.al. [50] summarised findings regarding suppression filters for the
two high performance aircraft (NT-33A and F-8 DFBW). Most suppression filter de-
signs were found to improve the HQs for PIO-prone aircraft. In effect, the filter breaks
the pilot control loop when approaching control rate and frequencies known to induce
PIOs. Therefore, the method of suppression filtering in this way is limited to vehicles
with well known dynamics (regions of PIO propensity). Knowing that a PIO will occur
at one frequency also does not ensure that one will not occur at another in different
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conditions. The application of these filters can also lead to a delayed recovery, where a
high performance aircraft flies like a large transport aircraft [54].
In 2007, Walden [10] reported a number of case studies from suppression of higher
frequency RPCs (PAO phenomena) in naval rotorcraft. In the study, Walden showed
that a common method used was to add specific notch filters once excited frequencies
were identified through analytical and in-flight observation. Table 2.1 summarises some
of the cases detailed. Although Walden’s study highlighted many problems solved
through filtering methods or changes to design, it also showed that some problems
have been solved through changes to procedures. Whilst these change are the most
simple to implement, they do not account for how the coupling may materialise in
future operations, where the role of the aircraft or additional operations are modified.
Although shown to adequately mitigate against A/RPCs tendencies which have been
experienced many sources state that due to the requirements to modify pilot control
inputs, they degrade general HQs. Ref. [55] states “Suppression filters ... attenuate
(pilot) commands and add phase lag to the aircraft response, degrading general HQs,
especially for high bandwidth tasks.” Furthermore, Ref. [56] states that a disadvantage
of the systems is that they are ‘always active’. Whilst notch filters can perfectly remove
oscillation tendencies at known frequencies, if the pilot faces a situation where they must
for some reason tightly control the aircraft, the task is no longer possible. If for example
pilot control is required for collision avoidance, it may not be possible to escape the
situation.
2.3.2 Compensation
The SAAB JAS-39 Gripen was developed as an attack and reconnaissance aircraft
to replace SAAB Viggens and Drakens [57]. During testing, two prototype aircraft
catastrophically crashed, both caused by PIO triggered by actuator rate limiting. Both
events, in 1989 and 1993 were filmed, and almost led to both the cancellation of the
program and loss of life. Indecently, the same pilot, Lars R˚adestro¨m, was at the controls
for both crashes. A detailed analysis of both accidents is contained within Ref. [58]. The
events were a catalyst for increased research efforts regarding compensation. Whereas
the ALT-5 shuttle had led to suppression filters, the SAAB crashes required a solution
to deal with quasi-nonlinear elements of the system.
Prior to the SAAB Gripen incidents, a number of compensation filters to avoid
actuator saturation were being considered for development. Rate or Saturation limit-
ing in control systems causes often unexpected non-linearities within the pilot control
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Table 2.1: Historical Events and Solutions in Naval Rotorcraft. [10]
Year Type Freq. Reason Solution
1967 CH-46D 3.2 Hz Shuﬄe
Mode
Air Resonance created by the
lightly damped main rotor regres-
sive lag mode, causing out-of-phase
de-patterning of the forward and
aft rotors.
Changes to blade characteris-
tics and 3.2 Hz notch filter
Early
1980s
CH-46E 3.5 Hz Shuﬄe
Mode
Low speed, insufficient rotor lead-
lag damping and pilot lateral cyclic
stick coupling through the SAS.
Changes to roll axis viscous
dampers, and procedural mit-
igations
1981 SH-60B 3.0 Hz Ground Roll
oscillation
Coupling between roll mode with
the main rotor system’s regressive
lag mode.
Procedural mitigations, to re-
duce rotor flapping
1982 SH-60B 6.5 Hz Vertical
bending mode
Caused during high speed autoro-
tations and turns and dive recover-
ies
Procedural mitigations, ability
for pilots to disable longitudi-
nal boost servo.
1981 CH-53E 3.4 Hz Vertical
bending mode and
4.3 Hz Lateral
bending mode
Interaction with modes through
the AFCS, despite the presence of
notch filters to attenuate pilot in-
put. Materialised during trans-
portation of external loads.
Reduction in roll axis FCS
gains and the implementa-
tion of procedural mitigations
through the removal of lateral
control oscillations and load
jettison
1989 V-22A 1.4 Hz Roll Mode Ground based, unstable and un-
predicted lateral/roll mode oscilla-
tion, involving coupling with the
aircraft’s high focal roll mode. Ef-
fect of aircraft lateral cyclic control
grip behaviour.
Viscous dampers and filtering
were not considered adequate
solutions due to potential ad-
verse effects on HQs. Added
lateral balance weight on the
cyclic.
1990 V-22A 3.2 Hz Wing Chord
Bending Mode
Coupling with lateral control dur-
ing diving flight. Initiated after
the installation of a reduced stick
damper whose purpose was to im-
prove control feel.
Addition of 2.3 Hz asymmetric
notch filter
1991 V-22A 3.8 Hz symmetric
wing chord bend-
ing
During sling-load operations, pi-
lot coupling through longitudinal
cyclic.
Addition of Notch Filters to al-
leviate the coupling by atten-
uation of the pilot control in-
puts.
1991 V-22A 4.2 Hz symmetric
wing chord bend-
ing
Coupling with the pilot thrust
control lever motion in forward
flight. Inadvertently triggered
through movement of both the
thrust control lever and longitudi-
nal cyclic
Notch filters at 4.2 Hz and 5.3
Hz installed, eliminating PAO.
1997 V-22B 1.4 Hz Roll Mode Ground based, re-emergence of
mode previously experienced in V-
22A, in part due to a reduction
in the mass balance weight on the
cyclic due to a reduction in FCS
gain.
Modified stick gain shaping
(reducing gain at 1.4 Hz) and
procedural mitigations to relax
the hand grip to terminate mo-
tion.
2003 V-22B 2.3 Hz Asymmetric
Drive System
During critical azimuth testing,
at an airspeed of approx. 40
knots, divergent oscillations fol-
lowed by sustained oscillations
causing swashplate rate limiting.
Coupling through lateral cyclic,
treated previously with notch fil-
ters.
Increase lateral stick mass bal-
ance weight to reduce pilot
gain in lateral axis and incor-
porate a new 2.3 Hz notch filter
in the lateral cyclic path.
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channel. Situations are dangerous as it often appears that a lack of control gain must
be compensated for through an increase in pilot control gain. However, this further sat-
urates actuators, and causes the effects of unexpected dynamics to magnify. The term
Anti-Windup (AW) filter refers to a system that attempts to avoid actuator saturation
by causing a change in control system dynamics when approaching or reaching satu-
ration. Usually these systems employ some combination of feed-back and feed-forward
control to unload actuators whilst still allowing pilot control of the aircraft.
In 1980s, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) developed phase compensa-
tion filters to reduce effects of rate limiting. The time-domain filter was set to reverse
the direction of the actuator when the actuator is on its rate limit and if the actuator is
travelling in the opposite direction from its command. The filter was patented by the
U.S. government. However, Ref. [59] states that problems were discovered regarding
sensitivity to input noise, and a tendency to develop an offset bias over time. However,
these problems could be overcome through additional complexity.
Rundqwist et.al. [60] developed a compensator, commonly termed the SAAB com-
pensator, as a preventative filter in response to the second SAAB accident. In 1996, the
system was presented within U.S. patent 5,528,119 [60]. This type of filter is referred
to as a Feedback-with-Bypass (FWB) filter. The low frequency elements of the con-
trol input are passed through a software rate limiter (SWRL) set to the actuator rate
limit. During Rate Limiting, the input signal to the SWRL is larger than the output,
creating a measurable difference. This difference is added to the pre-SWRL signal,
after it passes through a low pass filter. The difference signal will have a different sign
to the input, therefore reversing input phase. Therefore, phase lead is added to the
system, which results in a rate-limited signal with significantly less phase distortion. A
problem identified with the system was the possibility for high frequency disturbances,
but favourable pilot comments during flight tests gave enough confidence to continue
with production. In Ref. [47], Wilmes and Duda concluded that this is one of the most
effective compensatory systems to suppress PIO due to rate limiting.
In the 1990s, much work was done regarding phase filters that compensated through
the reversal of pilot input, through software rate limit (SWRL) compensation. This
has been referred to as the “Differentiate-Limit-Integrate” (DLI) method. [61]. Using
this method, amplitude attenuation is unavoidable. The input signal to an actuator
is filtered by determining the derivative, limiting the rate, and then integrating. The
output of the filter reverses in rate relative to the control input.
In 1996, Deppe, Chalk, and Shafer, [62] performed landing manoeuvres with a fly-
by-wire Learjet, to investigate the use of a Rate Limit Concept (RLC), utilising DLI.
The aircraft configuration, with Level 3 Handling Qualities was improved to Level
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2 through the addition of the RLC, with few PIO tendencies. The RLC featured a
bias removal feature, which was found to cause attenuated response to abrupt inputs,
reduce predictability of the aircraft, and cause out-of-trim conditions. Furthermore,
all of these undesirable effects were exacerbated by noise or high frequency content
[62]. A recommendation was that the bias removal feature be redesigned to eliminate
the sensitivity to noise. In 1997, Ohmit discovered that an automatic bias removal
was unacceptable. Moreover, automatic bias removal during benign conditions led to
commanded input, also deemed unacceptable [63].
In 1990s, the Deutsche Aerospace Aktiengesellschaft (DASA) compensation scheme
was developed, simply a feed-forward filter which allows control signals to pass unat-
tenuated if its rate is below the threshold of the rate limiter, and attenuates the input
signal if it is higher. This is achieved by using a feed-forward SWRL, in series with
both a lead and lag filter. The main drawback of this approach is considered to be
the lack of feedback within the system [64]. Wilmes and Duda [47] concluded that the
system did not seem quite as effective as the SAAB compensator.
In 1999, Chapa [63], as part of the HAVE FILTER program, presented a novel
nonlinear filter, the rate limiter prefilter (RLPF), based upon the principle of reversing
phase with the input. Chapa recognised that the big problem with previous DLI tech-
niques was the removal of system bias, and the sensitivity to noise. Chapa implemented
a system to remove bias quickly through the use of a reset integrator, and achieved noise
filtering through off-line analysis. Chapa concluded that the addition of a SWRL only
showed promise at protecting against instability, but could be set so low as to have a
degrading effect upon aircraft HQs. Furthermore, the use of both RLPF and SWRL
could also lead to degradation in HQs, but could allow a higher SWRL to be set whilst
still avoiding PIO. Chapa however discovered that, even with the bias removal system,
a large bias build-up sometimes occurred during aggressive manoeuvring, leading to
either non-responsive or opposite pilot commands.
In 2001, Postlethwaite, Turner, and Prempain [65] presented a novel approach to
rate limit compensation, through the use of H∞ optimisation. The approach is to
minimise the difference between the saturated and un-saturated actuators, subject to
a constraint on the energy of the reaction signal produced by an Anti-Windup type
compensator. The aim is to produce an AW compensator that deviates from the linear
system response as little as possible, maintaining stability. The system was tested on
an F-18 simulation model, alongside both SAAB and DASA compensators. Response
of the compensation methods was completed for a number of open-loop and closed-
loop control inputs, within the roll axis. It was concluded that the H∞ approach was
suitable for the problem, and was found to give ‘sharper responses’ for demands of
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the low gain pilot than the SAAB scheme. However, with high gain pilot and large
inputs, the SAAB method was found to produce better results. In the study, there
was limited tuning of the H∞ controller, and no tuning of either SAAB or DASA
systems. Therefore, it was not fully understood whether any of the filter systems were
set to optimal response. In Ref. [65], it is claimed that the H∞ scheme has the ability
to handle multi-variable systems, unlike SAAB and DASA systems which are SISO
in nature. However, this study was not completed. Further results were presented
within Ref. [66]. Since this work, a number of further studies have been completed by
Postlethwaite, Turner, Sofrony, and Brieger, including work described in Ref. [67–70].
These have mainly focused on improving the rigour of processes to determine selection
of AW system characteristics.
In 2002, Liebst, Chapa, and Leggett [71] demonstrated the use of the RLPF and
a SWRL in both motion based simulation and flight test results. Flight tests were
conducted in the NF-16D Variable Stability In-flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA).
The combination of the RLPF and SWRL filters were shown to prevent departure
and/or PIO in the vast majority of cases that were susceptible before addition of the
filters.
In 2004, Alcala et. al. [54] presented a method of phase compensation to mitigate
against Category II type oscillations. Here, a nonlinear filter was proposed that com-
pensates the phase of the control signal before it reaches the control surface. Alcala et.
al. stated that the best method of compensation was feedback, but that current ex-
isting methods required very careful choice of parameters for particular circumstances.
Alcala’s phase compensator feeds back the output signal and obtains the error signal.
The error signal feeds a phase-lead network, with the result summed with the original
output and passed through a rate limiter block. The authors stated that the system
was advantageous over previous methods as the compensator does not rely on the am-
plitude of the signal, and the system can be easily tuned. However, the system is only
capable of detecting and suppressing Category II type oscillations.
In 2008, Brieger et. al. [18] presented results from the application of a rate saturation
compensation scheme to the DLR Advanced Technologies Testing Aircraft (ATTAS).
An anti-windup technique was employed, to augment the existing controller with an
element that is only active during rate limiting. In this way, the baseline (original)
controller is conserved and will function normally, except when actuators undergo rate
limiting. This is the same method as employed by the SAAB compensator and the
DASA system. The filter attempts to keep the phase-lag between the input and output
of the rate limited actuator to a minimum. Brieger et. al. commented that the problem
with ‘Phase Compensator’ methods include that they are not rigorous in design, often
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giving no concern for stability and performance guarantees, they are not systematic
with regards to tuning (i.e. ad-hoc filter parameters), they take no account for aircraft
dynamics, and they give no consideration for measured input signals of the aircraft
response. Brieger et. al. presented a design for an anti-windup system which attempted
to account for limitations within phase compensators. The design was approached using
a methodology governed by design trade-offs to conserve as much as possible the flight
envelope of the ATTAS. This was completed using the Riccati equation approach [68].
A number of systematic design parameters were tested in-flight, for a number of tasks,
including discrete roll tracking employed during HAVE FILTER [72]. Overall, the anti-
windup technique designed through the systematic approach helped to improve the
safety and HQs during periods of rate saturation. When the anti-windup system was
present, there was a reduction in the level of rate limiting of the control signal. However,
the effects of tuning the anti-windup system were not clear from the investigation and
further tests were recommended.
In 2008, Menon et. al. [73] presented a further approach, building on AW principles,
using Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion techniques . The method has been developed from
a more general control engineering approach, and is designed to cancel the nonlinear
terms in the system through nonlinear state feedback. The system assumes perfect
knowledge of the system dynamics, and suffers from a number of problems stated in
Ref. [73]. Results were presented for a linear simulation model of a wind tunnel tested
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16 scaled BAe Hawk aircraft model, with results demonstrating promise of the approach
and indicating the superiority of the optimal AW scheme.
In 2009, Klyde and McRuer [74] introduced both Smart-Cue and Smart-Gain con-
cepts, designed to initiate a force-feedback cue and/or a command path gain reduction
when the position error exceeds the position lag. The Smart-Cue concept provides a
force-feedback cue to the pilot, alerting him/her to the valve-bottoming characteris-
tics in a FBW system configuration. The commanded and actual surface position are
used to define a position error through an ideal linear system. This therefore reflects
differences due to distortions in the system. In essence, as the distortion gets greater,
the proprioceptive cue back to the pilot gets stronger. The force-feedback cue exhibits
a user-tunable dead-zone, to account for the situation where no feedback is required.
The Smart-Gain concept feeds back the position error between the actual and ideal
systems, providing command path gain attenuation. The Smart-Gain concept does
not consider pilot input frequency as in previous approaches. Instead, attenuation is
scheduled through a function of position error.
Klyde and Liang [75], and Klyde, Liang, and Schulze [52] further discussed results
from the implementation of Smart-Cue and Smart-Gain concepts during approach and
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landing evaluations. Here, it was found that the Smart-Gain concept had the greatest
influence on performance. However, the best results were obtained for the configura-
tions where pilots flew with both Smart-Gain and Smart-Cue. Together, the techniques
were found to significantly reduce the PVS loss of control incidents that routinely oc-
cured with the rate-limited configurations.
One major drawback of the aforementioned compensation techniques is the emphasis
on single-input single-output (SISO) systems. Such control channel activity is common
in fixed-wing aircraft, where control ‘cross-coupling’ is not a major issue. However, in
rotorcraft, due to the dynamics of the control systems, ‘cross-couplings’ are common
place. An attempt to use the DLI method in a MIMO system was investigated by Hess
and Snell [76].
In 2010, Yildiz and Kolmanovsky [61] presented a novel compensation scheme, de-
signed to counter the effective time delay applied through high pilot gain or anomalies
in the pilot-vehicle system. Entitled CAPIO, the authors claim that the technique is
suitable for use in multi-input multi-output (MIMO) systems. In this work, the au-
thors assumed that PIOs could be recognised through application of detection tools
(e.g. Ref. [77]). This would activate a synchronisation mode of CAPIO, which would
help the aircraft to recover through minimizing the phase shift between the commanded
and actual control effort.
In 2011, Yildiz, Kolmanovsky, and Acosta [78] extended the algorithm to create
the “CAPIO system”, which automatically detects and compensates the phase shift
between the desired and actual total control effort, regardless of a PIO occurrence.
In the CAPIO system, the shift between synchronization and tracking occurs as a
result of the phase shift value. The work was extended in Ref. [79]. With MIMO
systems, one must ascertain where exactly the phase lag is being introduced. Yildiz
and Kolmanovsky showed that, for a vehicle with inertial cross-coupling, CAPIO has
the potential to assist recovery. The investigation did not however involve piloted
simulation, a recommendation for future investigation.
2.3.3 Detection
In 1999 Cox and Lewis [80] introduced a novel detection and compensation algorithm
based upon Neural Networks. Results from testing using the Large Amplitude Multi-
mode Aerospace Research Simulator (LAMARS) was presented in [81]. It is claimed
by Cox, Lewis, and Suchomel that the algorithm is the first accurate real-time PIO
detector, and received a patent in 1999 [80]. The patent broadly claims all PIO detec-
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tion involving aircraft response variable and a pilot control signal. It also covers PIO
compensation. Cox and Lewis identified eight requirements for a detection algorithm,
namely:
1. A detector must work well in the presence of noise, non-stationary signals, and
multiple frequency signal content
2. A detector must operate in real-time
3. A detector must correctly indicate when PIO are occurring
4. A detector must correctly indicate when PIO are not occurring. This is even
more important than the previous requirement, since compensation should not be
engaged when PIO are not occurring
5. Good continuity must be maintained during detection or non-detection. The de-
tector should not be repeatedly and rapidly turning on and off
6. Detection must be timely. A good detection time is less than 1 second. Also, the
detector must turn off quickly when the PIO cease
7. The detector must work for any pilot
8. The detector must work for a wide variety of aircraft configurations
Cox and Lewis also identified eight requirements for compensatory systems, includ-
ing the requirement for the compensator to stop PIO, the lack of interference with pilot
control, and the ability for the compensator to switch on and off. The detector system
designed exhibits a feature system, computing values that characterize the current state
of the aircraft’s response to the pilot. A discrimination function is used to distinguish
between PIO and non-PIO features. The system presents a digital output of 0, 1, or
some value in-between if the result is within the ‘gray area’. The discrimination func-
tion is built using a neural network. When tested using LAMARS, both pitch and roll
PIOs were recognised using two separate systems. The detector conditions correlated
well with pilot assessments of PIO.
Cox and Lewis used two compensator types, based on previous suppression meth-
ods, to link to the detection algorithm. It was proposed with both a system to reduce
pilot gain authority and a method to filter the pilot control signal at and above PIO
frequency (similar to notch filtering). This method was similar to the Shuttle compen-
sator methods [51], but with the introduction of a PIO frequency estimator for variable
frequency filtering. Within real-time simulation, only the pilot gain attenuation system
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was tested. Pilots agreed that the authority reduction was a valid method for stopping
the most severe PIOs [81].
In 2000, Mitchell and Hoh [82] introduced Real-Time Oscillation VERifier (ROVER).
The development was based upon experience in campaigns such as HAVE PIO and
HAVE LIMITS, and reservations regarding the existing approach to assessment, pilot
recognition, and manoeuvre definition for exposure of PIOs [83]. ROVER was de-
signed as a real-time monitoring system, which could feed back information regarding
the conditions incipient to PIO through a display logic. Working in the time domain,
the method is computationally cheap, but requires constant monitoring and filtering
of input and output signals. However, the algorithm developed is based directly upon
the fundamental requirements for PIO (shown in Ref. [11]). Therefore, there is a clear
understanding of implications of results obtained from its use.
In 2002, Johnson [56] used the ROVER as a system to control the activation of a
notch filter suppression system. When ROVER detected PIO, the system was set to
activate a notch filter. This was designed to remove the constant effect of the con-
tinuously present notch filter systems, which were previously found to degrade vehicle
HQs during tight control. The system was tested using aircraft models previously used
by Chapa in the HAVE FILTER flight test programme [72], and tested using a simple
proportional gain pilot model. Johnson defined a PIO severity logic system for switch-
ing between unattenuated pilot command signal and a modified command through the
notch filter. The system was successfully tested using the VISTA aircraft in a manned
flight trial.
A negative quality of the system observed was the extremely poor low frequency
authority available to the pilot during ROVER activations. This effect limited the
pilot’s ability to minimise errors when the filter was active, and the authority which
would be crucial if the pilot was to need to escape from a threat. The implementation
of a narrower notch filter was recommended for future investigations. Within the inves-
tigation, the filter was not designed around a specific frequency and therefore, covered
a wide band of pilot input spectra. Overall the system did not meet the goal set by
Johnson to improve PIO ratings by 80%. However, it did aid pilots in suppressing PIO,
and was helpful during the task. Pilots indicated a noticeable reduction in workload,
occurring for PIO prone configurations. The main problem with the system was the
introduction of a secondary PIO once the notch filter was de-activated. The secondary
PIOs actually materialised as complex Category III oscillations, not expected prior to
the investigation.
ROVER determines the PIO susceptibility through the application of ‘PIO flags’.
These flags are set to limits deemed appropriate for the vehicle being tested. In previous
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investigations, no common limits have been found, with significant variation between
investigations. Examples of boundary thresholds used in previous studies are shown
in Table 2.2. In the study detailed in Ref. [56], two sets of ROVER thresholds were
presented. In this study, ROVER was tuned following its use to observe PIOs in flight
test data. The thresholds were adjusted to give the optimal correlation between pilot
subjective ratings and ROVER results.
Table 2.2: ROVER thresholds used in previous studies.
Ref. Vehicle Axis Min.
Stick
Def.
Min.
Attitude
Rate
(deg/s)
Min.
Phase
(◦)
Freq.
Range
(rad/s)
Notes
[84] C-17 Lat. 4.5in,
(50%)
12 75 1-8
[27] Helicopter
(medium
class)
Long. 15◦ 40 83-97 1-8
[85] Bo105 Long. 2.5◦ 18 >75 1-8
[56] ‘Fighter-type’
aircraft
Long. 5◦ 12 >65 1-8 Initial
[56] ‘Fighter-type’
aircraft
Long. 4◦ 15 >105 1-8 After tuning
The flag limits are key to the ability of ROVER to detect PIOs. As a result, the
incorrect selection can lead to significant under/over detection of PIOs. Using the
subjective method of selection, the results of the application can be highly dependent
on the opinion of the user. This makes it challenging to apply the algorithm to generic
aircraft, particularly if previous test data from the aircraft are unavailable.
In 2005, Gray [86] presented a novel method of quantifying pilot control activity to
identify the onset of Boundary-Avoidance Tracking (BAT) PIOs. BAT PIOs are created
specifically through the presence of boundaries, which in some way influence pilot
control strategy to cause destabilising oscillations. The degree to which the boundaries
effect the pilot control strategy is dependent upon the boundary size, which defines
the upper and lower limits of vehicle attitude. Further work regarding BAT PIOs is
contained within Refs. [87–89]. Gray defined Pilot Inceptor Workload (PIW) metrics
Duty Cycle (PIWDC) and Aggressiveness (PIWAG). The combination show ‘how often’
and ‘how hard’ a pilot is working [90]. The combination of metrics gives an overall
appreciation for the pilot’s workload, and any sudden or distinct change in metrics can
be used to qualitatively assess a BAT situation. Gray states that increasing PIW is
equivalent to an increasing pilot gain. The metrics have been used as an instructional
tool at the USAF Test Pilot School (TPS), and to provide an objective measure for
data analysis [89]. In 2011, Niewind [91] presented a method of creating a normalised
one-dimensional result, based on a combination of the PIWDC and PIWAG . This
new metric helped to qualify the effect of boundary size on the pilot workload. The
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study concluded that the PIW criteria proved to be a highly valuable addition and
allowed new insights into the individual differences between high and low gain pilots.
To date, PIW has only been applied to BAT type PIOs, and not to those considered
‘conventional’.
In 2005, Mitchell and Klyde [11,35] used wavelet scalograms to analyse F-14 Aerial
Refuelling cases. The method is a display of time-varying power spectra density plots,
that not only show at what frequencies the peak power is occurring, but also at what
point in time [11]. Using the knowledge that during a PIO, power will amplify close to
the PIO frequency, the method can be used to determine distinct peaks in both the pilot
input and vehicle output. This is proposed as a method to extract the ‘PIO signature’.
In recent years, the method has seen increasing use as an objective analysis tool when
dealing with PIO situations, examples including Refs. [52, 75, 92, 93]. As the method
shows scaled wavelets, currently there is no way to define what does, and what does not,
constitute a PIO. Users are required to subjectively assess PIO characteristics which
appear in the wavelet output. Whilst this method may provide correct observation of
PIOs, it could lead to differences between users.
Very recently, in 2012, Lampton and Klyde [36] presented a novel metric for analysing
flying tasks. Power frequency has been derived from the cut-off frequency through
wavelet analysis. Therefore, the resulting power frequency metric relates the frequency
of pilot input with the intensity of that input. Work in this area displays significant
ongoing efforts to define suitable detection criteria, to identify PIO events in real-time.
As the metric has only recently been developed, it does not currently define any general
limits or boundaries to characterise PIO events.
2.4 Assessment of A/RPCs
2.4.1 Subjective Methods
Subjective appraisal has been selected as the primary method of assessing A/RPCs
following ‘pilot-in-the-loop’ evaluation. Usually, pilot opinion has been collected using
subjective ratings scales, often using the term ‘PIO’ in preference to A/RPC.
The first ‘PIO tendency rating scale’ was presented in 1963, within NATC-RAD32-
103 (See Fig.2.5, [94]), and was termed a ‘Pilot Opinion Rating System’. A six point
scale, pilots were asked to assign a numerical rating based on the description that best
matched perceived oscillations. This scale included the words ‘motions’, ‘oscillations’,
and ‘divergence’. On this scale, ratings 4-6 referred to oscillations that ‘tended to
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diverge’ whereas ratings 1-3 referred to tendency for undesirable motions. The scale
included ‘Adjective Ratings’ alongside the numerical ratings.
Figure 2.5: The ‘Combined’ PIO scale typically used, formed by merging the elements
presented in Ref. [7].
In 1967, DiFranco [95] presented a similar tabular ‘PIO tendency scale’. This table
of descriptions maintained the six point scale, but modified descriptions to classify in
terms of undesirable motions, oscillations, and divergent oscillations. The scale retained
terminology used in the original 1963 scale, but introduced updated terms such as ‘pilot
opens control loop’, instead of ‘pilot must fix stick’. The scale however shares general
classifications outlined within the 1963 scale. This scale has been, and is still used
in research campaigns (examples include Refs. [33, 34]). Furthermore, the scale was
used to assist in the development of HQ research guidelines [96]. Whilst it is simple
to use and apply during test programmes, it offers little guidance to aid pilots in the
subjective decision making process.
As an alternative, in 1981, the Calspan corporation presented a rating system,
in AFWAL-TR-81-3118 [97], featuring a ‘decision tree’. The decision tree structure
was based around simple questions, aimed at standardising the pilots decision finding
process, to produce more consistent results. However, it was found that these simple
decisions alone were not enough to adequately describe PIO tendencies. The scale
lacked many of the phrases that had been used to quantify the demands on the pilot,
and caused a departure from the original meanings of the tabular scale presented in
1967. As a result, in MIL-STD-1797 [15], this tree was presented alongside the 1967
table. Its common use today is believed to be a result of the presentation of both scales
within MIL-STD-1797A [15], and it has become the standard method for assessing PIO
tendencies. This scale has been used in many research campaigns since, some examples
shown in Refs. [12,48]. A method adopted by many (examples shown in Refs. [41,52]),
and in this research, is to combine the descriptions and decisions into a complete tree.
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This scale is shown in Fig. 2.6, and is referred to throughout as the ‘Combined PIO
Tendency Scale’. However, since its conception (and even before), many have tried to
introduce new scales, to counter problems that they have experienced with both the
1967 descriptive scale and the 1981 decision tree scale.
Figure 2.6: The ‘Combined’ PIO scale typically used, formed by merging the elements
presented in Ref. [7].
A technique employed by Powers in 1984 [98], used a ‘top-down’ decision tree,
with simple descriptions leading to numerical ratings (See Fig.2.7). Again, this scale
featured the words ‘motions’, ‘oscillations’ and ‘divergence’. Furthermore, the scale
featured the 6-point numerical scale. Unlike the the 1981 decision tree, this scale
featured some demands of the pilot, but this was not shown consistently through the
scale. Furthermore, the use of the top-down decision tree meant that the pilot was
not required to pass through the complete tree prior to awarding the most desirable
rating, a technique avoided with most widely used subjective decision tree structures
(i.e Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale, [96]).
Since its first use, a number of research organisations have attempted to modify the
scale presented in Ref [15]. One of the first companies to do this was the then Veridian
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Figure 2.7: Top down scale. [98]
Engineering, which had previously been Calspan corporation, and originally introduced
the PIO tendency scale. Veridian changed the decision ‘divergent?’, to ‘Is task achiev-
able?’. Furthermore, there was a removal of the word ‘tend’ in the decision regarding
‘undesirable motions’. However, the largest change was to the descriptive terms, which
were somewhat simplified, with their reliance shifted towards task performance [99].
In 1999, Mitchell [83] presented a review of the 1981 PIO tendency rating scale. His
view was that PIOs should not be evaluated using a decision tree structure; rather a
system for identifying the oscillation characteristics should be employed. He presented
the ‘Comprehensive PIO Rating Scale’ (See Fig.2.8), designed to assess the ‘Severity’,
‘Frequency of Occurrence’, ‘Demands on Pilot’, and ‘Overall Assessment’ of occurring
PIOs on separate interval scales. Here, with no numerical rating applied, pilots are
free to subjectively assess elements of PIOs, ‘breaking the rating’ process into pieces.
However, the scale has never been adopted for any further test processes. Perhaps this
is due to the significant departure from the accepted evaluation method.
Mitchell [100] also stated that PIOs should not be dealt with through the use of a
decision tree structure. He stated that Flying Qualities are ‘metathetic’, i.e. quantified
by the pilot in relative terms. Furthermore, they are always present. Mitchell argues
that PIOs can be divided into three regions; the operation before the event, during, and
after. Flying qualities discussion is appropriate before and after. PIOs are sporadic,
and are almost always a surprise. Therefore, it doesn’t seem sensible to attempt to
use a flying qualities oriented rating scale. Whilst this is acknowledged, assessment of
PIOs during and after an event should be possible using a decision tree structure. If
PIOs are not present, a decision tree can lead to pilot to a situation where they are not
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required to provide any assessment of PIOs. However, if PIOs are triggered, the pilot
can provide an assessment of during and after the event.
Figure 2.8: Comprehensive Scale. [83]
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced an ‘Aircraft Pilot Cou-
plings’ rating scale (See Figure 2.9), which was included in a recent update to the
Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Airplanes [101]. This scale uses a
one-dimensional decision tree, and replaces numerical ratings with three letter abbrevi-
ations. This scale is separated into 4 points; ‘Satisfactory’, ‘Adequate’, ‘Controllable’,
and ‘Unsatisfactory’. The FAA has also sought to reference these against the origi-
nal PIO ratings, from Ref. [15], with descriptions derived from the same source. The
comparison to PIO ratings, and the ‘Rating’ highlights some questionable descriptions
within the scale. For ‘Adequate’ FAA HQ Rating, the description includes ‘No more
than extensive pilot compensation required’. This is said to be equivalent to PIOR
= 3. This is not necessarily similar to ‘Undesirable Motions, task performance com-
promised’. Furthermore, if a direct comparison to traditional PIO tendency ratings is
being made, the purpose of the scale is unclear. This is particularly in light of the fact
that it uses less rating levels, so theoretically conveys even less information.
The work of GARTEUR AG-12 [99] highlighted many difficulties experienced with
the use of PIO rating scales. Some of these difficulties are discussed in the proceeding
section. To counter these, the group proposed a new scale, based on the design shown in
Fig.2.6 (See Fig.2.10). The scale, which is similar to the FAA scale, was designed with
a one-dimensional decision tree. The group considered that a 6 point scale was enough
to characterise incipience to PIO, and assigned each decision to a numerical rating.
The scale appears to borrow much of its process from Handling Qualities evaluation.
In this scale, the first statement is ‘Pilot closes control loop’. This implies we are
marginally beyond ‘Pilot enters control loop’. If the pilot states that the aircraft is
controllable, the next question is ‘Could the task be performed?’. Based on experience
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Figure 2.9: FAA APC Rating Scale. [101]
with pilots, this is considered to be a very dangerous question, so early in the decision
tree. This encompasses the pilots ability to complete the task, the difficulty of the task,
the ability for the vehicle to complete the task, and the conditions of operation for the
task. Furthermore, the task itself is not defined in the scale. This implies the scale can
be used for any task. If the pilot could not complete the task, a ‘no’ leads to ‘Divergent
oscillations, for which the pilot must release or freeze the stick’. This is considered to
perhaps cause many disparities between the decision tree and the descriptive terms.
One of the largest changes in this scale is the admission that PIOR = 3 refers to
oscillations. The word ‘oscillation’ is no longer contained within the decision tree, and
it is believed that this extends the range of results that can be achieved from the scale.
Modifications to PIO scales, and their subsequent interpretation, have led to incon-
sistencies regarding data analysis through the years. It should not be assumed that
two PIOR = 3 awarded using different scales refer to the same observations by pilots.
When using these scales, detailed pilot comments and some other form of subjective
rating should be taken. One interesting consideration is the use of PIO scales in recent
years. It has been shown that even in the same institutions and projects, different
scales are used. Two examples are highlighted. The Air Force Institute of Technol-
ogy has conducted valuable research on prediction, detection, and alleviation of PIO
tendencies, and many concepts and ideas have been evaluated in the last 20 years.
Masters theses of Gilbreath [102], Hanley [57] and Witte [103] were published in 2001,
2003, and 2004 respectively. All of these use different ‘PIO scales’. Witte presented the
tree and descriptions as shown in Ref. [7], and states that PIOR 1-2 are approximately
equivalent to Level 1 aircraft, PIOR 3-4 to a Level 2 aircraft, PIOR 5 to a Level 3
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Figure 2.10: GARTEUR AG-12 Rating Scale. [99]
aircraft and PIOR 6 as ‘extremely dangerous’. Gilbreath presented the original 1967
scale only, whilst Hanley supplemented it through the use of the a short questionnaire,
replicating the decision tree process.
Another example is highlighted through comparisons of Ref. [44] and Ref. [43]. Both
of these papers discuss work from GARTEUR Helicopter Action Group 16, one of the
most in-depth studies conducted to date in Europe regarding APCs in rotorcraft. In
Ref. [44], the PIOR scale presented is that originally presented by Powers [98]. However,
Ref. [43] cites that it was the scale taken from MIL-STD-1797 [7] that was used for the
investigation. These two scales are not the same, and the results from their use should
not be confused. Mistaking selecting the wrong PIO scale to present is not difficult,
when there is no clearly defined standard. The two examples demonstrate a recurring
theme that was found in this investigation; the use of consistent naming conventions
with inconsistent rating scales.
Rating scales outlined in this section (with the exception of Mitchell’s comprehensive
PIO scale) are all believed to suffer from at least one of the following two weaknesses.
The first is that they do not directly convey Severity. Severity is inferred through the
assessment and through the descriptions, but there is no defined rules to show that one
rating suggests a situation that is more severe than the last. The second is that the
scales are not considered to contain sufficient ‘subjectivity’. for pilots to adequately
provide a justified rating. Limited choice available in scales featuring decision tree
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structures forces pilots towards ratings that do not necessarily reflect the situation
which they experienced. The exception here is the comprehensive PIO scale, which is
not believed to suffer from any major weaknesses shown by other scales. However, this
scale is yet to be applied in any test and evaluation campaigns. A reason for this is
perhaps its rapid departure from the accepted ‘standard’, and perhaps the difficulty
that may be encountered regarding presentation of results obtained following its use.
2.4.2 Tasks
Mitchell commented that manoeuvres to identify PIO must be robust, and expose PIOs
on a regular basis, without giving false indication of real PIO problems. This requires
the tasks to be realistic, and to offer conditions to those where PIOs have been observed
in the past. However, in order to conduct flight testing, the manoeuvres must be
performed safely, routinely, and with the minimum additional flight time required [83].
Mitchell commented that several manoeuvres from previous HQ tests had effectively
exposed PIO or tendencies for PIO. Therefore, in the future, the catalogue of these
tests should be consulted for the development of future tasks.
In Refs. [83, 104], specific PIO manoeuvres for fixed-wing aircraft were reviewed.
These were compiled from previous research efforts, and were all found to feature a
number of drawbacks. Sets of tasks previously used included Precision Offset Landing,
Probe and Drogue refuelling, and various tracking tasks. For the tracking tasks, the
main drawback was found to be the requirement for a programmable Head Up display.
Furthermore, some of the tracking tasks were found to lack the necessary elements
to expose a wide range of PIO phenomena. Both the Precision Landing and Probe
and Drogue refuelling were considered to impose a high safety risk, and they require
operation close to the ground and close to another aircraft respectively. Furthermore,
the required equipment required for refuelling tasks and the additional aircraft would
make it difficult to perform routinely.
The probe and drogue refuelling task was previously used during the validation
of the ROVER detection method [11]. It was also used when investigating wavelet
scalagram techniques [35]. Tracking tasks have been employed during research efforts
conducted by the USAF, and used within the development of the PIW criteria during
BAT tests [90, 105]. These tasks were used due to the need for a visible boundary
within flight. The precision offset landing task has been used extensively by Systems
Technology Inc., during development of PIO mitigation techniques [36,74,75].
With regards to rotorcraft testing, not all previously defined fixed-wing tasks are
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relevant. For example, rotorcraft landing is conducted in a different way to fixed-
wing aircraft, and therefore the precision landing task is not relevant. During previous
rotorcraft investigations, the combination of previously used fixed-wing tasks and tasks
derived from those in ADS-33 [16] have been used. In Ref. [43], five tasks were used for
the investigation of RPCs. These included three tasks taken directly from ADS-33 [16];
the Vertical Manoeuvre, the Slalom, and the Lateral Side-step task. Furthermore, a
roll command tracking task as created, and a BAT tracking task in the longitudinal
axis.
The Vertical manoeuvre task was found to cause unexpected yaw PIOs, following
application of aggressive collective input required to complete the task. It also showed
heave oscillations following the application of a small time delay within the vehicle
model. The roll tracking task, which featured discrete changes in roll attitude, was
found to expose severe roll PIOs, with pilots required to abandon the task to escape
oscillations. A number of cases were observed where the pilot did not fly the task to the
desired standard, in order to avoid PIOs. The slalom manoeuvre was found to expose
severe PIO, and were triggered as the pilot attempted to re-align the flight path with the
runway centre-line (stabilisation at the end of the manoeuvre). The same observation
was made for the lateral side-step manoeuvre, where oscillations were triggered at the
end of the manoeuvre during the stabilisation. The investigation showed that ADS-33
tasks could be used to expose PIOs, with no modification. However, very few test
runs were shown, and results from the tests were not directly linked to any predictions.
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude as to whether the PIOs were expected, and if
all oscillation tendencies were exposed by the tasks. Furthermore, no HQ ratings were
presented with the PIO results. For this reason, it is not possible to judge the suitability
of the tasks.
In Ref. [27], a number of manoeuvres were completed in closed-loop simulation.
These tests were only completed by one pilot, and for one hour. The Accel-Decel
manoeuvre was taken directly from ADS-33 [16], and three other tasks were designed;
a low speed forward flight speed capture, a vertical speed capture, and a pitch attitude
capture task. From the limited tests, both the pitch attitude capture task and Accel-
Decel tasks were successful in exposing PIOs, which were confirmed through the use of
ROVER.
In Ref. [45], during an investigation detailing rotorcraft stability margins in hover,
PIOs were exposed during the ADS-33 Precision Hover task. In these tests, ten pi-
lots investigated 4 different vehicle configurations. These PIOs were further exposed
through the implementation of an additional turbulence. In the study, no further in-
vestigation of the task influence over PIO was investigated, as it was not the focus of
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the research. However, results show that it is possible to expose rotorcraft PIOs using
the Precision Hover task.
2.5 Summary of Review
1. Suppression methods were first employed for Aerospace applications, as a reactive
process. However, the methods are neither the most logical (present when not
required) or efficient (degradation to vehicle handling qualities). Therefore, their
use has generally now been restricted to notch filtering of high-frequency vibra-
tional modes. These have been used as the most common solution to mitigate
against rotorcraft RPCs, in particular during the V-22 development program.
2. Alleviation methods are also still in development, but are yet to be installed on
operational vehicles. However, the methods have shown promise to use simple
Suppression schemes in conjunction with a monitoring system to alleviate A/RPC
tendencies only when required.
3. Prediction methods are widespread for fixed-wing, linear and quasi-linear PIO
characteristics. However, for the rotorcraft world, only a few tools have been
applied. Whilst BPD criteria has been used extensively in rotorcraft since its
introduction in ADS-33, its use to detect solely PIO tendencies is less well known.
Studies report that the method seems directly applicable with previous fixed-
wing boundaries. However, currently OLOP is the only tool to predict quasi-
linear type oscillations within rotorcraft. Although the method has been shown
applicable, many questions exist including the validity of boundaries, its use for
PIO prone systems, and the pilot models employed for the analysis. As a result,
there is limited confidence in the results obtained. There is a need for a novel
prediction tool, particularly for quasi-linear type oscillations, designed around use
for rotorcraft.
4. In previous investigations, detection methods have been developed to improve
safety during flight, and to provide an additional means for objective assessment
of PIOs. However, currently methods have been used only in limited investi-
gations, and have seen even more limited use in full flight investigation trials.
Although methods currently show the potential to distinguish between PIO and
no-PIO conditions, currently none is considered to offer a clear generic approach
to determine PIO susceptibility. This causes difficultly when applying previously
used and validated methods to new vehicle configurations or conditions.
5. Subjective appraisal methods are well defined for Handling Qualities investiga-
tions. However, this is not the case for APC/PIO investigations. It is acknowl-
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edged that there are limitations with the most widely accepted subjective rating
scale. However, no novel scale has been widely accepted as a replacement. Many
have attempted to design new scales to mitigate against limitations. However,
usually minor changes only have been completed. Further research into the key
problems regarding traditional scales must be completed, and a novel scale should
be produced to account for all problems experienced.
6. There are no currently defined tasks for appraisal of rotorcraft PIO tendencies.
In previous investigations, a mixture of tasks from the fixed-wing community and
from rotorcraft HQ investigations have been used. To date, only limited data for
each task has been collected, and the suitability of tasks is unclear. It is suggested
from previous efforts that ADS-33 tasks could be suitable for exposing PIOs.
2.6 Research Questions
From appraisal of the findings from the review of the literature, the following
research questions were posed;
Q1: Is it possible to detect PIO tendencies using a method that uses a
standardised approach to determining susceptibility?
Q2: Can the standardised method be engineered to allow real-time pre-
diction, allowing for direct feedback of PIO incipience during closed-
loop flying tasks?
Q3: Could a novel prediction method also be used for prediction, to
achieve clearer understanding of PIO tendencies prior to closed-loop
piloted simulation?
Q4: Would a novel system of subjectively assessing A/RPC tendencies
provide benefits over current methods?
Q5: Can current Handling Qualities tasks be used to improve detection
of A/RPC tendencies within piloted simulation?
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Chapter 3
Experimental Set-up
3.1 Outline
This section describes the experimental set-up for all of the work presented within this
thesis. This information is contained here, and referred to throughout the subsequent
sections of this work.
3.2 Vehicle Modelling
Prior to any experimental research, rotorcraft models were required. These were used
for both piloted and non-piloted simulations. For all investigations, two rotorcraft
models were used; the Flightlab Generic Rotorcraft (FGR), with characteristics similar
to that of a UH-60 Blackhawk, and a light, manoeuvrable helicopter, representative
of a BO105 helicopter (See Fig. 3.1). From this point forward, they are referred to
as the FGR and BO105 respectively. The FGR was available prior to the start of
the project, and could be used for investigations without the need for modifications
or validation. The BO105 helicopter was created specifically for use in this work, and
as such required some validation before it was used for research. This validation was
necessary to ensure that its behaviour was representative of a light, agile helicopter. It
was not however intended to produce a highly accurate, high fidelity representation of
the BO105 helicopter, as available resources within the work did not allow for this.
The BO105 was selected due to the availability of data, which allowed for the
construction of a complete simulation model. As part of the ARISTOTEL project,
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partners required helicopter models with different levels of fidelity, for investigation of
various types of RPC. All partners involved used their own simulation tools of choice,
with the University of Liverpool (UoL) favouring the use of FLIGHTLAB software [106].
It was decided that all partners should investigate RPC phenomena using the same
vehicle. As FLIGHTLAB software was not available to all partners, the FGR was not
suitable. For this reason, the BO105 model was selected, developed, and validated.
During the project, an agreement was reached with partners involved in GARTEUR
Helicopter AG-16 [26,107] to use experimental and configurational data obtained during
the project. Within AG-16, data was collected using the Deutsches Zentrum fu¨r Luft-
und Raumfahrt (DLR) BO105 Research Platform. As this data was not available at
the start of this research, the FGR was used for initial investigations. When the BO105
simulation model was completed and validated, it was used for later investigations.
(a) Photograph of BO105. [108]
(b) Photograph of UH-60 Black Hawk
(foreground). [109]
Figure 3.1: Vehicles used as basis for simulation models for the research.
As the FGR was not developed during this research, its configuration and the resul-
tant model are not discussed in detail. A complete description of all parameters within
the model is contained within Ref. [110]. As part of this research, the susceptibility of
the model to RPC/PIO phenomena using previously developed tools was completed.
This is discussed later within this chapter.
3.2.1 Nonlinear Vehicle for Real-Time Simulation Model
The full non-linear model of the BO105 was created using FLIGHTLAB. The reference
data used to develop the model are shown in Appendix A. FLIGHTLAB is a commer-
cial modelling software that can be used for the construction and application of vehicle
simulation models [106]. Developed by Advanced Rotorcraft Technology (ART), the
modelling software has been tailored towards the helicopter market. Models are devel-
oped using a library of physically based modelling components. Each component is an
independent dynamic element such as a spring, a damper, etc. [106]. The general vehi-
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cle model is constructed by interconnecting these components to create one structure.
Each component can be tailored to include as much (or as little) ‘real world’ effects as
is desired for the simulation model.
Components are included within a library and can be selected and combined for
different types of aircraft model. These include aerodynamics, control, structure and
propulsion [106]. Within the components, aircraft specific data can be added in order to
create accurate simulation models of ‘real’ rotorcraft. An advantage to the component
method during model development is the fact that the fidelity of each component can
be modified depending on the available data. In this way, models can be developed and
‘fine-tuned’ without the need to ‘rebuild’ simulation models.
When building a simulation model, FLIGHTLAB Model Editor (FLME) can be
used in order to tailor the individual components. FLME is structured as a tree, where
the user can select which components they wish to include in their simulation model.
FLME is also used to position components and to define the control systems.
The BO105 model generated consists of 44 states; 18 translational and rotational
body states, four propulsion states and 22 rotor states, incorporating flap and lead-lag
rotation for each individual rotor blade. The model uses a Peters-He Six State Inflow
model. Real-time computation of rotor forces and moments is achieved through the
use of dynamic look-up tables. These tables incorporate additional elements of realism,
such as rotor stall. No rotor interference is included in the model in its current form.
The tail rotor was modelled as a Bailey type rotor. Aerodynamic surfaces include
non-linear effects, and stall.
Main Rotor and Tail Rotor
The BO105 features a hingeless rotor. In order to model the response of a hingless rotor
to pilot control, one must build a full elastic model of the vehicle’s blades. This presents
two problems: the real-time simulation of such a blade is computationally expensive,
which would lead to a low frame rate; and unrealistic simulated experience and there
is a requirement for detailed data of the blade properties. For these reasons, for use in
real-time simulation, the rotor was modelled using the equivalent hinge offset approach,
which is described in detail in Ref. [111]. The hingeless rotor allows pilot control of
the vehicle through flexing of rotor blades, attached ‘rigidly’ to the rotorcraft hub.
Low mechanical complexity leads to fast rotor response, which leads to a more agile
and manoeuvrable helicopter. As a result, the rotor-type features generally improved
HQs [112].
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For low frequency investigations, such as ones conducted in this study, the hingeless
rotor can be modelled as an equivalent articulated rotor system, using the centre-
spring equivalent rotor approach [111]. An equivalent hub offset is introduced, to
replicate the forces at the hub of a hingeless type. This assumes that the blade has
rigid segments beyond the equivalent offset. The implementation of an elastic rotor
blade was not necessary for two reasons. The first was that there was no requirement
in this investigation to observe the high-frequency (> 1.5 Hz) response of the aircraft.
The second was that there was a requirement only for an aircraft akin to a BO105.
Therefore, if the characteristics were shown to be similar to the actual aircraft, the
model could be considered representative of a small, agile helicopter.
Control System
The control system was modelled using FLIGHTLAB Control System Graphical Ed-
itor (CSGE). The system uses a block diagram structure to enable elements of the
vehicle control systems to be modelled. As the study was based around the response
of a simple, un-augmented helicopter model, the control system employed was simple,
featuring a direct link between pilot input and vehicle swashplate pitch. As mentioned
above, the BO105 aircraft features a hingeless rotor system. This rotor type make the
aircraft very responsive to control inputs, allowing for high agility during flight. As
swashplate responds to pilot demands faster than a conventional articulated rotor, the
phase distortion between pilot input and vehicle output is lower. This results in lower
RPC susceptibility than for an equivalent articulated rotor.
For this reason, in order to engineer RPC susceptibility, Rate Limiting Elements
(RLE) and transport delays were added within the forward control system. The RLE is
positioned after any control system gain and any saturation elements. These represent
triggers that could occur within the system actuator, prior to the vehicle swashplate.
Figure 3.2 displays the elements of the control system between the pilot input and
vehicle swashplate.
Figure 3.2: Structure of the control channel.
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3.2.2 Model Validation
The behaviour of the simulation model was validated using a number of methods, to
ensure that its characteristics were representative of an light, agile helicopter. This
validation included both the static and dynamic characteristics of the vehicle, and
included reference against previous simulation models and actual measurements from
a test vehicle. Sections below detail validation methods that were used.
Eigenvalues
The long-period response of the aircraft that is disturbed from trim can be described
by the system eigenvalues. When found for the Rigid Body aircraft modes, from the
linearised vehicle model, eigenvalues describe the motion of the aircraft in pitch, roll,
yaw, and heave. Knowledge of the required level of pilot control, and difficulty of flying
the aircraft, can be gained from the observation of eigenvalues.
Presented as complex numbers, eigenvalues give information regarding the damping
of the vehicle response and, in some cases, the oscillation tendencies. The composition
of the eigenvalues leads to the Real part describing the damping (given by ζωn). A
negative value denotes a damped system, and therefore the mode is stable (its amplitude
will decrease with respect to time). A positive value leads to the opposite, a response
that increases amplitude with respect to time. The Imaginary part of the eigenvalue
shows the damped frequency of the mode. This is the natural frequency of the mode
following influence of the system damping. From the eigenvalues, the damping ratio
(ζ) and natural frequency (ωn) can be determined.
In order to determine whether the BO105 model was representative of a traditional
helicopter, eigenvalues were determined from the linearisation process. As eigenvalues
are determined from the linearisation, results are only valid for small amplitude re-
sponse. ADS-33E-PRF [16] contains boundaries for the locations of the longitudinal
and lateral oscillatory eigenvalues in the complex plane. These boundaries were devel-
oped through HQ tests during the development of ADS-33. The degree to which the
eigenvalue affects the pilot’s ability to fly the aircraft is defined by both the damping
and the frequency. Modes with high frequency will be difficult for the pilot to con-
trol, causing a lack of precision and increase in workload. Furthermore, modes with
a positive damping will be unstable, with a time for oscillations to double amplitude
satisfying Eqn. 3.1 [113].
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T2
loge2
=
1
R(µ)
(3.1)
Figure 3.3a shows the root locus of eigenvalues obtained from the BO105 simulation
model describing the phugoid (long-period) mode of the aircraft. The locus is shown
against ADS-33 boundaries for full attended operations [16]. As shown, the aircraft
has an unstable phugoid throughout the flight envelope, but reaches close to neutral
stability at 40 knots. The shape of the phugoid response of the model is similar to that
shown for the BO105 within Ref. [111]. The mode instability increases from the speed
of 40 knots, reaching T2 ≈ 2 secs at 100 knots.
This shows that the aircraft is longitudinally unstable, and perturbation from trim
requires pilot compensation to stabilise the vehicle. As shown, the locus is located in
all regions, from LEVEL 3 (unacceptable HQs) at hover and high speed, to LEVEL 1
(good HQs) at 40 knots. Ref. [114] reports from measured responses of the longitudinal
‘mid-term’ pitch oscillations at 80 knots on the DLR BO105. Average ζ and ωn were
determined as -0.06 and 0.32 rad/s respectively, suggesting LEVEL 1 HQs for fully
attended operations. This is significantly more stable than the BO105 simulation model
response, which in turn is more stable than data shown within Ref. [111]. The difference
between the flight test vehicle and the simulation model could be a result of the loading
configuration, which is not explicitly stated in Ref. [114].
− ζ ω
n
ω
 
=
 
ω
n
 
(1−
ζ2 )
1/
2
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4
0
0.5
1
1.5
100 kts
Hover
LEVEL 3
LEVEL 2
LEVEL 1
(a) Phugoid Mode plotted against ADS-
33E-PRF boundaries.
− ζ ω
n
ω
 
=
 
ω
n
 
(1−
ζ2 )
1/
2
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
100 kts
Hover
LEVEL 2
(TTA)
LEVEL 1
LEVEL 3 (TTA)
LEVEL 3
(b) Dutch Roll Mode plotted against ADS-
33E-PRF boundaries.
Figure 3.3: Dynamic modes of motion plotted with respect to ADS-33 Handling Qual-
ities Levels
Figure 3.3b shows the lateral oscillatory Dutch Roll mode of the BO105 simulation
model. The root locus is shown against ADS-33E-PRF lateral oscillation boundaries.
The Dutch Roll mode is a combination of roll, yaw, and sway. As shown, in this case
the complete locus for the Dutch Roll mode is in the LEVEL 3 TTA tasks. Again, this
reflects the expected characteristics for the BO105 Dutch Roll characteristics. Measured
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response of the Dutch Roll mode for the DLR BO105 is also contained within Ref. [114].
Here, an average ζ and ωn were determined as 0.155-0.162 and 2.44 rad/s respectively.
This is very close to the simulation model, which was found to have a Dutch Roll mode
with ζ and ωn of 0.155 and 2.14 rad/s respectively. The measured and simulation model
responses have a T2 different by just 0.26 seconds. Therefore, the model was seen to
accurately replicate the BO105 helicopter.
Table 3.1 shows Eigenvalues, and the associated predicted HQ Level predictions.
Eigenvalues from the simulation model are shown alongside those shown in Ref. [111].
These values are also obtained from a simulation model of the BO105 aircraft. The
stiff hingeless rotor leads to a very agile helicopter. As a result, the helicopter features
both high pitch and roll damping, in the form of LEVEL 1 pitch subsidence and roll
subsidence modes. This leads to a sharp and precise response of the aircraft.
Eigenvalues are considered to show good correlation with those shown in Ref. [111],
through observation of both the mode characteristics and the predicted HQ Levels.
Concerning the Phugoid characteristics in forward flight, the simulation model was
found to have poorer HQs than the model presented in Ref. [111]. This was due to the
larger ‘real’ part of the Eigenvalue. This lead to a much larger ‘time to double am-
plitude’ in the simulation model. Despite differences at high speed, the characteristics
were found to show good correlation for all axes during hover flight. Furthermore, the
natural frequencies of all modes were considered to show good correlation between the
two simulation models.
Non-linear Response
Validation of the vehicle model’s time response to pilot control input was conducted
using data obtained from the DLR BO105 research platform. A number of doublet
response inputs were available from GARTEUR AG-16 [26] research. In order to de-
termine the models response, the same flight conditions, along with the same pilot
control inputs were set within the FLIGHTLAB model. A short simulation was then
completed using FLIGHTLAB’s Non-Linear Response Tool. As the requirement was
only for an aircraft model representative of a BO105, there were no strict tolerances
for errors between the simulation model and the recorded flight test (FT) data. Pri-
marily, it was desired that all axes exhibited response in the same direction and of a
similar magnitude. Figure 3.4 displays one result, of a Non-linear response obtained
for a longitudinal doublet. As shown, the same doublet signal is used in the FT and
in the FLIGHTLAB BO105 model. All Rigid Body axes responses are shown along-
side the control input. As one can see, for this signal, all vehicle responses are in the
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Table 3.1: Example eigenvalues of BO105 simulation model.
Ref. Speed,
kts
Eigenvalue ωn,
rad/s
ζ T2, sec Mode HQ Level
- 0 0.17 + 0.45i 0.48 0.34 4.15 Phugoid LEVEL 3
[111] 0 0.24 + 0.52i 0.57 0.41 2.92 LEVEL 3
- 80 0.13 + 0.38i 0.41 0.33 5.12 LEVEL 2
[111] 80 -0.02 + 0.31i 0.31 0.05 42.59 LEVEL 1
- 100 0.33 + 0.33i 0.47 0.71 2.06 LEVEL 3
[111] 100 0.033 + 0.31i 0.31 0.11 20.97 LEVEL 2
- 0 -0.14 + 0.51i 0.53 0.26 4.83 Dutch Roll LEVEL 3 (TTA)
[111] 0 -0.21 + 0.60i 0.64 0.60 3.29 LEVEL 3 (TTA)
- 80 -0.33 + 1.93i 1.96 0.16 2.12 LEVEL 3 (TTA)
[111] 80 -0.57 + 2.64i 2.70 0.21 1.22 LEVEL 3 (TTA)
- 100 -0.34 + 2.42i 2.45 0.14 2.02 LEVEL 3 (TTA)
[111] 100 -0.61 + 3.09i 3.15 0.19 1.13 LEVEL 3 (TTA)
- 0 -10.36 10.32 1.0 0.07 Roll Subsidence LEVEL 1
[111] 0 -14.21 14.21 1.0 0.05 LEVEL 1
- 80 -8.52 8.52 1.0 0.08 LEVEL 1
[111] 80 -13.72 13.72 1.0 0.05 LEVEL 1
- 100 -8.29 8.29 1.0 0.08 LEVEL 1
[111] 100 -13.65 13.65 1.0 0.05 LEVEL 1
- 0 -0.24 0.24 1.0 2.85 Spiral LEVEL 1
[111] 0 -0.27 0.27 1.0 2.53 LEVEL 1
- 80 -0.04 0.04 1.0 16.05 LEVEL 1
[111] 80 -0.02 0.02 1.0 28.75 LEVEL 1
- 100 -0.05 0.05 1.0 13.53 LEVEL 1
[111] 100 -0.03 0.03 1.0 21.04 LEVEL 1
- 0 -3.76 3.76 1.0 0.18 Pitch Subsidence LEVEL 1
[111] 0 -3.84 3.84 1.0 0.18 LEVEL 1
- 80 -4.68 4.68 1.0 0.15 LEVEL 1
[111] 80 -4.25 4.25 1.0 0.16 LEVEL 1
- 100 -4.96 4.96 1.0 0.14 LEVEL 1
[111] 100 -4.51 4.51 1.0 0.15 LEVEL 1
- 0 -0.36 0.36 1.0 1.93 Heave Subsidence LEVEL 1
[111] 0 -0.32 0.32 1.0 2.14 LEVEL 1
- 80 -0.36 0.36 1.0 1.90 LEVEL 1
[111] 80 -0.65 0.65 1.0 1.06 LEVEL 1
- 100 -0.30 0.30 1.0 2.32 LEVEL 1
[111] 100 -0.58 0.58 1.0 1.20 LEVEL 1
correct direction and of similar magnitude to those recorded in the flight test data. In
particular, the on-axis response is thought to show a strong correlation to the FT data.
Off-axis response has been captured for the signal, including strong cross couplings in
yaw and roll. Similar responses were obtained for doublets and 3-2-1-1 inputs in all
axes. From the observations, it was considered that the model was suitably replicating
the response of a light, agile, helicopter.
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Figure 3.4: Example of response to a longitudinal doublet control input.
Model Limitations
Model validation was conducted in order to ensure that the model was representative
of a light, agile helicopter. When creating the model, it was not intended that a high
fidelity version of the helicopter on which it was modelled, the BO105, would be created.
This was due to the available resources within the ARISTOTEL project. Instead, a
generic helicopter model, which could be used for piloted simulation campaigns, was
sought.
Furthermore, the model generated for use in this research was intended for appli-
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cation of Rigid Body testing. Therefore, the model did not include any aeroelastic
elements, such as a flexible rotor, required for high frequency RPC analysis. The Rigid
Body modes of the helicopter are the primary concern during piloted simulation, as
these are most likely to interact with the active pilot control.
During normal control, the pilot should not interact with any aeroelastic modes
of the vehicle. Furthermore, the response of the vehicle to pilot control should not
be significantly effected through the presence of aeroelastic modes. However, it is
important to remember that any aeroelastic RPCs, which may be encountered in real-
flight, through the presence of the ‘passive pilot’, will not be observed within simulation
using the model generated.
3.3 PIO Susceptibility Using Current Tools
As discussed in Chapter 2, the vast majority of PIO prediction tools have been applied
only to fixed-wing aircraft. Both the Bandwidth Phase Delay (BPD) and Open-Loop
Onset Point (OLOP) criteria however have been applied to rotorcraft during research
campaigns. For this reason, both tools were used to determine the RPC susceptibility
of the vehicle models discussed above. The BPD criterion is suited to prediction of
Category I (linear type) PIOs, whilst OLOP is used exclusively for observation of
Category II (quasi-linear type) PIOs. Firstly, predictions from the application of BPD
are discussed, followed by those obtained using the OLOP criterion.
3.3.1 Predictions Using Bandwidth Phase Delay
The Bandwidth Phase Delay is used primarily to ascertain the system’s susceptibility
to linear-type RPCs, and is used extensively in the HQ evaluation process to determine
predicted HQs. The criterion uses the bandwidth, to essentially measure the response
time of the system. An aircraft with high bandwidth will have a sharp response, with a
low response time, and would be less likely to encounter RPC tendencies than a system
with low bandwidth. The following steps are taken to determine the Bandwidth Phase
Delay.
•Frequency responses of attitude response to pilot input are gathered, through the use
of flight data or through simulation.
•The Bandwidth frequency is determined as the lower of the following; the frequency for
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which the Gain of the transfer function is equal to 6dB, or the point for which the Phase
Angle is equal to 135◦. This defines a margin between either Gain or Phase instability.
•The Phase delay is calculated to determine the system properties following the band-
width frequency. The slope of the phase transfer function is determined, with a larger
slope representing higher change in phase with respect to frequency, and increased sus-
ceptibility to instability.
•Both the Bandwidth and Phase Delay are plotted, against pre-defined boundaries. This
shows whether the configuration is prone to PIO.
Figure 3.5a and 3.5b display Bandwidth Phase Delay predictions for the BO105
simulation model, for various control system time delays.
As shown, in the longitudinal axis, the aircraft model was predicted to be susceptible
to PIO with a time delay of 200ms. This is due to the additional phase delay caused
by time delay. For this case, the system bandwidth alone is not enough to determine
the PIO susceptibility. Regarding the roll axis of the model, time delay’s above 200ms
were found to be susceptible to PIO, again due to the phase delay and not directly the
system bandwidth.
For the BO105 aircraft, the pitch and roll bandwidths of the vehicle without applied
delays were found to be comfortably within the PIO Robust region. This is a result
of the stiff rotor-head used in the model. Such high rotational axis bandwidth makes
the vehicle very robust to Category I PIO. In order to reach a point where the vehicle
was found to be incipient to Category I PIO, large lateral and longitudinal time delays
are required. The caveat with these levels of delay is that they can be detected by the
pilot, with pilots able to adjust their control strategy in the early stages of PIO. As a
result, it was found that pilots were much more susceptible to sustained PIO tendencies
with additional quasi-linear elements (i.e. forward control path rate-limits).
Figure 3.6 displays results from the application of BPD to the FGR model. For
this model, PIO susceptibility could be engineered through the removal of the Stability
Augmentation System (SAS). As shown in Fig. 3.6, for the ‘SAS-ON’ configuration,
the result is within the PIO Robust region. When the SAS is disabled, the bandwidth
of the system is significantly reduced, causing the result to appear within the PIO prone
region. Unlike results for the BO105 model, the phase delay is similar for both cases.
This is because no additional delay has been applied to the system.
56
0 2 4 6 8
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Pitch Attitude Bandwidth, rad/s
Ph
as
e 
D
el
ay
, s
ec
PIO Prone
PIO Robust
0ms
200ms
100ms
(a) BPD predictions - BO105, Pitch Axis,
Hover
0 2 4 6 8
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Roll Attitude Bandwidth, rad/s
Ph
as
e 
D
el
ay
, s
ec
200ms
100ms
0ms
PIO Robust
PIO Prone
300ms
400ms
(b) BPD predictions - BO105, Roll Axis,
Hover
Figure 3.5: BPD results with respect to PIO boundary.
0 2 4 6 8
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Pitch Attitude Bandwidth, rad/s
Ph
as
e 
D
el
ay
, s
ec
PIO Robust
PIO Prone
SAS−ON
SAS−OFF
Figure 3.6: BPD predictions - FGR, Pitch Axis, Hover.
3.3.2 Predictions Using OLOP
As discussed previously, OLOP is used to determine the PIO susceptibility from RLEs.
Results are based upon observation of the position of the so-called ‘Open-Loop Onset
Point’ on a Nichols chart. The following bullet points describe how OLOP is applied
to a simulation model.
•Apply a sinusoidal control signal to the open-loop system. Any control system feedback
elements are not included. It is assumed that the sinusoidal stick input should be of
maximum amplitude (i.e. worst case scenario).
•Determine the onset frequencies of any rate limiting elements in the system, by ob-
serving the frequency when rate limits will be triggered in the system.
•Select an appropriate pilot model and gain for the situation. The pilot gain can be
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tuned through the observation of the Phase Margin at 0dB. This should be kept consis-
tent throughout.
•Plot the frequency response of the closed-loop system, without rate limits active, on a
Nichols Chart, displaying the Gain and Phase of the system. On the same figure, plot
the onset point determined.
•Observe where the onset point lies in relation to OLOP boundaries. If the point is
above the boundary, then the configuration is deemed susceptible to Rate Limited PIO.
The OLOP method was performed on both the lateral and longitudinal axes of the
BO105 aircraft, at three speeds (0knots, 60knots, 80knots). Five Rate Limits (RLs)
were applied to each condition. Results are shown in Figures 3.7a to 3.7f. All plots
display the two OLOP boundaries found in the literature. ‘OLOP’ was the original
boundary determined for use with the OLOP criteria. However, in later developments,
it was suggested that this boundary was too conservative, and that a boundary such
as ‘OLOP 2’ should be used. Despite this suggestion, no further validation of ‘OLOP
2’ was presented, and therefore in this investigation both were used to observe PIO
potential. Markers display OLOP results, with the numbers beside them displaying
the system rate limit (in deg/s). OLOP above the boundary denotes a configuration
that is deemed to be susceptible to Rate Limited PIO, whilst those points below should
be free from PIO.
As shown, for the BO105 simulation model, a RL = 15deg/s was always found to be
prone to PIO, when using the ‘OLOP’ boundaries. However, when using the ‘OLOP2’
boundaries this RL was never found prone to PIO. For all but one of configurations
and speeds, RLs found to be prone to PIO using ‘OLOP’ boundaries were found to
be PIO robust when using ‘OLOP2’ boundaries. The large differences in predictions
made it challenging to ascertain the PIO susceptibility of the vehicle models. OLOP
boundaries have seen only limited use in rotary-winged campaigns [27, 44]. In one
previous study [44], is was suggested that that the OLOP boundary for rotorcraft
should be placed between ‘OLOP’ and ‘OLOP2’. However, this was supported only by
limited results.
Figures 3.8a and 3.8b display OLOP results for the FGR model, for both SAS-
ON and SAS-OFF configurations. For this aircraft model, the susceptibility to Rate
Limiting was found to be similar with and without the SAS engaged. Using the original
OLOP boundaries, RL = 20deg/s and 10deg/s were found to be susceptible to PIO.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the predictions made using OLOP, for both the BO105
and FGR models. ‘Tick’ symbols display cases where OLOP has predicted PIOs due
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(a) Roll Axis, Hover Condition. (b) Roll Axis, 60 knots.
(c) Roll Axis, 80 knots. (d) Pitch Axis, Hover Condition.
(e) Pitch Axis, 60 knots. (f) Pitch Axis, 80 knots.
Figure 3.7: OLOP results for the BO105 simulation model for various RL settings.
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(a) Pitch Axis, SAS-ON. (b) Pitch Axis, SAS-OFF.
Figure 3.8: OLOP results for the FGR simulation model for various RL settings.
Table 3.2: OLOP predictions for lateral axis BO105
Bound. Speed (Kts) Rate Limit, deg/s
20 15 10 5 2.5
0 7 3 3 3 3
OLOP 60 7 3 3 3 3
80 3 3 3 3 3
0 7 7 7 7 3
OLOP2 60 7 7 7 7 7
80 7 7 7 7 7
0 7 7 7 3 3
Mid-point 60 7 7 3 3 3
80 7 7 3 3 3
to RLEs, and ‘cross’ elements show the cases where no PIO is predicted.
As shown by results, with boundaries not currently standardised, it is difficult to
determine the susceptibility using OLOP. For this reason, it could not be used directly
to determine rate limits to be used in the investigations. During this investigation,
a boundary mid-way between ‘OLOP’ and ‘OLOP2’ (mid-point) was selected, as it
was thought to offer a good compromise for the assessment of RLEs. This was a
recommendation from results discussed in Ref. [44]. Therefore, this boundary was used
when selecting rate limits, and was used to determine OLOP predictions when used for
comparisons in the subsequent sections. Both the OLOP, and BPD boundaries could
be used to set experimental conditions before the simulation test campaigns, in order
to obtain a good balance between PIO prone and PIO robust vehicle models.
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Table 3.3: OLOP predictions for longitudinal axis BO105
Bound. Speed (Kts) Rate Limit, deg/s
20 15 10 5 2.5
0 7 3 3 3 3
OLOP 60 7 3 3 3 3
80 7 3 3 3 3
0 7 7 7 7 3
OLOP2 60 7 7 7 7 3
80 7 7 7 3 3
0 7 7 7 3 3
Mid-point 60 7 7 7 3 3
80 7 7 7 3 3
Table 3.4: OLOP predictions for longitudinal axis FGR
Bound. Configuration Rate Limit, deg/s
50 30 20 10
OLOP SAS-ON 7 7 3 3
SAS-OFF - 7 3 3
OLOP2 SAS-ON 7 7 7 7
SAS-OFF - 7 7 7
Mid-point SAS-ON 7 7 7 3
SAS-OFF - 7 7 3
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3.4 Simulation Devices
All research was performed using two full-motion flight simulators, located in the Uni-
versity of Liverpool’s Flight Science and Technology group. The majority of research
was conducted in HELIFLIGHT-R (see Fig.3.9a), with some initial research conducted
using HELIFLIGHT (see Fig.3.9b).
HELIFLIGHT was commissioned in 2000, introduced as a reconfigurable system for
use predominantly for research of flight HQs. The simulator features a 6 DoF motion
platform, and five visual channels, provided by collimated visual displays (outside world
view) and direct screens (chin windows). The instruments are provided by a single
monitor, allowing for easily reconfigurable panels.
HELIFLIGHT-R was commissioned in 2011. A full description of the facility is con-
tained within Ref. [115]. Briefly, the simulator consists of a 12ft visual dome, mounted
on a 6 degree-of-freedom motion platform. Three projectors allow for a maximum 210◦
x 70◦ Field of View (FoV), a highly desirable feature of a rotorcraft simulator. It
features an interchangeable and reconfigurable crew station. For the current research,
the cockpit was configured with two wide-screen LCD screens, providing primary flight
displays akin to those contained within a standard bare-airframe helicopter.
Unlike HELIFLIGHT, HELIFLIGHT-R contains reconfigurable control force-feel,
for the cyclic, collective, and pedal systems. For all research conducted, the control
forces were engineered to represent those of a BO105 aircraft. Quantities were set using
data provided by DLR.
Motion cueing is provided by an electric motion system, featuring six actuators
with a 600mm stroke. The motion configuration gives maximum > 300◦/s2 in each
rotational axis, 0.71g in surge and sway, and 1.02g in heave [115]. As recommended
for rotary-wing research campaigns, all motion low-pass washout filters were set as 3rd
order transfer functions. In fixed-wing research, 1st and 2nd order transfer functions
were generally found to be sufficient, due to the low accelerations required. However,
for more dynamic manoeuvres such as completed using rotorcraft, 3rd order filters are
required due to the ‘return-to-neutral’ characteristics [116]. This helps to ensure that
the platform will always return to neutral position following a disturbance. This means
that when the next disturbance begins, the motion system again features maximum
travel. Tuning of the motion system requires one to ascertain the correct ratio between
washout and motion gain. Too much washout, the pilot will feel false cueing which could
destabilise closed-loop tracking. Too much motion gain will cause the motion system to
reach either soft (software) or hard (hardware) travel or rate limits. HELIFLIGHT-R
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motion system was configured using the approaches detailed in Refs. [115,116].
(a) HELIFLIGHT-R Full Motion Simulator.
(b) HELIFLIGHT Full Motion Simulator.
Figure 3.9: Full Motion Simulators used in this research
3.5 Mission Task Development
An outcome of the Literature Review contained within Chapter 2 was the lack of guid-
ance regarding tasks to expose RPC/PIO tendencies. Currently, there are no guidance
documents detailing tasks used to expose unfavourable couplings. Many experimental
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campaigns develop their own tasks specifically for the observation of RPC/PIO char-
acteristics in the test vehicle of choice. As observation of flying qualities pivot around
the task conducted, if all research campaigns use different tasks, it is not possible to
directly compare results from different investigations.
In investigations detailed in this current research, the goal was to define tasks that
could be used to investigate RPC potential in a wide range of rotorcraft. The starting
point for this was to investigate directly the use of tasks akin to those contained within
the HQ guidance document ADS-33E-PRF [16]. The main function of ADS-33 tasks is
to assess vehicle HQs during expected and routine operational tasks. RPC/PIO tenden-
cies are only exposed during routine operations in the most extreme of cases. Usually,
RPC/PIOs will only be triggered during an ‘edge of the envelope’ or ‘unexpected’
situation. Despite this, they have been used in previous RPC investigations [43].
During this research, it was not possible to complete a wide range of MTEs during
each piloted simulation campaign, due to pilot availability. Therefore, it was important
to select the most appropriate tasks for the investigation. In order to select tasks,
a wide range of previously investigated tasks were completed in an initial simulation
campaign. Tasks shown in Fig.3.10 were investigated during the initial test campaign.
Figure 3.10: Tasks investigated during initial investigation.
The majority of tasks were also investigated as part of GARTEUR AG-16, the
results of which are reported in Ref. [43]. All task requirements, settings, and notes for
test pilot briefing are shown in Appendix B.
Only three of the tasks shown above were selected for further investigation. Findings
regarding tasks not selected are shown in Table 3.5. Each of the tasks not selected were
found to feature some negative points. This is in spite of the fact that many of the
tasks had previously been used for RPC investigations [43].
The most suitable tasks not selected for further investigation were the Vertical
manoeuvre, the Sidestep, and the Acceleration Deceleration manoeuvre. All of these
tasks were found to display a link between degradation in task performance and PIO
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Table 3.5: Appraisal of task suitability during tests conducted in the ARISTOTEL
project
Manoeuvre Proposed RPC
Uses
Use in HQ Re-
search
Positives Negatives Considerations
Vertical
Manoeuvre
(VM) [16]
Incipience in
heave and yaw
axes, hover
Assess heave
axis controlla-
bility, adequate
damping and
undesirable
couplings
•Reduction
in handling
qualities and
increase in PIO
susceptibility
with increasing
time delay
•Highly scat-
tered PIO
ratings, due
to significant
cross-coupled
vehicle model
•Task ag-
gressiveness
showed lim-
ited differences
in subjective
ratings
•Manoeuvre
suitability in
question when
off-axis sta-
bilization is
required •Auto-
compensation
for cross
couplings to
achieve a higher
HQ rotorcraft
model
Slalom (S)
[16,43]
Incipience in
the roll axis,
forward flight
Check for
the ability to
manoeuvre
in forward
flight and
objectionable
cross-couplings
•Highly pre-
dictable, pilots
were able to
complete with
open-loop con-
trol even with
high triggering
configurations
•Additional
side walls did
not improve the
pilot compensa-
tion effort
Additional
disturbance to
force pilots to
achieve tighter
control •Vari-
able distance
between slalom
poles could
reduce pre-
dictable nature
of task
Sidestep
(SS) [16,43]
Incipience in
the roll axis,
hover and low
speed
Lateral direc-
tion handling
qualities for
aggressive ma-
noeuvring and
undesirable
cross-couplings
•High control
activity in lat-
eral axis •Clear
tendencies for
PIO
•Requires large
horizontal
field of view
to complete
manoeuvre
successfully
•Manoeuvre
suitability in
question when
limited horizon-
tal FoV
Roll
Tracking
(RT) [43]
Incipience in
the roll axis,
hover and
forward flight
N/A •Unnatural
single axis no
motion task
with high bank
angle com-
mands •Hard
for pilots to
distinguish
commanded roll
and the vehicle
response •Lim-
ited time for
pilots to achieve
commanded
bank with the
vehicle model
•Redesign of
the task com-
mands with
vehicle capa-
bilities •Visual
design desired
and adequate
boundaries
Accel/Decel
(AD) [16]
Incipience in
the pitch axis,
hover and low
speed
Longitudinal
handling
qualities for
aggressive ma-
noeuvres and
undesirable
couplings
•‘Explosive’
PIOs obtained
during the
stabilization
element of the
task with time
delays and rate
limits
•Requires large
vertical FoV
•Difficult task
to achieve,
particularly
for rotorcraft
with large cross
couplings
•Provide addi-
tional cueing to
pilots •Manoeu-
vre suitability
in question
when off-axis
stabilisation is
required
65
susceptibility. This shows that the tasks are successfully exposing PIOs during their
completion. However, each of the tasks featured negative points, which made them
less suitable than the tasks selected. Whilst the Vertical Manoeuvre was found to
expose PIOs in the vertical axis, the results appeared to be significantly affected by
the off-axis HQs characteristics. The Sidestep task requires a large field of view (FoV),
as so the pilot can see the target point during completion of the manoeuvre. Whilst
this is available in HELIFLIGHT-R, it was not available in other simulators to be used
during the ARISTOTEL project (such as HELIFLIGHT, and SIMONA at the Technical
University of Delft [117,118]). As all tasks had to be suitable for experiments in other
facilities, the task was deemed not suitable for this project. Similar FoV restrictions
were found during the completion of the Accel-Decel task, whereby the translation to
hover requires high pitch attitude, that causes loss of visual cues. Pilots noted that
this is also a problem during completion of the manoeuvre within real flight, but the
problem is more pronounced in simulation.
Tasks that were selected from those initially investigated are shown in Table 3.6.
Although the tasks were found to have negative points, overall it was seen that they
had the most potential.
The Precision Hover manoeuvre was selected primarily due to its multi-axis nature
and its applicability to normal rotary operations. A further manoeuvre selected was
the Roll Step, first used at the University of Liverpool for tilt-rotor investigations
[119]. The manoeuvre is similar to the Roll Slalom course employed in investigations to
enhance ADS-33 roll bandwidth HQL boundaries reported in [38]. Finally, a novel Pitch
Tracking task was designed for investigation of RPC incipience following aggressive
changes in pitch attitude. All tasks are described in more detail in later chapters of
this work, when used for investigations.
3.6 Pilots
A number of experimental test pilots were used in the various investigations. Whilst
some pilots were new to the subject of Rotorcraft Pilot Coupling investigations, all
were proficient with the types of tasks and methods investigated. All were qualified
test pilots, either current or retired. Furthermore, many had been involved in previous
research campaigns at the University of Liverpool and, as such, were familiar with the
research facilities.
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Table 3.6: Considerations of selected tasks.
Manoeuvre Proposed RPC
Uses
Use in HQ Re-
search
Positives Negatives Considerations
Precision
Hover (PH)
Incipience in all
axes, predomi-
nantly roll and
pitch, hover
Check ability
to maintain
precise posi-
tion, heading
and altitude
following tran-
sition from
translating
flight
•Clear In-
crease in PIO
susceptibility
with increasing
time delay
(roll and pitch)
•Multi-axis
task appears
suitable for ex-
posure of PIOs
in all axes
(Pitch, Roll,
Yaw, Heave)
•Suitable for
assessment of
cross-couplings
•Lack of high
gain pilot con-
trol demand
after hover
board capture
•Requires large
visual FoV
to adequately
capture ground
references
•Alteration of
hover board
size •Additional
disturbances to
force pilots to
achieve tighter
control during
the stabilization
element
Roll Step
(RS)
Incipience in
the roll axis,
forward flight
N/A •High control
activity on
lateral axis
•Increase of
HQR with
increasing time
delay
•Difference in
course specifi-
cations at dif-
ferent facilities
•High aggres-
sion requires
large simu-
lator motion
travel (or low
motion gains)
•Scattered PIO
ratings
•Standardise
roll step course
•Adjusted mo-
tion filters to
ensure preserva-
tion of motion
travel margins
Pitch
Tracking
(PT)
Incipience in
the pitch axis,
hover and
forward flight
N/A •Largely suc-
cessful at
exposing RPCs
due to rate
limiting ele-
ments •Easy
to implement
and easy for
the pilot to
understand
performance
requirements
•Boundary
width allowed
pilot to operate
open-loop with
certain control
strategies •Has
the potential to
lose ‘realism’
from rotorcraft
tasks •Requires
Head-up display
•Either apply
external forcing
function on
aircraft/bound-
aries or decrease
the boundary
width to force
pilot control
gain
Table 3.7: Pilot experience resume.
Pilot Current Employment Rotary-
wing hours
Fixed- wing
hours
Sim hours
A Senior Captain for Commercial Air-
line
3000 11000 5000
B Senior First Officer for Commercial
Airline/British Royal Navy
7800 8000 1300
C Royal Netherlands Air force - Chi-
nook Test Pilot
1500 200 230
D Royal Netherlands Air force -
Apache Test Pilot
2000 150 400
E Retired Royal Air Force/Head of
ETPS
4000 1000 500
G Royal Air Force - Test Pilot 2000 <50 450
H Royal Air Force - Test Pilot 3000 <50 200
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As all test pilots were trained in the use of subjective opinion scales, during each
test campaign they were asked to award Handling Qualities Ratings (HQR) and Pilot-
Induced Oscillation Ratings (PIOR). HQRs were awarded using the Cooper-Harper
scale (See Fig.3.11). The PIO Rating Scale used is shown in Fig.2.6.
Figure 3.11: Cooper Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale. [96]
3.7 Summary of Chapter 3
Here, the general experimental setup has been explained. This has included the devel-
opment of simulation models, discussion of the experimental facilities, and selection of
MTEs for further investigation. The following are the findings from Chapter 3.
1. The model of a BO105 helicopter has been generated using advanced modelling
software FLIGHTLAB. This model was validated using data from previous models
and collected from in-flight experiments.
2. The baseline vehicle stability Handling Qualities have been determined, showing
it to have poor longitudinal Phugoid stability.
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3. Predictions have been made using pre-existing methods to determine PIO sus-
ceptibility, both in the lateral and longitudinal axes. BPD and OLOP were used
to determine the susceptibility to Cat. I and Cat. II PIO respectively. Results
can be used to set vehicle configurations for testing within piloted simulation.
4. Three Mission Task Elements have been selected for further investigation, based
on observations of many ‘candidate’ tasks completed in previous RPC research
campaigns.
69
Chapter 4
A New Criterion for Detection of
RPCs
4.1 Objective
Significant effort has been expended to develop criteria to predict the susceptibility
pilot-induced oscillations. Much of this work has been carried out for fixed-wing air-
craft, and it is only recently that their applicability to rotorcraft has started to be
assessed. Real time pilot-induced oscillation identification methods provide an alter-
native means to at least warn the pilot that a pilot-induced oscillation is in progress
so that preventative action can be taken. Existing methods, however, have some lim-
itations and have rarely been used for rotary-wing purposes. Specifically, the existing
methods assessed in this work do not provide an indication of the severity of the event
and mask the underlying data that are being used to generate the warning. This section
proposes and presents a new method to identify pilot-induced oscillations, either in near
real time or as a post processing aid for recorded flight-test data, that addresses both
of these issues. The new method, entitled “Phase-Aggression Criterion,” is compared
with current methods. It is shown, for a specific set of test cases and test pilots, that
not only can it provide more information about the pilot-induced oscillation but it can
also provide an earlier warning of its onset.
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4.2 Overview of Pilot-Induced Oscillation Detection Meth-
ods
Chapter 2 presents an overview of previously developed PIO detection methods. Here,
it was concluded that current methods have potential to aid in detection of PIOs, but
tools lack the ability for application to a generic vehicle. The following sections give
further overview of the two previous detection methods used for the development of a
novel detection tool: Real-Time Oscillation VERifier (ROVER) and the Pilot-Inceptor
Workload criterion (PIW).
4.2.1 Real-Time Oscillation VERifier (ROVER)
After many years of development of oﬄine prediction criteria and still no clear solu-
tions for the suppression of PIOs during aircraft development and test phases, it was
hypothesized that, due to the infinite amount of trigger situations, “PIOs will never be
prevented real time, so the best we can hope for is detect it early and minimize the ef-
fect on the aircraft” [104]. Given this somewhat bleak statement, every effort should be
made to ensure that, in the operational life cycle of the aircraft, PIOs are detected and
suppressed in real time. ROVER was developed to address this challenge, and was first
developed for the United States Air Force (USAF), then later refined by NASA Dryden
Flight Research Center [11]. It was designed to monitor the real time conditions of the
aircraft and relate those to any potential PIO situation. It is designed to use pilot input
data in conjunction with aircraft angular rates to calculate the phase, frequency and
magnitude of the oscillations (both for rate and control inputs). ‘Thresholds’ to denote
values of the aforementioned parameters considered large enough to cause PIOs are set
by the user, and are specific to aircraft type and configuration. These thresholds are
represented by four digital flags, initialized at zero and, when user defined values are
met, a value of unity is returned. This leads to a ROVER score between zero (no condi-
tions flagged, no A/RPC detected) and four (all conditions flagged, A/RPC detected)
being assigned to the situation. As shown in Ref. [56], analysing ROVER output not
only allows the prediction of A/RPCs, but may also allow for counter-measures to be
introduced. Some notable fixed-wing research campaigns that have used ROVER are
summarized in Refs. [56, 84]. In these test campaigns, the method has been shown to
be a capable tool for the detection of PIOs and has been used in order to increase
the confidence in results obtained from pilot subjective opinion. However, only very
limited research has been conducted into the application of ROVER to the analysis
of rotorcraft PIOs. For RPC analysis, it has only been used as an exploratory, post-
processing tool [27]. In this limited capacity, however, the indications are that it is
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capable of predicting rotorcraft PIOs. There are a number of uncertainties associated
with the ROVER methodology. First, it is not possible to distinguish between different
severities of PIO. Because of the nature of the tool and the use of digital flags, the
relative magnitudes of vehicle oscillations and pilot inputs are masked. It is therefore
difficult to determine what is happening during the PIO event with sole reference to
the ROVER output. A potential drawback of the method is the need to set threshold
values, based on the vehicle being analysed. Currently, the threshold boundaries must
be selected subjectively, based on conditions relating to PIOs in the vehicle. It has been
shown in previous studies how this can dramatically influence the results obtained [56].
If the thresholds are set too low, over-prediction of PIOs will occur. Similarly, if too
high, adequate prediction will not be achieved.
The ROVER logic is shown in Fig. 4.1. It uses the combination of four digital flags
to ascertain the incipience of the PVS to PIO. These flags are as follows;
•Magnitude of Pilot Control Input: The demands of the pilot, to ensure that
he is part of any observed oscillations;
•Magnitude of Vehicle Rate Output: Rate response in the axis of interest, to
ensure that vehicle oscillations are occurring;
•Oscillation Frequency: Of both Pilot Control and Vehicle Rate output. Gives
insight into whether the vehicle is operated in the correct frequency range for a rigid-
body PIO and
•Phase: Difference between the pilot input and the vehicle output, shows if the nec-
essary condition of out-of-phase behaviour causing mental-mismatch is occurring
There are two inputs to the ROVER logic; the aircraft angular rate response and the
cockpit control input. Both these inputs must be smoothed to try to reduce or eliminate
the effects of noise. The algorithm treats all signals as oscillatory, and calculates phase
distortion in the time domain, based on the period of oscillations.
For a PIO to exist, all flags must be triggered. Depending on the situation, flags are
triggered on or off. The user is required to set limits to determine when the flag will
be triggered. Based on the status of the flags, a cumulative ‘ROVER score’ is given to
the situation. Individually, all flags are given equal status. However, if two or more
flags are triggered and one of these is the ‘phase’ flag, it is given a value of 1.5. This
is to increase the dependency on the phase difference in a PIO situation. Using the
additional half, it is possible to obtain a ROVER score of 3.5. It is recommended that
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Figure 4.1: Flowchart of the ROVER process [11].
this is taken as the situation where the vehicle is entering a PIO, with the prediction
made and the deployment of an alleviation system.
4.2.2 Pilot-Inceptor Workload
One method that uses pilot control activity to assess the potential for PIOs was pre-
sented by Gray [86], called Pilot-Inceptor Workload (PIW). The reader is directed
towards Ref. [90] for a more detailed description of the method and its development.
PIW has been developed specifically for workload build-up tasks and identification of
A/RPC susceptibility in boundary avoidance tracking (BAT) tasks. In a BAT scenario,
the pilot switches from a point tracking task (such as aligning a bore sight reticule with
a target) to the avoidance of some form of boundary (such as an angle-of-attack limit
or the Earth’s surface) [90]. The PIW criterion separates pilot control activity into
two coupled time-domain based parameters: Duty Cycle (PIWDC) and Aggression
(PIWAG). PIWDC is a measure of pilot activity, and in former work has been mea-
sured using a minimum threshold of control displacement, control rate, or a combination
of the two. PIWAG is a measure of the pilot’s ‘aggression’, and in previous work has
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been computed using the resultant magnitudes of a combination between pilot control
displacement and rate.
With the use of only the inceptor outputs, the application of this method to flight
testing and evaluation is simple, requiring no complex hardware installations. It has
also proven to be a successful visual tool for pilots to assess their workload in relation to
the inceptor activity at the United States Air Force Test Pilot School (USAF TPS) [90].
For different investigations, a variety of measures have been used to denote PIWDC
and PIWAG. For the purposes of this research, PIWDC was taken to represent the
percentage of time the pilot is moving the controls and AG describes how fast the pilot
is moving them (as per definitions in Ref. [120]). PIWDC and PIWAG are coupled
parameters because they are dependent upon the rate of the control inceptor motion
(δ˙). Large changes in δ˙ will likely to lead to both high values for both parameters.
However, the combination of the two can provide insight into the pilot control strategy
and workload.
Figure 4.2 shows a graphical display of how a combination of the parameters relate
to changes in control activity.
Figure 4.2: Duty Cycle and Aggression relationship to control activity (adapted from
Ref. [90]).
As shown in Fig. 4.2, high PIWDC with low PIWAG represents constant, slow
inputs. This is a situation where it is unlikely that the system bandwidth (ωBW ) or
rate limit values, two of the primary causes of RPCs, will be reached. A situation with
low PIWDC and high PIWAG relates to occasional fast inputs. This is a situation
where ωBW and rate limits are likely to be reached. However, due to the nature of
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the sporadic inputs, it will not lead to an A/RPC as sustained out-of-phase inputs will
not occur. It is when there is a combination of high PIWAG and high DC that the
situation could result in an A/RPC. This situation relates to high pilot gain, where
fast, aggressive movements of the inceptor are continuously being made. However, with
PIWDC and PIWAG information alone, it is not possible to identify whether or not
the aircraft-pilot system is in a PIO situation, because nothing is known about the
dynamics of the event. It is intuitive that if a pilot tries to fly an unstable aircraft, the
workload and required control gain will be higher. However, there is nothing to say
that such an aircraft will not have perfect in-phase control response. Therefore, in the
form shown in Fig. 4.2, only an indication of the tendency to PIO can be determined.
Because of this, the criterion must be combined with other analysis methods to increase
confidence in the correct detection of PIOs. In Ref. [120], a large increase in PIW and a
failure to maintain desired performance was used to indicate a critical boundary point.
It is hypothesized that, at this point, a pilot will enter into a BAT PIO event [90].
The theory behind BAT PIOs posits a different form of pilot control strategy from the
traditional point-tracking (PT) model of, for example, aircraft flight-path or attitude
control. A PT task requires the pilot to maintain some fixed value such as the vehicle
attitude or speed. However, the BAT situation demands that the pilot adopts a different
strategy in order to avoid defined boundaries such as stall limits. In previous campaigns
at the USAF TPS, the criterion has been used to analyse control activity over complete
flight manoeuvres, or for pre-defined subsections of the flight. Unfortunately, use in
this way only allows for analysis of results following the completed flight, and therefore
cannot be used as a real time detection tool. It can however be used to give feedback
on the flight undertaken.
4.3 Real-Time Phase-Aggression Criterion
It was intended that any new criterion should address the limitations of the existing
real-time methods mentioned in the preceding discussion. The method proposed and
subsequently investigated to try to achieve this was to extend the PIW criterion and
include additional information relating to the vehicle dynamics. This new method has
been called the ‘Phase Aggression Criterion’.
The additional information selected, as the name suggests, was the phase difference
between pilot input displacement and vehicle rate output. As the pilot is ultimately
interested in achieving a desired attitude, a phase difference between the attitude rate
and inceptor input, with the rate lagging the inceptor input by 90◦, classically describes
an out-of-phase response (i.e. the vehicle attitude lags pilot control by 180◦). This is
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classically one of the important factors required for a PIO to exist. The combination
of data from both the pilot and the vehicle, it was considered, would complement the
capability of ROVER, whilst removing the subjective selection of thresholds and the
masking of the underlying data that are inherent within the method.
The combination of phase information was achieved through the modification of
the use of PIW criteria. Gray proposed the PIW metrics as measure of activity over
the course of a manoeuvre. For example, following completion of a MTE, both a DC
and AG result would be attained. However, use in this way does not allow for ‘real-
time’ detection of PIO. Therefore, the first proposal was to create time varying DC
and AG outputs, with constant time-step. For example, if the time-step was set at 1
second, an update of DC and AG would be given. Time sampling in this way allows
the progression of PIW to be observed, either with respect to time, or on the chart
shown in Fig. 4.2.
The proposal to implement an updating phase calculation was seen to complement
this sampling technique. Due to the requirement for real-time output, it was only
conceivable to calculate phase distortion in the time domain. Therefore, a method
similar to the method employed by ROVER was developed.
Firstly, the pilot input signals and vehicle output signals were low-pass filtered to
limit the frequency content to lower than 10 rad/s (the recognised maximum frequency
for historical PIOs). Then, control input magnitude and vehicle rate amplitudes were
differentiated to find the respective rates. This allowed for determination of maximum
and minimum points through observations of zero crossings. Each zero crossing was
determined to be a maximum or minimum, and time stamped. Frequency of signals
could be determined through the observation of the time difference between the current
and last maximum/minimum in either the pilot control input or the vehicle output.
Phase was calculated using Eqn.(4.1), where Tp(q,r)PK2 is the current attitude rate peak,
TδPK2 is the current control input peak, and TδPK1 is the last control input peak. All
parameters are shown in Fig. 4.3.
Θ = 360
Tp(q,r)PK2 − TδPK2
TδPK2 − TδPK1 (4.1)
In order to improve the consistency and accuracy of phase calculation, each max-
imum point was required to be followed by a minimum point and vice-versa. One
consideration is when the pilot is inactive, the calculation of phase in this way can lead
to spurious values, which appear very large. These should not be confused with phase
distortions during closed-loop control. Phase calculations are updated following each
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Figure 4.3: Calculation of phase distortion in the time domain.
cycle of the oscillatory signal. During post-processing, it is possible to time-stamp each
phase calculation to ascertain the progression through completion of the mission task.
From a number of different measures proposed during BAT research, the rate of pilot
control application was chosen to represent Aggression (AG). The formula developed
is shown in Eqn.(4.2).
AG = Hs
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
|δ˙θ1c(1s,0c)(t)|dt (4.2)
AG is the integral of the control input rate over the sampling time period. For
example, if the sampling time period is set as 1 second, then the AG is the integral of
control rate for the last second. The result is divided by the time step and multiplied
by the control gearing term Hs. The definition of Hs is shown in Eqn. (4.3), and
describes the vehicle attitude rate with respect to the pilot control input. This term is
introduced to make the criterion applicable to vehicles of different dynamics. Overall,
for a rate command system, the units of AG are given as deg/s
2.
Hs =
∆p(q, r)
∆δθ1c(1s,0c)
=
θ1c,(1s,0c)
∆δθ1c(1s,0c)
∆p(q, r)
θ1c,(1s,0c)
(4.3)
Eqn. (4.2) was used in the first application of the Phase-Aggression Criterion.
However, the use of a constant sampling rate was found to be inefficient. For example,
for periods of inactivity, there was no need to have sampling each second. Furthermore,
the resolution of the algorithm was dominated by the sampling time. However, required
resolution should be based on the requirement (i.e. the frequency of oscillatory signals).
Therefore, Eqn. (4.2) was replaced with a time-varying calculation. The constant
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sample time was replaced by the phase period time. This means that each time a new
phase distortion is calculated, an associated Aggression is presented. This increases the
resolution of the algorithm for higher frequency oscillations. The updated time-varying
AG formula is shown in Eqn. (4.4).
AG =
1
Tp(q,r)PK2 − Tp(q,r)PK1
∫ Tp(q,r)PK2
Tp(q,r)PK1
Hs|δ˙θ1c(1s,0c)(t)|dt (4.4)
The result of the formulation are two time-dependent, linked parameters; phase
distortion (Φ) and Aggression (AG). Furthermore, from calculations frequency of input
(ωIN ) and vehicle rate (ωp(q,r)) can be determined. The 2-dimensional plot proposed by
Gray (see Fig.4.2) can now be replaced with a 2-dimensional ΦAG chart. The analogous
regions of this chart are shown in Fig. 4.4. Those points where Φ is low and AG is
high describe the situation where vehicle output is synchronous to pilot control. In
this situation, the pilot is commanding and driving the aircraft response. When AG
is low, and Φ is high, the situation shows excessive phase lag with little pilot control
input. This situation could refer to mild pitch bobbles, or open-loop control activity.
Neither of these should warrant significant concern. The combination of AG and Φ
shows oscillations driven by the pilot, with high phase distortion. This is the situation
where PIOs are likely to occur, and mitigation techniques may be required. In this
situation, it is likely pilot response is driven by resultant vehicle oscillations.
Figure 4.4: Phase-Aggression Chart regions.
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4.4 Preliminary PAC Investigations
Pitch Tracking Task
In order to investigate the applicability of PAC, a novel Pitch Tracking task was used.
The task was designed to expose Rate Limiting, through the use of a number of attitude
captures, using the head-up display (HUD). This display is shown in Fig. 4.5. The
task was designed for use in the pitch axis.
Pilots are required to position the bore-sight, denoted by ‘A’, anywhere within the
boundaries (‘B’ and ‘C’) which were located a visual angle of 5◦ apart. At 5 second
intervals, the boundaries instantaneously move to a new vertical position in the visual
scene. The pilot’s task was to reposition the bore-sight between the newly located
boundaries within 2 seconds, and stabilise the vehicle pitch motion until the boundaries
moved again. This task, where pilots are forced to apply large aggressive control inputs
followed by tight control for stabilisation, is similar to the task employed by DLR to
expose lateral PIOs [121].
Figure 4.5: Pitch Tracking.
The FGR model, described in Chapter 3, was used for the investigation. In order
to provide a simplified experiment to investigate the use of PAC, the model was con-
strained to allow rotation in the pitch axis only. The task was flown by two of the test
pilots, Pilot G and H. PIO susceptibility was engineered through disabling the Stability
Augmentation System (SAS), and through varying levels of forward control RL. Over-
all, three different Pitch Tracking sequences (shown in Fig. 4.6) led to the observation
of 21 unique configurations. The task sequences were defined by the movement of the
boundaries. Each was repeated by both pilots a minimum of two times.
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(a) Pitch Tracking boundary C1
(b) Pitch Tracking boundary C2
(c) Pitch Tracking boundary C3
Figure 4.6: Signals for the Pitch Tracking Investigation.
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Initially, pilot comments and observations during the test campaign were used to
conclude whether or not PIO events had been encountered. The goal was to use this
information to set PAC PIO susceptibility boundaries.
4.4.1 Identification of Pilot-Induced Oscillations
In order to proceed, potential PIO events had to be identified and verified in the test
data. During the analysis, attention was focused on identifying events whereby any
oscillatory vehicle motions that had been observed were solely an unwanted effect from
pilot control. Key factors in this appraisal were the level of task performance, the
synchronization of pilot control input with vehicle output and the magnitude of the
vehicle’s motion (whether excessive or larger than expected).
Data from the investigation was post-processed in order to determine, for each
completed test point, whether PIOs had been experienced. One of the most important
outcomes from this would be to differentiate between the dangerous PIO situation,
whereby a safety critical situation arises, and the ‘mild’ or ‘moderate’ pitch bobbles
experienced during high aggression flight. This of course is fundamental to any newly
developed detection tool; it is not desirable to identify and potentially alleviate every
minor pitch bobble. Therefore, when analysing the test data, the following rules were
used:
•Task Performance ; A PIO that warranted concern was one that had a signifi-
cantly detrimental effect on overall task performance. The key distinguishing feature
that was assessed was to ‘filter’ the situations where oscillatory responses were a side
effect of the pilot’s tracking effort, and to identify the oscillations that suggested po-
tential for loss of control. To assist with this analysis, pilot comments in conjunction
with subjective opinion ratings were used.
•Changes in control strategy ; PIOs cause changes in control strategy, whether it
be due to applied compensation to prevent an oscillation occurring or due to a change
in strategy to suppress an oscillation that is already in progress.
•Effects of limiting elements; A strong indication of PIOs occurring is given by
any control path rate limits being activated. Whether this is constant or sporadic,
non-linearities can make it more challenging for the pilot to apply the correct amount
of compensation that is required.
•Phase difference ; For PIOs, there exists the requirement for the aircraft response
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to be out-of-phase with the pilot command; that is, a mismatch between the pilot and
vehicle dynamics.
A key concern when inspecting the data was the manner in which the pilot completed
the task, relating to the frequency and magnitude of their control inputs to the vehicle
and the repeatability of the manoeuvre in general. In the perfect vehicle, the desired
task performance would only require a small number of large control inputs. If, during
completion of the task in the experimental models, the pilot commanded many more
large inputs, it gave a strong indication, when coupled with other signs noted above,
that a PIO event was occurring.
Pilot comments and subjective ratings were also used in order to assist with the
identification of a PIO. However, during completion of the Pitch Tracking manoeuvre,
it seems that pilots found it challenging to separate control synchronous oscillations
with those that were truly unintentional. Therefore, little value was seen in using
Pilot-Induced Oscillation Ratings as the sole method for identification of PIOs. All
test points, and subjective ratings from the investigation, are shown in Appendix B.
Figure 4.7 displays three time-traces of typical cases recorded during the Pitch
Tracking investigation. The figures show the pilot input and the vehicle attitude output.
Figure 4.7a displays an example with no clear oscillations; where pitch overshoots occur,
but do not inhibit completion of task performance. Here ‘open loop’ pilot control
is observed, whereby control inputs are used primarily to acquire the desired pitch
attitude. This case is one where no change in performance strategy is apparent, and
the task has been satisfactorily completed.
Figure 4.7b displays an example where sustained oscillations have been experienced.
The pilot has not been able to suppress these oscillations through the test run, but has
been able to complete the task and maintain control of the vehicle. Pilot control
inputs are seen to use approximately half of the available control gain. In the pitch
attitude trace, clear oscillatory response is shown. This represents the situation where
oscillations have required a change in task strategy, and have significantly impacted
the performance of the pilot. Therefore, in this situation, PAC would be required to
detect oscillatory response.
Finally, Fig. 4.7c displays a case where severe, divergent oscillations were experi-
enced during attempted completion of the manoeuvre. As shown in the pitch attitude
trace, in this case it is very difficult to ascertain whether the pilot is attempting to
complete the task at all, or whether he is focused purely on suppressing oscillations. In
this case, ‘saw-tooth’ type control inputs are observed using maximum control input
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(±5in) from approximately 20 seconds. Control input in such a manner suggests rate
limiting in the vehicle control path. The magnitude of oscillations seems to increase
as time progresses, suggesting divergent oscillation tendencies. As a result, this case is
one for which PAC must identify oscillations.
The differences observed in the above data traces were used as a benchmark for PAC
susceptibility boundaries. It should be expected that PAC detect PIO occurrences for
both Fig.4.7b and Fig.4.7c.
4.4.2 Application of ROVER
Prior to any development of PAC metrics, all results from the study were processed
using the ROVER algorithm, discussed in a preceding section. Care was taken when
setting thresholds for ROVER, as they must be set based on the specific aircraft.
A number of studies to date have used a wide range of threshold values, to re-
flect the characteristics of the aircraft used. However, none have detailed a rigorous
method for completion of this ‘threshold tuning’, and it is unclear how thresholds have
been determined. One method that has been used is to calibrate ROVER based on
previously completed tests. An example is shown in Ref. [84], where thresholds for a
C-17 transport aircraft were calibrated from ten flight events. This method of selection
requires data to be available from previous tests, and does not take account how the
PIO characteristics, or the characteristics of the threshold values, change as the vehi-
cle changes (retrofitted modification, changes in weight, flight conditions, atmospheric
conditions). Furthermore, there is no reference to the number of pilots used in order to
calibrate the thresholds. In Ref. [56], calibration of ROVER thresholds was completed
through the use of a parametric study, which led to ‘optimised’ detection thresholds.
This method is reliant upon pilot subjective opinion only and, it leads to a calibration
only valid for one flight condition.
In a similar method as used in previous sources, the ROVER algorithm thresholds
were tuned through observation of the test data. Using rules outlined in the following
section, stick deflection and vehicle rate thresholds could be determined. In line with all
previous sources, the frequency range was set to 1−8 rad/s. The subjective appraisal of
thresholds is considered an inherent limitation of this method. The thresholds selected
for ROVER are shown in Table 4.1.
An important assumption was that thresholds for ROVER were the same for both
pilots and for all vehicle model configurations. Specifically, SAS-ON and SAS-OFF
vehicle models have different parameters, with regards to control gain, etc. This was
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(a) TP3 PG-I simulated flight data results
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(b) TP9 PH-I simulated flight data results
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(c) TP6 PH-I simulated flight data results
Figure 4.7: Vehicle swashplate deflection, vehicle pitch rate, and pitch attitude for three
cases recorded during the Pitch Tracking investigation.
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Table 4.1: ROVER thresholds used during the investigation.
Parameter Selected
Vehicle FGR
Axis Pitch
Stick Position (%) 30%
Vehicle Rate (deg/s) 15
Phase (deg) 100 < Φ < 180
Frequency (rad/s) 1.0 < ωIN < 8.0
not seen to impact the ROVER thresholds.
Full results from the application of ROVER are shown in Table 4.2. For each test
run, both the number of occasions for which ROVER Score = 4 (R4) was returned
and the number of consecutive ROVER Score = 4 (R4−4) were recorded. If the pilot
experiences a PIO event, sustained cycles will prevail. If cycles are not sustained, it
could indicate that the pilot has avoided sustained PIO through adaptation in strategy.
In Ref. [82] for example, it states that oscillations must exhibit at least two cycles to
be classed as a PIO.
As ROVER returns a flag for each cycle it is possible to determine whether PIO
tendencies are sustained during the flight. If ROVER Score = 4 is not awarded for
consecutive cycles, it indicates that oscillations are not sustained. The observation
of consecutive points was considered very important when inspecting results obtained
from the application of the ROVER algorithm.
For all configurations, R4 was triggered at least at one time by each of the pilots.
However, often these were only isolated, and single occurrences. For many cases, one
or two spurious ROVER points were obtained, where R4 was awarded but no real
oscillatory presence seemed to exist. Here, the guidelines above are used, and the re-
quirements to select oscillations that warrant concern only. One observation was that
on many occasions, R4 was obtained due to the large control inputs required to com-
plete the task. In the Pitch Tracking task, a large control input is required to capture a
new attitude. The vehicle pitch response follows this input, lagging due to the available
pitch bandwidth. However, as soon as ROVER detects the pilot has reversed control,
it recognises a ‘cycle’, and calculates the phase and frequency. At this time, R4 is
returned. However, immediately after, the pilot has stabilised and is not within a PIO.
Therefore, this ‘spurious’ flag almost represents ‘the entry’ to ‘possible’ PIO, but does
not denote actual sustained oscillations. In order to remove these spurious flags, and
to not trigger a warning when not warranted, all data was inspected subjectively. As a
result, the following rules were applied to improve the effectiveness of the application
of ROVER:
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Table 4.2: ROVER Results from Pitch Tracking Investigation, displaying total percent-
age of ROVER Score = 4 flags and number of consecutive ROVER Score = 4 (shown
in parenthesis).
ROVER Observation
Run 1 Run 2
Test
Point
SAS Long.
Rate Limit
(deg/s)
Bound. P-G P-H P-G P-H
1 ON 30 C1 2(1) a 2(1) 6(1)
2 ON 30 C3 2(1) 6(1) 5(1) 2(1)
3 ON 20 C1 4(1) 12(3) 2(1) 5(1)
4 OFF 20 C2 23(3) 41(6) 5(1) 38(8)
5 ON 20 C3 3(1) 0(0) 2(1) 2(1)
6 OFF 10 C3 11(2) 61(7) 4(1) 33(9)
7 OFF 30 C2 0(0) 21(5) 11(2) 10(1)
8 ON 10 C1 6(2) 2(1) 9(2) 23(8)
9 OFF 30 C1 9(3) 49(9) 11(2) 54(9)
10 ON 10 C2 3(1) 0(0) 16(4) 7(2)
11 OFF 30 C3 6(1) 9(2) 12(2) 4(1)
12 OFF 10 C2 21(3) 19(5) 32(9) 4(2)
13 ON 20 C2 9(4) 2(1) 19(3) 6(1)
14 OFF 20 C3 8(1) 17(3) 18(3) 35(4)
15 OFF 10 C1 15(2) 30(11) 20(4) 34(6)
16 ON 30 C2 5(1) 4(1) 6(1) 6(3)
17 ON 10 C3 27(4) 0(0) 47(12) 4(1)
18 OFF 20 C1 17(2) 27(5) a 8(3)
19 ON 50 C1 4(1) 0(0) 8(2) 0(0)
20 ON 50 C2 7(1) 4(1) 4(2) 2(1)
21 ON 50 C3 8(1) 0(0) 6(1) 2(1)
aCase not recorded
•PIO observed for cases where 5% of results are found to be ROVER =
4
•PIO observed for cases where 2 or more consecutive ROVER = 4 are ob-
tained
•PIO not observed for cases where no consecutive ROVER = 4 obtained
AND less than 5% of results are found to be ROVER 4
Using the above rules, the results shown in Table 4.3 were obtained from the appli-
cation of ROVER. As shown, detections were made by ROVER for all cases flown. The
percentage of detected cases was found to be higher for the SAS-OFF configuration,
with over 80% PIO detection for all RL cases.
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Table 4.3: ROVER detections for all test cases.
Test Points Aircraft Dy-
namics
Rate
Limit,
deg/s
ROVER De-
tection (Run
1)
ROVER De-
tection (Run
2)
PIO Ob-
served,
%
19/20/21 SAS-ON 50 n,n/y,n/y,n y,n/y,n/y,n 42
1/2/16 SAS-ON 30 n,n/n,y/y,n a,n/n,n/y,y 36
3/5/13 SAS-ON 20 n,y/n,n/y,n n,n/n,n/y,y 33
17/8/10 SAS-ON 10 y,n/y,n/n,n y,n/y,y/y,y 58
7/9/11 SAS-OFF 30 n,y/y,y/y,y y,y/y,y/y,n 83
4/14/18 SAS-OFF 20 y,y/y,y/y,y n,y/y,y/a,y 91
6/12/15 SAS-OFF 10 y,y/y,y/y,y n,y/y,y/y,y 92
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aCase not recorded
Although PIOs are detected for all cases, the propensity for PIO appeared to be
different for both the SAS-ON and SAS-OFF cases, and for difference RLs. This is
shown through observation of the spread and mean of ROVER = 4. These results are
shown in Figures 4.8a and 4.8b. For the SAS-ON cases, a trend of increasing ROVER
detections is observed with respect to RL. Only a very low number of R4 observations
are made for cases with 50 deg/s and 30 deg/s RL, but these are enough to cause
concern. When RL = 10 deg/s, the percentage of cases where ROVER = 4 was found
to occur in the range 0% to 46%. For the SAS-OFF cases, a less distinguishable trend
was found between RL and the %R4 results. For all cases, a large spread of results
was found. Overall, all SAS-OFF cases showed higher susceptibility through the use of
ROVER than SAS-OFF cases.
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of % ROVER Score = 4 with respect to rate limit and vehicle
configuration.
Figure 4.9 shows an example between difference in ROVER predictions between the
SAS-ON and SAS-OFF cases with the RL = 30 deg/s. Both of these cases represent
those where PIO has been identified. However, a difference in the propensity due to
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the control system is shown. Without the SAS engaged, oscillations appear undamped,
and appear throughout the task completion. These oscillations are only found to be
indicative of PIO during a short period of the run. However, when the SAS is engaged,
the tendency for oscillations is reduced, and those that do occur appear to be well
damped. This leads to no sustained ROVER = 4 results, despite a similar number of
Phase, Rate, Stick, and Frequency flags appearing.
Taking considerations into account, final observations were made regarding ROVER’s
ability to ‘detect’ PIOs, as a post-processing aid. Overall in the study, a large number
of PIOs were detected through the use of ROVER. In fact, many more PIO events were
observed than had been envisaged. This appeared to be a result of the task aggression,
where larger control inputs than expected were required to complete the translation.
Throughout the recorded tests, the most severe PIOs were found with the lower
rate limits, and with the SAS-off configuration. In these conditions, large excursions
were often experienced and the pilot often struggled to alleviate oscillations on his own.
This difficulty was conveyed through multiple and sustained R4 scores. These results,
and the findings from the application of ROVER, were used in order to develop the
presented PAC criteria further.
4.4.3 Application of PAC Criterion
All data processed using ROVER was post-processed using the newly devised PAC
algorithm. Here, some examples of the analysis are shown, to give an overview of its
use to determine PIO susceptibility. Results are shown against ROVER Scores, and
with respect to time. Figure 4.10a and 4.10b show results for TP3, flown by Pilot G.
As shown, two isolated R4 exist, towards the beginning of the manoeuvre, as a result
of the large translations and rapid control. However, direct observation of the test data
does not explicitly show any PIO tendencies. As shown, AG peaks during translations,
and then subsides prior to the next translation. AG peaks at approximately 15 deg /s
2.
Notably during the case, Phase distortion stays similar throughout the manoeuvre.
This suggests that no ‘trigger’ has occurred during the run. At some points during
the manoeuvre, the Phase rapidly increases where miscalculation has occurred. This
is where the pilot has applied open-loop control, and the response of the vehicle does
not reflect oscillatory motion. Figure 4.10c and 4.10d show results from TP9, flown
by Pilot H, where clear oscillatory response was observed throughout the manoeuvre.
As shown, ROVER detected PIO, sustained from approximately 20 seconds. As shown
through PAC results, at this stage AG starts to increase as the pilot continues to fight
oscillations. AG increases to above 40 deg/s
2, over double shown in 4.10b. Throughout,
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(a) ROVER result, RL = 30 deg/s, example for SAS-OFF configuration.
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(b) ROVER result, RL = 30 deg/s, example for SAS-ON configuration.
Figure 4.9: Comparison of two ROVER results.
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Phase distortion remains consistent. Therefore, in this case, PAC seems to suggest PIO
tendencies through the increase in AG.
A final example is shown in Figures 4.10e and 4.10f, where severe oscillations, of
very large amplitude are shown throughout the manoeuvre. Upon inspection, these
are caused by activation of system RL. As in the previous case, these oscillations are
detected using the ROVER algorithm, sustained throughout the manoeuvre. PAC
results in Fig. 4.10f show continuously increasing AG, and reaches a maximum above
50 deg/s2. As in the previous case, it appears that PIO tendency is shown through
the increase in AG, which has occurred as the pilot fights resultant oscillations. Phase
distortion throughout the manoeuvre remains consistent after 20 seconds.
These three cases illustrate the differences that can be observed through the appli-
cation of the Phase-Aggression Criterion.
Figures 4.11a to 4.11c display the spread of PAC results obtained for the three
examples shown above, displaying the regions of highest concentration of PAC results.
Each PAC chart is separated into regions, and the percentage of PAC points within
each region, with respect to total number of PAC points, is displayed. Also displayed,
as a dashed line, is the equivalent Aggression required to cause rate limiting (for the
case shown in Fig.4.11b, the rate limit is higher than the maximum Aggression shown,
and therefore is not displayed). When Aggression is greater than this value, the pilot is
operating above the rate limit (i.e. his/her control will cause rate limiting). For the case
shown in Fig.4.11a, the highest concentration of PAC points in found with the lowest
level of Aggression (0-5 deg/s2), and phase between 40◦-80◦. This is consistent with
what was expected from observation of the data. For both cases shown in Fig.4.11b and
Fig.4.11c the highest concentration of PAC points occur at much larger AG and Φ. For
the cases shown in Fig.4.11b, the highest concentration of PAC points is found between
80◦-120◦, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the case shows a sustained PIO.
Furthermore, for the case shown in Fig.4.11c, it is shown that the highest concentration
of PAC points in above the rate limit.
Whilst the results show the differences between PIO incipient and PIO robust cases,
it is not completely apparent how the results can be used to ‘detect’ PIO. Here, it was
hypothesised that boundaries could be drawn upon a φ-AG chart, in order to warn of
PIO tendencies.
From results obtained, there was clear indication that not all PIOs were caused by
RL. An example is shown in Fig. 4.12, where rate limit output is synchronous with
control input, but large oscillations appear throughout completion of the manoeuvre.
This could also be seen in other data traces obtained. As previously stated, the goal of
90
0 10 20 30 40
−5
0
5
δ θ
1s
,
 
de
g
 
 
−20
0
20
q,
 d
eg
/s
δθ1s
q
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
3
4
Time, sec
R
O
VE
R 
Sc
or
e
(a) TP3 PG R1, ROVER results
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
Time, sec
A G
,
 
de
g/
s2
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
100
200
Time, sec
Ph
as
e,
 d
eg
(b) TP3 PG R1, PAC results
0 10 20 30 40 50
−4
−2
0
2
4
δ θ
1s
,
 
de
g
 
 
−20
−10
0
10
20
q,
 d
eg
/s
δθ1s
q
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
3
4
Time, sec
R
O
VE
R 
Sc
or
e
(c) TP9 PH R1, ROVER results
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
60
Time, sec
A G
,
 
de
g/
s2
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
100
200
Time, sec
Ph
as
e,
 d
eg
(d) TP9 PH R1, PAC results
0 10 20 30 40
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
δ θ
1s
,
 
de
g
 
 
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
q,
 d
eg
/s
δθ1s
q
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
3
4
Time, sec
R
O
VE
R 
Sc
or
e
(e) TP6 PH R1, ROVER results
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
Time, sec
A G
,
 
de
g/
s2
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
100
200
Time, sec
Ph
as
e,
 d
eg
(f) TP6 PH R1, PAC results
Figure 4.10: Comparison of ROVER and PAC results for three cases.
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Figure 4.11: Spread of PAC results from three cases completed during the Pitch Track-
ing investigation.
the investigation was to determine preliminary boundaries for PAC, to detect regions of
PIO susceptibility. Furthermore, one of the motivations behind the use of PAC was the
ability to determine the types of oscillations experienced, and to cater for a wide range
of conditions. With this in mind, it seemed suitable that two sets of boundaries were
required for the criterion: the first set representing ‘linear-type’, steady behaviour, and
the second set specifically identifying ‘quasi-linear’ effects, due to RLEs.
In order to achieve this goal, cases were separated into those where no PIOs were
recognised, those where PIOs were recognised but limiting was not a factor, and those
where PIOs were recognised and limiting was a factor. Dividing the cases into these
groups allowed for the determination of regions of susceptibility.
Using the subjective appraisal of data, ROVER results, and pilot subjective opin-
ion, it was possible to determine preliminary boundaries for susceptibility, based upon
results obtained through the use of PAC. The following process was undertaken;
1. The data from an individual run completion was plotted on the Phase-Aggression
Chart.
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Figure 4.12: Example of control input trace alongside rate limiter output.
2. Resultant oscillations and instability were identified through use of the test data.
3. Pilot subjective opinion, the combination of HQR and PIO, was used to justify
subjective appraisal of data. Available pilot comments were also used to ascertain
whether PIOs had occurred.
4. If PIO was not detected, the region was seen as ‘safe’. Determination of the
‘unsafe’ region was achieved through drawing safe regions.
Figure 4.13 displays an example of the envelope of results obtained from one case
(Pilot H, TP10). During this case, the RL = 10 deg/s which is equivalent to an AG of
11.1 deg/s2. This means that when the AG is reached, the pilot is operating at the rate
defined by the RL (i.e. 10 deg/s). The AG conversion accounts for control sensitivity,
and unit conversions. The individual points display PAC detections. As shown, for this
case, most of the points are found to have AG lower than the RL. The ‘Upper Boundary’
shown on the figure display the maximum AG with respect to Φ found during the run.
It is shown that for this case, the Upper Boundary is above the rate limit between 50
deg and 120 deg of phase. Upper Boundaries were used to observe the region of PAC
results for all cases completed during the pitch tracking investigation.
Figures 4.14a to 4.14f give insight into the spread of PAC points obtained for the
various configurations. The figures show the PAC charts separated into ‘regions’. In
each of these regions, the amount of PAC points, as a percentage of the total number
of points, are shown. This displays where the highest concentration of PAC points for
each test were recorded. The figures also display the rate limits, as a dashed line, for
the cases, showing if the majority of PAC cases were above or below the rate limit. For
the cases where no rate limit is displayed, it is greater than the maximum Aggression
shown on the graph. As shown, a larger majority of PAC points were found above the
rate limits for the SAS-ON configuration. This shows that the configurations are more
susceptible to Cat.II PIOs than the equivalent SAS-OFF cases. This is consistent with
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Figure 4.13: Example of region identified.
the Cat.II OLOP appraisal presented in Chapter 3. However, SAS-OFF configurations
display a larger amount of phase than SAS-ON equivalents. This is consistent with the
Cat.I predictions obtained using BPD.
The scatter of PAC points, and knowledge of the RL and the pilot appraisal was
used to construct preliminary PAC boundaries. These boundaries were constructed
first for the Rate Limit cases (Cat. II), and then for the cases where Rate Limiting is
not a factor (Cat. I). The boundaries were constructed using a combination of the data
available and knowledge of which combinations of phase and aggression could cause
PIO.
When constructing the Cat. II boundary, the most important cases were those with
RL = 10deg/s. Besides these cases, no other RL combination appeared to lead to Cat.
II PIOs. The following were taken into account;
•The boundary was based on the Rate Limit: as the limit changes, the position of
the boundaries should also change.
•Severe PIOs will only occur with a significant phase distorsion: in order for clas-
sical PIOs to exist, there must be a phase distorsion between pilot input and vehicle
output [4]. Therefore, the Severe PIO boundary was set to a minimum phase distor-
tion.
•Depedency upon AG and Φ: as shown in Fig. 4.4, the combination of AG and φ
will lead to the most Severe PIOs, characterised by large, fast, and aggressive control
inputs. Therefore, as the phase increases, the AG required to reach the boundary should
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(a) SAS-ON, RL = 30 deg/s
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(b) SAS-ON, RL = 20 deg/s
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(c) SAS-ON, RL = 10 deg/s
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(d) SAS-OFF, RL = 30 deg/s
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(e) SAS-OFF, RL = 20 deg/s
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(f) SAS-OFF, RL = 10 deg/s
Figure 4.14: Comparison of scatter of PAC points, determined from cases with different
Rate Limits and vehicle configuration.
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reduce.
•Potential for oscillations when operating above the Rate Limit: if φ is small and the
pilot is operating above the rate limit, oscillations are possible if the level of aggression
continues. Therefore, points in this region should also be detected.
Figures 4.15a and 4.15b display how the ROVER results were used to assist with
the generation of the boundary. Figure 4.15a displays all PAC points obtained for
cases where ROVER did not detect PIO. During tests, varying Rate Limits were used.
In order to display the results on a single figure, the Aggression for all cases has been
normalised against the corresponding rate limit. Therefore, normalised AG = 1 is equal
to the aggression required to trigger and sustain the rate limit. For this reason, any
points with AG > 1 are those where the Aggression is greater than the rate limit. As
shown in Fig. 4.15a, for the majority of cases where ROVER has not detected PIO, the
PAC points are below the rate limit. Furthermore, most points are ‘clustered’ below
the rate limit. The figure displays a suggested boundary for PIO susceptibility, which
contains all PAC points within the strong cluster. As shown, a number of scattered
points exist above the boundary, displaying a possible mismatch between the ROVER
and PAC detections. The suggested boundary requires a minimum phase of 80 deg to
show PIO, which is set based upon theory, as insufficient data was available within this
region for the accurate construction of the boundary.
Figure 4.15b displays the PAC points for cases where ROVER detected PIO. Here,
the increase in Aggression is shown, as a much larger proportion of points appear above
the boundaries. Furthermore, the cluster of points crosses the suggested PAC bound-
ary. The difference between the cases is shown through observation of the suggested
boundary.
Using the statements above, and full inspection of the simulation data, it was pos-
sible to construct boundaries to give both Moderate and Severe PIO regions. These
regions, for identification of Category II PIOs, are shown in Fig. 4.16a. Here, both
‘Moderate’ and ‘Severe’ PIO boundaries are shown. Whilst the Severe boundary was
set to require a minimum phase distortion of 80 deg, the Moderate boundary did not
include this requirement. This was due to the intended use of the ‘Moderate’ boundary.
As a detection tool, it is important to identify dangerous situations during flight. Here,
it was considered that operating the vehicle above the rate limit should be classed as a
dangerous situation and should return as a warning to the pilot. Although the region
is termed ‘Moderate PIO’, it should also be considered as a ‘warning’ region.
If the pilot is working constantly above RL, variable pilot control input rate during
the cycle could lead to local triggering of limits, without sustained limiting. In this
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Figure 4.15: Preliminary boundaries drawn for analysis of PIO susceptibility in the
longitudinal axis.
way, the effect of constantly ‘triggering’ could occur, causing difficulty for the pilot and
ultimately PIO behaviour. Furthermore, regardless of initial Φ distortion, triggering
of limits will lead to quasi-linear oscillatory behaviour. This is assuming there is no
alleviation system contained within the vehicle. Therefore, it should be recognised if
the pilot is operating above the RL, to warn of impending oscillations.
The AG limits for higher phase distortions are lower than the rate limit as, in this
region it would be much more likely that a pilot would trigger Rate Limiting through
control of the vehicle. With large over-control, short periods of rate limiting could
occur, leading to un-conventional vehicle response and undesirable oscillations.
Boundaries for Category I tendencies were constructed using the same method, by
observing the difference between PAC points for PIO cases, and for those cases where
PIO was not present. The final resulting boundary for the longitudinal axis is shown in
Fig. 4.16b. Unlike the Category II boundaries, neither ‘Moderate’ or ‘Severe’ regions
exist for phase distortion below 70 degrees. This is due to the out of phase requirement
to ensure that any oscillations present vehicle motion different to that which the pilot
intended.
With the boundaries defined, it is possible to both observe the spread of φ and AG
points, but also determine the time dependent PIO incipience. Here, examples of the
three cases previously shown in this chapter are used to display results on the Phase-
Aggression chart. Results are shown for both the Category I (linear) and Category II
(quasi-linear) incipience.
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Figure 4.16: Preliminary boundaries drawn for analysis of PIO susceptibility in the
longitudinal axis.
Figures 4.17a and 4.17b display results for TP3, flown by Pilot G. Here, results
show that the pilot has encountered no sustained PIO event. It is apparent that at
one point, the pilot-vehicle system (PVS) reaches conditions for moderate PIO, caused
by triggering of RL. However, the pilot does not maintain AG within this region, and
full, sustained PIO events do not occur. Furthermore, in this case, the results remain
within the ‘NO PIO’ region for the Category I susceptibility.
Figures 4.17c and 4.17d display results from TP9, flown by Pilot H. Here, strong
oscillations were apparent throughout the completion of the test manoeuvre. As a
result, the pilot awarded HQR 6, and PIOR 4. This suggests convergent oscillations,
that inhibit the ability to complete the task to desired performance standards. Fur-
thermore, the pilot stated that he experienced objectionable oscillations throughout
the manoeuvre. Results shown in Fig.4.17c show that ‘Severe’ oscillations are detected
during the completion of the manoeuvre. As in the case shown in Fig.4.17b, the pilot
reaches conditions sufficient to trigger Cat. II PIO, but does not sustain AG or rate
limited oscillations. Therefore, in this case, PAC has detected oscillations, triggered by
the linear dynamics of the vehicle (Cat. I PIO).
Figures 4.17e and 4.17f display results from TP6, flown by Pilot H. In this case,
extreme oscillations are observed throughout the manoeuvre. As a result, the pilot
could not achieve adequate performance, with most of his effort focussed to maintain
control of the vehicle. In this case, it was clear that oscillations were caused by sustained
RL. As the pilot tried to ‘fight’ oscillations, he applied control above the rate limit,
sustaining oscillations throughout. In results obtained using PAC, clear oscillations
were identified, using both Cat. I and Cat. II boundaries. This observation confirmed
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the results obtained through the use of PAC.
4.4.4 PAC correlation and consistency
Further justification for the use of boundaries proposed was achieved through the com-
parison of results with those obtained using ROVER. Here, results determined using
ROVER were compared directly with those obtained using PAC. As with ROVER ob-
servations, all PAC results were inspected to ensure no false observations. Furthermore,
as with the ROVER method, it was considered necessary that significant PAC points
within the PIO regions was considered. For the analysis, the percentage breakdown of
PAC points for each case was determined.
•If the total number of points within the ‘Moderate’ and ‘Severe’ PIO re-
gions was found to be below 5% of total manoeuvre points (usually equivalent
to one single point), the case was not considered to show sustained oscilla-
tions, and therefore not considered to constitute PIO.
•If less than 5% points occurred within the ‘Severe’ region, but over 5%
in the combined ‘Moderate’ and ‘Severe’ regions, the case was deemed to
exhibit ‘Moderate’ oscillations.
Results for Pilot G and Pilot H are shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 respectively.
Here, the severity of PAC observations is shown, alongside ROVER overall appraisal.
PAC results are separated through Cat. I and Cat. II observations. For PAC results,
either No (n), Moderate (m), or Severe (s) PIO was identified. For ROVER results,
PIO was either identified (y), or was not (n). Correlation between ROVER and PAC
detection is shown with a tick symbol (3).
As shown, Pilot G shows results with a 67% correlation for the 1st test runs, and
80% for the 2nd test runs. Whilst it was hoped that the correlation would be higher, it
is recognised that the two tools are different, and as a result will likely show different
observations. This is particularly true for ‘borderline’ cases, where low frequency of
observation was shown by each method. Furthermore, there are likely differences due
to the ‘observation’ thresholds set during the analysis. The requirement of ROVER
is that one must select the thresholds for PIO. However, this ‘estimation’ may not be
correct. Furthermore, in this analysis, it has been assumed that all models and pilots
have the same ROVER thresholds. This is not necessarily the case, and may lead to
some differences regarding observations.
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Figure 4.17: PAC results from Pitch Tracking investigation, determined through use
of preliminary longitudinal boundaries. Numbers shown alongside points represent the
time of observation, rounded to the nearest second.
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As shown in Table 4.5, correlation between methods for Pilot H is more consistent.
For both the 1st and 2nd runs of the manoeuvres, correlation is approximately 75%.
Again, whist it was hoped that the correlation would be stronger, it is recognised
that the results obtained are encouraging. Findings also show the advantage offered
through the use of PAC, as it is possible to observe both the source, and severity of the
oscillations. For example, one can see that TP9 has led to PIOs that have not been
caused by RL. Furthermore, oscillations were more found to be more severe for Pilot
H. Finally, for this case, there was no reduction in severity during the 2nd completion
of the manoeuvre for either test pilot. For this case, ROVER returns observation of
oscillations for completed test runs. However, the severity of these oscillations is not
clear.
Table 4.4: ROVER results from Pitch Tracking investigation, Pilot G.
Run 1 Run 2
TP Cat. I Cat. II ROVER Correlation Cat. I Cat. II ROVER Correlation
1 n n n 3 n n n 3
2 n n n 3 n n n 3
3 n n n 3 n n n 3
4 m n y 3 m n n 7
5 n n n 3 n n n 3
6 m m y 3 n n n 3
7 n n n 3 m n y 3
8 m s y 3 n s y 3
9 m n y 3 m n y 3
10 n m n 7 n s y 3
11 n n y 7 m n y 3
12 m m y 3 s s y 3
13 n n y 7 n m y 3
14 m n y 3 s n y 3
15 m m y 3 m m y 3
16 n n y 7 n n y 7
17 m s y 3 m s y 3
18 n n y 7 - - - a
19 n n n 3 m n y 3
20 n n y 7 n n y 7
21 n n y 7 n n y 7
38% 29% 67% 67% 45% 30% 70% 80%
aCase not recorded
As an overall comparison, Fig. 4.18 displays the percentage of PIO cases detected
by each criterion, with respect to vehicle configuration (RL, SAS setting). Here, the
clear difference between criteria is shown for the SAS-ON configurations, with RL equal
to and above 20◦/s. In fact, these cases were those predicted to be most PIO prone.
This is shown through results from both criteria. However, ROVER has consistently
recognised more PIO events than PAC. Again, this could be a result of the threshold
selection. Furthermore, it is perhaps a consideration that ROVER is more sensitive,
recognising oscillations when they are perhaps not a problem.
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Table 4.5: ROVER results from Pitch Tracking investigation, Pilot H.
Run 1 Run 2
TP Cat. I Cat. II ROVER Correlation Cat. I Cat. II ROVER Correlation
1 - - - a n n n 3
2 n n y 7 n n n 3
3 n n y 7 n n n 3
4 s m y 3 s n y 3
5 n n n 3 n n n 3
6 s s y 3 s s y 3
7 m n y 3 m n y 3
8 n s n 7 n s y 3
9 s n y 3 s n y 3
10 n m n 7 n s y 3
11 m n y 3 m n n 7
12 m s y 3 n n y 7
13 n n n 3 n n y 7
14 s n y 3 s n y 3
15 m s y 3 s s y 3
16 n n n 3 n n y 7
17 n s n 7 n s n 7
18 s n y 3 m n y 3
19 n n n 3 n n n 3
20 n n n 3 n n n 3
21 n n n 3 n n n 3
45% 35% 55% 75% 38% 24% 58% 76%
aCase not recorded
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Figure 4.18: Overall comparison between PAC and ROVER detections, SO = SAS-ON,
SX = SAS-OFF.
A further observation is the difference in prediction for the SAS-ON case, with
RL set at 10◦/s. In this case, PAC detects PIO for all cases flown, for both runs.
However, ROVER detects PIO for only 60% of cases. This suggests that PAC is perhaps
more sensitive to RL than ROVER. However, overall observations suggest that the two
criteria are consistent.
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Table 4.6 displays the correlation between ROVER observations, PAC observations,
and predictions made prior to the test campaign. Comparison with the predictions give
justification for the high number of observations for the SAS-OFF configuration and
for the SAS-ON configuration with a RL = 10 deg/s. In all cases, PIO is predicted
by at least one of the two criteria. However, for all other cases, PIO is not predicted.
This is in contrast to the ROVER detections, which show PIO observed for between
30− 40% of cases. This is in contrast to PAC observations, which show very few cases
where PIO is detected. Findings suggest that ROVER has over-detected PIO events,
and that PAC boundaries are more suitable.
Table 4.6: ROVER detections for all test cases.
Test Points Rate
Limit,
deg/s
ROVER PIO
Observed, %
PAC PIO
Observed, %
BPD Pre-
diction
OLOP
Predic-
tion
19/20/21 50 42 8 7 7
1/2/16 30 36 0 7 7
3/5/13 20 33 8 7 7
17/8/10 10 58 100 7 3
7/9/11 30 82 83 3 7
4/14/18 20 91 91 3 7
6/12/15 10 92 83 3 3
72 62
Overall, the single-axis Pitch Tracking task led to the observation of a large number
of PIO events. These were triggered both through the dynamics of the vehicle models,
and through triggering RLE contained within the forward control path. From these
PIO events, it was possible to develop tentative boundaries, to show PIO susceptibility
in the pitch axis. Results showed good agreement with those obtained using ROVER,
and with pilot comments. The next stage in the research was the extension of this
work, by applying PAC during a larger test campaign. Furthermore, it was required
to develop PAC, through the determination of lateral PIO boundaries, and through its
use in multi-axis flying tasks.
4.5 Validation of Boundaries through Single Axis Flying
Task
To validate boundaries identified within the following section, further Pitch Tracking
tests were completed. For this investigation, the BO105 model discussed in Chapter
3 was used. Also, the additional investigation allowed different pilots to be used,
from those used during the development of PAC. This offered a good opportunity to
validate the boundaries. These additional Pitch Tracking tests were completed using
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four test pilots (A-D). Four RLs were used (20◦/s, 10◦/s, 5◦/s, and 2.5◦/s), placed
in the forward control loop between pilot input and vehicle swashplate deflection. For
this investigation, due to time constraints, the vast majority of cases were completed
with only one of the three tracking signals. All pilots completed a range of both PIO
prone and PIO robust vehicle configurations. Full results of tests conducted are shown
in Appendix C.
Figures 4.19a and 4.19b display the overall HQRs and PIORs obtained with respect
to the longitudinal channel RLs. As expected, as the RL was reduced, the sensitivity
of the vehicle to RPC increased. This is shown through both the awarded HQRs and
PIORs. It is apparent that the ‘triggering’ of Severe RPC due to RLs only occurred
with the RL = 2.5◦/s. This was confirmed through the inspection of the post-processed
data traces. In Fig. 4.19b, one point exists where the pilot awarded PIOR = 4 with a
system rate limit of 10◦/s. On further appraisal of the data obtained during this run,
it appears that no full RPC event existed; the rating was awarded due to the pilot’s
opinion of the incipience of RPC/PIO only.
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Figure 4.19: Comparison of subjective ratings awarded during completion of the Pitch
Tracking task.
Figure 4.20a displays a typical case that occurred with an applied RL = 5◦/s. The
figure displays both the pilot-commanded and actual longitudinal swash-plate deflec-
tions. It can be seen that, for very limited periods (during the capture phase of the
task), RLs are ‘triggered’, but without the presence of sustained limiting. Conversely,
a trace of an identified severe PIO, shown in Fig. 4.20b, reveals severe limiting in the
period following t = 30 seconds. In this case, both rate and position limiting of the
actuators occurs, indicative of a severe RPC event. For the cases with RL = 5◦/s,
due to the nature of the task, the pilot consistently and sporadically triggers the RL.
If tracking was to continue, it is likely that this limited control would persist, causing
larger phase distortions and greater instability. As shown here, the stabilisation period
of the task allows the pilot to reduce his control gain, and ‘escape’ the rate limited
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situation.
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Figure 4.20: Comparison of subjective ratings awarded during completion of the Pitch
Tracking task.
The results shown above suggest that the effects of RL were apparent when set
at 5◦/s, but did not cause RPCs. Furthermore, the sustained significant triggering of
limits at 2.5◦/s is echoed through both the HQRs and PIORs obtained. For the case
of the Pitch Tracking experiment, it can be concluded that the presence of RL strongly
influenced the RPC susceptibility of the PVS.
PAC was used as a post-processing tool, with all cases analysed against proposed
longitudinal boundaries. During tests, it was found that PIOs were triggered by RLs.
Therefore, Cat. II boundaries were used to determine PIO susceptibility for each case.
Figures 4.21a and 4.21b display PAC results on the Φ−AG chart, for the cases shown in
Fig.4.20a and Fig.4.20b. These are shown against the proposed Cat. II boundaries. For
both cases, PAC has detected severe PIO for some period in the manoeuvre. However,
for the case where RL = 5◦/s, the PAC points are not sustained within the PIO
regions. Conversely, for the case where RL = 2.5◦/s, points are sustained within both
the ‘Moderate’ and ‘Severe’ PIO regions. Furthermore, there are significantly more PAC
points within the PIO regions. The results here reflect those seen when inspecting the
data traces, shown in Fig. 4.20a and Fig. 4.20b.
Figure 4.22 shows the distribution of PAC detections, made through the use of the
Cat. II boundaries, with respect to RL. PAC detections show PIOs have been detected
for RLs of 2.5◦/s and 5.0◦/s. As shown, for the case where RL = 2.5◦/s, all pilots
on all attempts were found to enter the ‘Severe’ PIO region. When RL = 5.0◦/s, the
majority of cases where found to exhibit PIO tendencies, manifesting predominantly as
‘Moderate’ Cat. II oscillations. For cases with higher RLs, no Cat. II PIO tendencies
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Figure 4.21: PAC results from further Pitch Tracking investigation, determined through
use of longitudinal boundaries.
were observed. Although the PAC detections are well correlated with predictions made
prior to the campaign, they appear to over predict in comparison to pilot subjective
ratings. As shown in Fig. 4.19b, pilots did not award PIOR > 3 for cases where RL
= 5.0◦/s, suggesting PIO tendencies only. On inspection of data, however, it appears
that consistent limiting occurred through the runs where PAC predicted oscillations.
Therefore, it is suggested that these cases are at the boundary of instability and should
be detected by PAC.
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Figure 4.22: Distribution of PAC detection with respect to rate limit
The results from this study were believed to complement and verify findings in the
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previous Pitch Tracking investigation. The boundaries developed were found to show
strong correlation with predictions, and were found to support pilot comments during
completion of the manoeuvre.
4.6 Validation of Boundaries During Multi-axis Flying
Tasks
Following observation of PAC for the single-axis Pitch Tracking task, the next stage
was to determine the suitability of the criterion for detection of PIO tendencies during
multi-axis flying tasks. In previous investigations, the single axis tracking task leads to
the simple observation of a constrained SISO system. The introduction of multi-axis
‘realistic’ flying tasks leads to two concerns;
1. Observation of Phase distortion due to coupling in the MIMO heli-
copter model.
2. Effect of transition between closed-loop and open-loop flying.
Both concerns primarily influence the phase calculation, which forms a key part of
PAC. Rotorcraft are inherently more prone to axis ‘cross-couplings’ than their fixed-
wing counterparts. This is due to flight mechanics, primarily due to transformations
which occur at the rotor head. Cross couplings in this way leads to single input pilot
control often influencing multiple helicopter axes. With this there exists the possibility
that the off-axis control response could influence the phase calculations on-axis. When
pilots switch to open-loop control, often the pilot may freeze the control input, breaking
any oscillatory response. Again, there is the possibility that this could also influence
the phase calculations during computation of PAC parameters.
4.6.1 Precision Hover Task
In order to investigate the influence of multi-axis tasks upon the use of PAC, the Preci-
sion Hover task was selected. The manoeuvre is a multi-axis reposition and stabilisation
task to assess low speed performance. It provides a method to appraise both the ability
of the aircraft to transition from translating flight to hover and the ability to maintain
precise position. Task performance is driven by a series of visual elements, positioned
within the environment, shown in Fig. 4.23. The investigation was conducted with
four pilots (A,B,C,D), and conducted using HELIFLIGHT-R.
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Figure 4.23: External view of the Precision Hover course.
Figure 4.24 displays a schematic of the course layout. The manoeuvre begins from
a point behind and to the left of the intended hover point (large cross in Fig. 4.23).
To reach the hover point, the pilot is required to hold 6-10 knots ground speed whilst
transitioning at 45◦. The transition is performed at 45◦ to observe both lateral and
longitudinal HQs, alongside deficiencies caused by cross-couplings. As the vehicle ap-
proaches the hover point, s/he must initiate a deceleration, to bring the helicopter to
hover at the reference point. When in the hover, the primary height and lateral cueing
is given by the ‘hover board’. The pilot must also maintain lateral and longitudinal
position, by using a series of cones located around the hover reference point. During
completion of the manoeuvre, the pilot, from his sight, must keep the view of the top of
the reference pole within the hover board (Spherical marker shown in Fig. 4.24). The
distance between the reference pole and the hover board defines the required lateral
and height tolerances. The reference cones define the necessary longitudinal position of
the helicopter, and assist the pilot in judging whether he is at the correct hover point.
The manoeuvre is initiated with the aircraft travelling at a ground speed of between
6 and 10 knots, at an altitude of less than 20 feet. The target hover point is oriented
at 45◦ relative to the heading of the rotorcraft. The ground track should be such that
the rotorcraft will arrive over the target hover point, which should be captured in one
smooth manoeuvre following the initiation of deceleration. This is to stop the pilot
decelerating, and ‘creeping’ to the final hover point.
Unlike the Pitch Tracking investigation, PIO incipience was engineered through the
addition of time delays only. However, these time delays were applied to both the Pitch
and Roll control channels. The manoeuvre requires the pilot to maintain performance
standards in all controlled axis (pitch, roll, yaw, heave). Furthermore, if the vehicle
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Figure 4.24: Schematic of Precision Hover course layout.
exhibits high levels of cross-coupling, maintenance of performance becomes a complex
task, with un-predictable vehicle behaviour.
Triggers (i.e. time delays) were applied in both the longitudinal and lateral control
channels to observe whether the task was suitable for exposing PIOs in both axes. A
matrix of combinations was completed, with configurations informed through the use of
the Bandwidth Phase Delay results, shown in Chapter 3. As displayed in the preceding
section, a delay of 200ms in the longitudinal axis was determined to cause a PIO prone
system. For the lateral axis, a value of 200ms was not enough to cause a PIO prone
vehicle. However, a delay above 300ms was found to cause a PIO prone configuration.
Through observation of predictions, time delays were applied to both the lateral and
longitudinal axes; in the lateral axis, delays of 200ms and 400ms and in the longitudinal
axis, delays of 100ms and 200ms. The cases were tested, alongside addition cases with
no delays that were added for the completion of the Precision Hover manoeuvre. During
the investigation, HQRs and PIORs were collected, awarded by all pilots during an
evaluation run of each configuration. All results are contained within Appendix C.
Figure 4.25 displays HQRs awarded during completion of the manoeuvre. As shown,
pilots found the manoeuvre most challenging with delays in both axes (as expected).
With a lateral time delay = 200ms, pilots consistently awarded HQRs within Level
2. One observation was the lack of difference observed between cases with 0ms and
100ms longitudinal time delay. However, small noticeable differences were observed
between cases with 100ms and 200ms longitudinal delay. This suggests that longitudinal
oscillations were not encountered until reaching a delay of 200ms. Furthermore, a
109
noticeable difference between HQRs awarded with a lateral time delay = 400ms was
observed. However, with one exception, all ratings awarded for this case were within
HQL 2 (HQR 4-6).
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Figure 4.25: Precision Hover HQRs. [Lateral Delay; Longitudinal Delay]
Figure 4.26 displays the PIO Ratings awarded during the investigation. As shown,
a large amount of scatter was found for results. This is believed to be due to defi-
ciencies within the PIO Rating Scale, and will be discussed in detail in a Chapter 6.
Scatter made it difficult to analyse results obtained. Traditionally, PIOR >= 4 is used
to denote a PIO that has been observed during the test campaign. This is due to the
descriptive wording used in the scale decision tree. Following this rule, pilots encoun-
tered oscillations for lateral delays greater or equal than 200ms, and for a longitudinal
delay of 200ms. This reflects predictions made prior to the investigation. However, it
is noted that for the majority of vehicle configurations, the observation of oscillations
was rare, with only one observation. Only with a lateral delay = 400ms, did multiple
pilots believe that they encountered unintentional oscillations.
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Figure 4.26: Precision Hover PIORs. [Lateral Delay; Longitudinal Delay]
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4.6.2 Application of Longitudinal Boundary
The opportunity was taken to observe whether the longitudinal boundary, set using
the Pitch Tracking investigation was applicable to a different task, using different sets
of pilots and vehicle configurations. Within the investigation, only Pilots A and B
appeared to enter any significant longitudinal oscillations. Throughout tests, Pilots C
and D were much more reserved with their flying, opting for open-loop control strategy
whenever possible. Furthermore, it was observed that Pilot’s C and D rarely acted to
‘fight’ resultant oscillations. Their strategy was to open the control loop as soon as
they felt they were experiencing difficulty.
To test the application of the boundary presented in the preceding section, longitu-
dinal control input and vehicle output data from the Precision Hover manoeuvres was
processed using PAC. Using pilot comments, it was possible to judge whether the pilot
believed he did or did not encounter oscillations in the longitudinal axis.
Table 4.7 shows some examples of manoeuvres completed by Pilots A and B. Dur-
ing investigations it was found that Pilots C and D were much less prone to encounter
oscillations, with PAC results showing that the pilots’ AG was not enough to encounter
defined longitudinal boundaries. Examples for Pilots A and B include cases where
lateral PIOs were triggered, and therefore, care should be taken when observing di-
rectly the subjective ratings awarded during the run. For all cases completed during
the Precision Hover, the longitudinal boundaries and PAC charts were used to deter-
mine whether pilot comments of longitudinal PIO tendencies were covered by identified
boundaries and whether the criteria could adequately deal with the effects of cross-
coupling distortions. Table 4.7 includes the longitudinal PIO prediction, made prior to
the investigation using the bandwidth-phase delay criterion.
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Table 4.7: Examples of longitudinal boundary.
# Case No. Pilot Long.
Delay
(ms)
Long.
Pred.
(BPD)
HQR PIOR Comments
A PH − PA− 10 A 200 YES 5 4 PIO observed, slight biody-
namic feedback due to control
settings - hand shaking
B PH − PA− 12 A 100 NO - 1 No initial problems
C PH − PA− 14 A 100 NO 3 1 Relatively low workload
D PH − PA− 16 A 200 YES 4 3 Initial axis pitch, response de-
lay incipient, capture rela-
tively benign
E PH − PA− 19 A 200 YES 6 4 Marked cliff-edge, PIO for
anything but reduction in
gain. Pilot held collec-
tive on leg, stops biodynamic
feedthrough
F PH − PA− 22 A 0 NO 5 3 -
G PH − PA− 25 A 200 YES 8 5 Mostly oscillatory behaviour,
not divergent but uncomfort-
able. Break in control re-
quired.
H PH − PB − 12 B 0 NO 6 5 Possibly experienced diver-
gence in roll. At times, possi-
bly PIOR = 6
I PH − PB − 8 B 0 NO 5 4 Slightly less sensitive in all
axis. Gently oscillating, back
out to stop undesired motions
happening.
J PH − PB − 17 B 200 YES 5 4 Real problems experienced in
pitch
K PH − PB − 20 B 200 YES 7 5 PIO when making initial
translation. Once sorted,
tighter control in hover.
L PH − PB − 27 B 200 YES 7 5 Bucking bronco, PIO in both
axes, hard to discriminate.
Axes approximately the same
Figures 4.27a to 4.27f show longitudinal PAC charts for examples A-F. These are all
results from Pilot A, who was found to be the most prone to longitudinal oscillations
during the investigation. As shown, the longitudinal PIO boundary was crossed for
examples A, D, and E. Although other cases showed high phase delays, AG was not
sufficient enough to trigger PIO tendencies. Referencing these findings back to pilot
comments shows good correlation, and supports the position of the boundaries. For
Example A, the pilot felt that a PIO was observed during the manoeuvre, and also
commented that he felt biodynamic feedthrough on the control inceptor. In Case D,
the pilot commented that the initial axis of concern was pitch, and that he could sense
an incipient delay. However, during the capture element, problems were relatively
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benign. As shown by the PAC chart in Fig. 4.27d, only two points are within the
‘Moderate’ PIO region, showing that these oscillation tendencies are not sustained. In
example E, the pilot commented that a marked cliff-edge existed, for anything but a
reduction in gain. As shown in Fig. 4.27d, in this case PAC points (at t = 18secs)
enter the identified ‘Severe’ PIO region.
Figure 4.28a to 4.28f show further cases justifying the longitudinal boundary, ex-
amples G-L. These PAC charts show results from both Pilot A and Pilot B, for cases
with varying levels of longitudinal PIO incipience. Of these cases, example G, J, K,
and L show points within the longitudinal PIO regions. As in previous examples, there
is justification that the boundaries correctly show PIO incipience. For example, in G,
the pilot experiences oscillatory behaviour, consistent throughout completion of the
manoeuvre, and awarded at PIOR = 5. As shown, PAC boundaries show Severe PIO
detection for large proportion of the manoeuvre. In example K, the Severe region is
entered at t = 17sec, but for a significant portion of the manoeuvre, moderate PIO is
recognised. The pilot commented that he felt PIO tendencies during the manoeuvre.
Finally, example L shows Severe PIO tendencies, with the pilot commenting that the
configuration was like ‘a bucking bronco’ in both longitudinal and lateral axes. Both
examples K and L received PIOR = 5 ratings from Pilot B.
Figures 4.29a - 4.29d display results from a number of examples where PIOs were
triggered, shown in the time domain. Each figure displays the control input, vehicle
rate output, and the ‘PAC score’ with respect to time. A PAC score = 0 denotes ‘no
PIO’, a situation where no PIO has been detected. A PAC score = 1 denotes ‘Moderate
PIO’, and PAC score = 2 denotes ‘Severe’ PIO.
Results are in agreement with pilot comments. For example, for G, the pilot com-
mented that he felt ‘mostly oscillatory behaviour’, which required a break in control to
stabilise. As shown in the case, Severe PIO is recognised throughout the manoeuvre,
which subsides only when the pilot ‘breaks out’ of the control loop (at approximately
t = 55 seconds). Overall, results suggested that the boundaries identified through the
single-axis investigation were applicable for multi-axis analysis, for different pilots, dif-
ferent vehicles, and different tasks. The nature of the multi-axis task made it difficult to
confirm the axes of any oscillations, but pilot comments and off-line predictions could
be used to justify the use of the boundaries.
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(a) Example A - PH-PA-10 - Pilot A
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(b) Example B - PH-PA-12 - Pilot A
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(c) Example C - PH-PA-14 - Pilot A
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(d) Example D - PH-PA-16 - Pilot A
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(e) Example E - PH-PA-19 - Pilot A
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(f) Example F - PH-PA-22 - Pilot A
Figure 4.27: PAC results from Precision Hover investigation, justification of longitudi-
nal boundaries (1).
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(a) Example G - PH-PA-25 - Pilot A
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(b) Example H - PH-PB-12 - Pilot B
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(c) Example I - PH-PB-8 - Pilot B
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(d) Example J - PH-PB-17 - Pilot B
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(e) Example K - PH-PB-20 - Pilot B
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(f) Example L - PH-PB-27 - Pilot B
Figure 4.28: PAC results from Precision Hover investigation, justification of longitudi-
nal boundaries (2).
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(a) Example E - PH-PA-19 - Pilot A
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(b) Example G - PH-PA-25 - Pilot A
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(c) Example K - PH-PB-20 - Pilot B
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(d) Example L - PH-PB-27 - Pilot B
Figure 4.29: PAC results from Precision Hover investigation, with respect to time.
4.6.3 Identification of Lateral Boundary
The boundary to determine lateral susceptibility to PIO was conceived using the same
method employed to determine the longitudinal boundary. Some preliminary test data,
from a number of pilots, were studied to observe whether PIO had occurred during com-
pletion of the manoeuvre. Using a combination of subjective and objective evaluation,
preliminary boundaries were drawn to reflect regions of moderate and severe PIO ten-
dencies. As with the longitudinal axis, different boundaries were obtained for Category
I and Category II detection. Upon inspection, it appeared that the Cat. II boundary
identified from the longitudinal pitch tracking cases was suitable for prediction in the
lateral axis. Changes however were found for the Category I boundary, the preliminary
version for low speed manoeuvring shown in Fig.4.30.
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Figure 4.30: Boundaries for detection of Cat. I PIO, lateral axis.
In the same way as shown for the verification of the longitudinal boundary, Table 4.8
shows six examples of results from the Precision Hover manoeuvre, with PIO triggers
set in the lateral axis.
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Table 4.8: Examples of lateral boundary.
# Case No. Pilot Lat.
Delay
(ms)
Lat.
Pred.
HQR PIOR Comments
M PH − PA− 4 A 0 NO 3 1 Achieved desired, enough
spare capacity
N PH − PA− 7 A 200 YES 4 2 Edge of desired perfor-
mance, mostly on heading
O PH − PA− 19 A 400 YES 6 4 Marked cliff-edge, PIO for
anything but reduction in
gain. Pilot held collective
on leg, stops biodynamic
feedthrough
P PH − PA− 25 A 200 YES 8 5 Pilot intentionally in-
creased aggression.
Mostly oscillatory be-
haviour, not divergent
but uncomfortable. Break
in control required, leads
to PIOR = 5
Q PH − PB − 12 B 400 YES 6 5 Possibly experienced di-
vergence in roll. At times,
perhaps PIOR = 6.
R PH − PB − 20 B 400 YES 7 5 PIOR = 5 when making
initial translation. Cliff
edge. Once sorted, tighter
control, in hover went to
PIOR = 4. HQR = 7 for
translation into the hover.
PAC results, plotted against proposed lateral detection boundaries are shown in
Figs. 4.31a to 4.31f.
Figures 4.31a and 4.31b show results from two cases where the pilot believed he did
not encounter PIO events. As shown in Table 4.8, the pilot felt that for both he achieved
desired performance requirements. As all PAC points lie within the ‘No PIO’ region,
the objective results are in agreement with pilot comments. Figures 4.31c and 4.31d
display PAC results from cases ‘O’ and ‘P’ respectively. These are both cases where
the pilot subjectively felt that he encountered PIO events, and was unable to maintain
desired performance tolerances. For Case ‘O’, PAC points lie within the ‘Moderate
PIO’ region. Sustained PIO (where points consistently appear in the Moderate zone in
a short period of time) appears to occur between t = 45sec and t = 51sec. For Case ‘P’,
a large number of PAC points were detected in both the ‘Moderate’ and ‘Severe PIO’
regions. These were found consistently through the manoeuvre, and echo the pilot’s
opinion that the case configuration led to Severe PIOs which required break in control.
Figure 4.31e and 4.31f display results from two cases where Pilot B entered PIO
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(a) Example M: PH-PA-4 - Pilot A
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(b) Example N: PH-PA-7 - Pilot A
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(c) Example O: PH-PA-19 - Pilot A
2
2
3
5
5
7 8
8
9
10 11
11
12
12
12
14
15
16
16
17
17
18
19
19
20
21
21
22
22
23
24
24
25
25
26
27
27
8
29
29
30
30
31
31
32
33
33
34
34
35
36
36
37
37
38
39
39
40 40
41
42
42
43
44
44
45
45
46
47
47
48
48 49
49
50
51
5152
52
53
54 54
55 56
56
58
58
59
59
60 61 61
63
63
63
65
65 66
67
67 69 6970
7071
72 72
73
74
74
75
77
78
879
80
80
81
81
82
82
83
84
84
85
85
86
86
87 88
88
89
90
90
91
91
Φ, deg
A G
,
 
de
g/
s2 NO PIO
MOD. PIO
SEVERE PIO
0 50 100 150 2000
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
(d) Example P: PH-PA-25 - Pilot A
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(e) Example Q: PH-PB-12 - Pilot B
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(f) Example R: PH-PB-20 - Pilot B
Figure 4.31: PAC results from Precision Hover investigation, justification of lateral
boundary.
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events. As displayed, for both cases, PAC points were found within both the ‘Moderate’
and ‘Severe’ PIO regions. Pilot B was found to attempt to suppress oscillations more
readily than Pilot A. Therefore, significantly less PAC points were found within the
‘Severe PIO’ region. Once the pilot encountered PIO tendencies, he made an effort
to arrest oscillations at sacrifice to task performance. The limited results here display
how the PAC boundaries appear consistent across different pilots, and vehicles with
different control transport delays. Overall, the boundaries were considered suitable to
proceed with further investigations.
4.6.4 Correlation between Pilot Subjective and Phase-Aggression
An important observation in the study was the correlation between PAC results and
pilot subjective opinion. As subjective opinion was used in the development of the
boundaries, it was believed that a correlation should exist between the objective PAC
results and subjective pilot ratings.
To observe correlation between subjective and objective results, all rated Precision
Hover cases were post-processed using PAC. This allowed each case to be determined
as one where ‘NO PIO’, ‘MOD. PIO’, or ‘SEV. PIO’ was observed. PAC was used to
evaluate both the Pitch and Roll axes, awarding an overall PIO observation based on
the worst of the two axes. The HQR and PIOR ratings awarded, which are a measure of
overall Handling Qualities and Pilot-Induced Oscillations for the overall system, could
then be cross-referenced to the PAC results.
Figure 4.32a shows PAC results with respect to the awarded HQRs for the Precision
Hover cases. As these are for all cases flown, they include both lateral and longitudinal
observations. As shown, PAC detected oscillations for two pilots only: Pilot A and B. In
these cases, both the range and average HQRs were higher than for the same pilots when
‘NO PIO’ was detected. This shows that, between cases, there has been a degradation
in vehicle handling qualities, suggesting PIO tendencies have been triggered. There is
also a significant difference shown between HQRs awarded for ‘MOD.’ and ‘SEV.’ PIOs.
When PAC detected Severe PIO, HQRs were within LEVEL 3, suggesting unacceptable
HQs during completion of the MTE. When Moderate PIOs only were detected, average
HQRs were found to be within LEVEL 2 for both pilots.
Figure 4.32b displays results for the same cases, with respect to PIO ratings. One
difference found was the higher scatter for cases where PAC did not detect PIO. As
shown, Pilot B’s PIO ratings ranged from PIOR = 1− 4, encapsulating a large range
of results. This suggests that perhaps PAC has not detected a PIO event encountered
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by Pilot B. However, for cases where Moderate or Severe PIO was found, ratings were
within the region of the PIOR scale that denotes that the pilots encountered PIOs.
For all ‘SEV.’ PIOs, pilots awarded PIOR = 5, suggesting divergent PIO tendencies
were experienced during task completion. Overall, results here suggested a good corre-
lation between pilot subjective and the objective PAC results. Although not perfectly
correlated, the observation of PIO tendencies by PAC for cases where pilots awarded
PIOR = 5 was encouraging.
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Figure 4.32: Comparison between PAC results and subjective opinion.
4.7 Validation of Boundaries with Independent Data Source
Although the boundaries were validated using data collected from real-time piloted
simulation campaigns, this did not show whether they could successfully be used to
identify PIOs that have occurred historically, prior to this research. Therefore, the
boundaries were used to determine whether PIOs had been experienced, using data
sources from Ref. [4].
Although Ref. [4] features a large number of data recordings from recognised PIO
events, not all were suitable for validation using PAC. The main reason for this is
the use of force for recording rather than stick position. PAC boundaries, due to the
facilities available during this research, were set for stick position. Therefore, although
it is envisaged that stick force can provide an equally adequate input to calculate the
aggression and phase, it does not help for boundary validation.
Furthermore, all suitable data traces contained within Ref. [4] are from fixed-wing
aircraft. It was not possible to obtain recorded data of PIOs experienced in rotor-
craft. Therefore, this validation shows the applicability to fixed-wing aircraft. It is
not expected that for all fixed-wing aircraft boundaries will be the same as seen within
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rotorcraft. However, the application should show the information required to deter-
mine whether the situation does or does not represent a PIO. The data used for the
validation was from an incident recorded for an Airbus A320.
The Airbus A320 aircraft is a twin engine, narrow-body commercial airliner, which
entered into service in 1988. In 1995, an A320 was approaching Washington National
Airport, with winds at 17 knots, gusting to 25 knots. Roll oscillations began at about
140 ft, and persisted for approximately 30 seconds. During the roll oscillations, it was
decided to perform a missed approach procedure. The data recording from the incident
is shown in Fig. 4.33, extracted from Ref. [4].
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Figure 4.33: Recorded data trace from A320 incident
As shown, during the incident, the pilot stick input reached 20 deg, causing aileron
deflections of similar magnitude. The roll rate, which was processed as the derivative
of the roll attitude, reaches approximately 25 deg/s. The aircraft altitude reached
the minimum point at approximately 1570 seconds into the data recording, which was
approximately 13 seconds after the initiation of large oscillations.
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From the data traces, Hs was determined as 1.157 deg/s/deg. This was used for the
calculation of AG, and was considered to be independent of amplitude and oscillation
frequency.
Data was processed using both ROVER and PAC, to observe differences regarding
the two tools. ROVER results are shown in Fig.4.34. Due to no other available data
for the A320, or any previous reference material, it was not possible to perform ‘tuning’
of the ROVER thresholds. For this reason, results were obtained through the use of
the threshold values shown in Table 4.1.
As shown, with these thresholds, consecutive ROVER Score = 4 were found through-
out the oscillatory period of the manoeuvre. ROVER detection show PIOs observed
between t = 19 sec and t = 48 sec, where ROVER Score = 4 was found for all returned
points. Furthermore, ROVER Score = 4 was also found at t = 8 sec and t = 9 sec. This
shows detected PIOs prior to the sustained event. This suggests that a pre-warning of
the PIO incipience could have been delivered to the pilot prior to the initiation of the
large oscillations.
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Figure 4.34: ROVER results from A320 incident
Figure 4.35 displays the results found using PAC. For this case, the lateral detection
boundaries are applied. As shown, PAC points are present within all regions of the
chart. However, most points were found within the Severe PIO region. These points
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are shown to be clustered with phase distortion between 100 and 150 degrees. The
observation is consistent with the ROVER observation, where large phase distortion
was present for a long period. The PAC points show that this period of large phase
distortion also featured high pilot aggression, indicating that large and/or fast control
inputs were commanded during the period of large phase distortion. This Aggression
was found to reach a maximum at t = 43 seconds, over 25 seconds after the initiation
of large roll excursions. This shows that the pilot Aggression increased during the PIO,
which shows that he was unaware that his control effort was causing the undesirable roll
oscillations. If the pilot had understood the cause of the PIO, he would have relaxed his
control effort, and reduced his aggression. This would have reduced the frequency of
oscillations, and reduced the phase distortion of the PVS. For this example, PAC could
be used to warn the pilot to reduce the aggression, which could be achieved through
either the reduction in control rate or the reduction in amplitude.
The feedback provided by the PAC chart is considered to be clearer than results
displayed by the ROVER algorithm. Using the PAC boundaries, it is possible to
observe the severity of oscillations, and the required reduction in Aggression and Phase
distortion to exit the PIO situation. ROVER does not return this information.
Figure 4.36 displays results obtained from the application of PAC boundaries in
the time domain. This shows the PAC ‘Score’ obtained during the oscillations. As
shown, from the period t = 20 seconds to t = 49 seconds, Severe PIOs (PAC Score =
2) were detected. Moderate oscillations were detected at t = 18 seconds. This offers
similar appraisal as the ROVER algorithm, showing sustained oscillations for almost
30 seconds. PACs initial detection of Moderate oscillations was found to be prior to
ROVERs identification of PIO, by one second. As with the ROVER results, PAC
detected PIO characteristics prior to the sustained event, at t = 9 second. For PAC,
this point is isolated, showing no sustained oscillation. Furthermore, when looking at
the point on the PAC chart shown in Fig. 4.35, it is apparent that the point is close
to the PIO boundary, and features lower aggression than for points where sustained
PIO occurred. The PAC chart shows a distinction between this spurious point and the
points where sustained PIO occurred. This information is not shown from ROVER
results.
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Figure 4.35: PAC results from A320 incident
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Figure 4.36: PAC score from A320 incident
4.8 Integration of Real-Time PAC Coding
At the centre of PAC’s development was its use for real-time observation and assess-
ment. This was seen as the primary advantage of the novel method, where it could be
used not only as an analysis tool, but also to provide a system for the integration of
real time detection and alleviation systems.
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In order for this to be completed, equations defined within this chapter were used to
create a real-time control system, using MATLAB SIMULINK. When used previously
in this Chapter, during the development, observation of results were performed using
MATLAB analysis scripts. However, these scripts were not programmed to allow for
real-time analysis, as they were used only to post-process results from simulation. For
real-time observation, SIMULINK is preferred, as it is widely used for the modelling
of real-time applications, such as aerospace control systems. Within SIMULINK, it
is also possible to create embedded MATLAB code, which can be used in real-time
simulation. However, for this work, the equations were translated to the type of logic
most commonly used in SIMULINK.
The ‘PAC block’, shown in Fig. 4.37, is intended for simple implementation into
aircraft control systems. The complete system inside the ‘PAC block’ is shown in Fig.
4.38. The inputs to the system are results from the real-time information. The require-
ment is only for the input of system time, pilot control (cyclic deflection), and vehicle
output (vehicle rate in relevant axis). All inputs are fed directly into the Phase subsys-
tem, whereas there is no direct requirement for the vehicle rate within the Aggression
subsystem. Calculations are performed within subsystems and then output from the
model to the MATLAB workspace. Results can also be imported back into the vehicle
model, to provide alleviation or PIO warning.
Figure 4.37: PAC system block
Figure 4.39 displays logic within the Phase calculation block. The system consists
of a number of logical elements, used to detect control and vehicle oscillations, and
calculate the difference in phase between input and output of the system. Firstly, the
‘Peak Calculation’ blocks search for points for which maximum and minimum control
or input displacement is found. These observe the sign of the derivative for the current
time step and the previous time step. If the two signs are different, it shows that either
a maximum or minimum has been found. Observing the signs of the two differentials
allows one to determine whether it is a maximum (peak) or a minimum (trough). One
system is used to calculate peaks in the pilot control input, whilst the other calculates
peaks in the vehicle rate. For implementation with a higher resolution, it is also possible
to incorporate the trough results, to provide double the amount of phase updates. If a
peak is determined, it returns a digital value of unity. This is multiplied by the time
of observation, to display the time of each peak.
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Figure 4.38: Inside real-time PAC system
This results in spikes of data, with the return of zero when a peak is not detected.
Particularly for alleviation measures, it is advantageous to hold the last value, to show
the last time for which a peak was detected. This is achieved through the use of the
‘Hold Function’ blocks. The contents of this block are shown in Fig. 4.40. The block
searches for zeros in the peak calculation output. If one is found, the previous peak is
added to the current value (zero), returning a held value.
In Fig. 4.39, the peak calculation of the output (vehicle rate) is subtracted from
the input (pilot input). In a normal operational situation, the pilot input will lead
the vehicle output, by a margin defined by the vehicle dynamics, system delays, etc.
Therefore, a positive result should be returned. Only results greater than zero are
desired for further analysis, which is found through the use of a logic block followed
by the hold function. This result is a difference in time between the vehicle input and
output, which can be used to calculate the phase delay when the period of oscillation
(frequency) is known. This is determined through determining the time difference be-
tween peaks calculated from the pilot control input. Division of the phase difference by
the period provides the phase distortion, which is output from the ‘Phase Calculation’
block. The result is also differentiated to determine the change in phase distortion.
This is to observe when a new phase value is calculated, to allow for calculation of
Aggression.
Calculation of AG is performed using similar logic as used for the phase calculations.
As defined in PAC equations, AG calculations are returned following each new phase
cycle. Therefore, the differential of phase distortion is fed into the AG block to trigger
each new calculation. This is calculated using the differential of pilot control input.
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Figure 4.39: Phase subsystem.
Figure 4.40: Hold function subsystem.
Cumulative results are stored until the next phase calculation is performed. At this
point, AG is divided by time. This results in the same amount of AG calculations as
phase calculations. The result is scaled using Hs, and output to the simulation model
alongside Phase distortion.
The SIMULINK blocks have been designed to allow them to be used as ‘plug-in’
elements, separate from the main vehicle model. If the user wants only to observe
results ‘up-stream’, and provide no physical alleviation, the SIMULINK system can be
easily added with just one simple connection. Furthermore, if the system is to be used
for alleviation or warning, the outputs can be fed directly back to the simulation model.
Due to the observation of peaks only, the real-time code implemented has lower
resolution than previously used code. To provide a robust measure for PAC in real-
time simulation, the decision was to use only the peaks. The use of ‘troughs’ too would
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require further modifications to the SIMULINK model, including a more complex peak
detection logic. This is recommended for any future work completed using PAC for
real-time analysis.
4.9 Summary of Chapter 4
Here, a novel PIO detection algorithm has been presented. The method has been de-
signed as a tool for objective assessment of PIO tendencies. The following are considered
the main benefits of the novel method:
1. The Phase Aggression Criterion has been developed for observation of RPC ten-
dencies. The formulation has intended to combine the principles of previous
methods to create a suitable metric to determine PIO incipience.
2. The method has been constructed to consider a range of rotorcraft, with factors
to normalise results obtained. Therefore, comparisons can be made between ro-
torcraft of different types and role. This is a significant advantage over previous
methods, as these require model specific tuning.
3. Through a number of simulation campaigns, it has been possible to determine
detection boundaries, not presented for any other real-time detection criteria.
Boundaries have been validated for a number of different rotorcraft models, for
a variety of MTEs. Results show promise for generic prediction suitable for
rotorcraft of different classes and roles.
4. The Phase-Aggression Criterion incorporates principles which, in theory, make
it suitable for the prediction of all types of PIO. Using simple requirements for
PIO as the structure for metrics, all Categories of oscillatory RPC should be
captured by the method. This includes higher frequency PAOs, which share the
same fundamental principles as PIOs.
5. As results have displayed observation of Category I and II PIOs, it should also be
possible to successfully detect Category III events. This is because the parameters
used in the Phase-Aggression Criterion calculation can be used as a measure of
PIO susceptibility for all categories.
6. It can be used as both an objective measure for data analysis and an online
detector for real-time piloted flight. Both can further assist with determining
when, why, and how PIOs occur. It is considered that the simple structure of time-
variant measures should help to improve understanding over existing methods.
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Chapter 5
The Development of Prediction
Tools for RPCs
5.1 Objective
Despite years of significant research effort, well detailed in Ref. [4], no single prediction
method has emerged for rotorcraft research and testing. Often, if PIOs are exposed
during HQ investigations, further analysis will be conducted using tools adapted from
fixed-wing research. However, currently there are no clear methods or processes for such
research. Furthermore, current prediction methods are often limited to certain types
of oscillations or vehicle characteristics. The objective of this section is to present
a novel prediction method, developed from the real-time algorithm in the previous
section, to improve analysis processes in the design process. The method is designed
to improve standardisation regarding analysis, and to offer information not available
current prediction methods.
5.2 Transition from Detection tool to Prediction tool
As outlined in Chapter 4, PAC was developed for detection of RPCs, either through
real-time application or during post-processing of flight data. The criterion has been
used to analyse data from a number of simulated test campaigns. From this analysis,
boundaries for PIO susceptibility, both for Category I and II type PIOs were drawn.
Validation of these boundaries was achieved through application to further test data.
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The PAC method calculates time varying parameters based on data traces from both
the pilot and vehicle, returning metrics that can be translated into a PIO susceptibility.
However, there is no reason that these data traces must be collected in real-time. If
results can be translated into the time domain, metrics can be collected for any signals,
and could offer a method of prediction.
With modelling and simulation, it is possible to replicate conditions that may be
experienced during flight, to either predict the response to a certain task or, the response
to a degree of pilot control. Predictive PAC (PRE-PAC) attempts to predict PIO
tendencies for these conditions.
There are two methods that have been developed to observe the PIO potential of
a pilot-vehicle system with PAC. The first method is termed Open-Loop PRE-PAC
(O-PRE-PAC). This is where the open loop vehicle system is subjected to control
inputs which are not related to any specific task or situation. This method is akin to
the current oﬄine prediction method Bandwidth Phase Delay (BPD). The method is
termed ‘open-loop’ as there is no closed-loop piloting task associated. Output from
the vehicle does not influence the input, and therefore, the system is not ‘closed’. The
second method, termed Closed-Loop PRE-PAC (C-PRE-PAC), is used to determine
the PVS response during a specific task and/or a specific set of conditions. Using this
method, predictions are specific to the conditions implemented in the simulation. The
processes of these two methods are displayed in Fig.5.1.
Figure 5.1: PRE-PAC flow chart.
The two methods for using PRE-PAC share the same methodology. However, the
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required inputs to the system are different. The general procedure for the use of
the PRE-PAC is discussed below. The procedure makes use of the general real-time
algorithm, applying it to control inputs in an oﬄine environment. The term ‘oﬄine’
describes the situation where computation is not real-time. For this reason, the services
of an evaluation pilot and a flight simulation device are not required.
5.2.1 O-PRE-PAC Method
The initial step in the O-PRE-PAC process requires the user to specify the vehicle
model. The complexity of this model is dependent on user requirements; an aircraft
in the early design stage may require only a linear analysis model. However, prior to
full scale flight tests, the requirement may be for a full non-linear model, at various
conditions and configurations. Figure 5.2 gives an example of a typical rotorcraft model
architecture that may be employed.
Figure 5.2: Example of vehicle model used with O-PRE-PAC analysis.
The typical rotorcraft model, assuming rigid body dynamics, contains a number of
elements that have an influence on PIO susceptibility. Firstly, the interface between the
pilot and the vehicle may have a significant effect on the tendency to induce oscillations.
In previous studies, it has been found that static and dynamic inceptor forces can
have significant influence over the tendency to induce PIO [122–124]. Secondly, it
is important to consider the transfer of pilot command to the vehicle through the
swashplate dynamics. Here, one should consider any transport delays, actuator position
and rate limits, and non-linearities. It is at this stage that many quasi-linear effects
have been previously studied. Thirdly, the transformation from swash plate deflection
to vehicle response must be correctly modelled. The rigid body dynamics have perhaps
the largest influence on the response characteristics. Finally, consideration must be
made for the effects of any Stability Control Augmentation System (SCAS). These
systems, now predominantly digital and becoming more common in rotorcraft, have
the potential to add both transport delays and non-linearities. Furthermore, system
‘mode switching’ elements could have a significant influence over RPC potential [4].
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The O-PRE-PAC model represents the excitation of the open-loop vehicle model
by an active pilot. Here, the pilot is said to be applying control inputs regardless of
the end vehicle motion. With this in mind, there is no feedback between the vehicle
and the pilot. A typical open-loop model is shown in Fig. 5.2. Pilot control is passed
through the control inceptor, swashplate, quasi-linear elements, and the rigid body
vehicle dynamics, resulting in the motion of the rotorcraft. The model may feature
inner-loop closed-loop systems, but the overall system response is open loop.
For O-PRE-PAC, there is no requirement to model the human pilot. Rather than
try and replicate the actions of the human pilot, it takes consideration of a number
of generic input signals, that adequately describe possible actions of the pilot. There-
fore, it is proposed that sinusoidal inputs, of varying magnitudes and frequencies will
adequately show at what conditions a PIO will occur. As a result, a ‘pilot model’, is
not required. For the analysis, sinusoidal frequency sweeps are proposed, covering the
range for which PIOs are known to occur. This is in an attempt to ‘map’ the complete
potential response envelope of the vehicle, rather than its response to an individual
pilot. If the mapping is conducted for the range of achievable pilot inputs, it can be
used to judge at what level of control input pilots will likely enter into a PIO.
During the development of O-PRE-PAC, signals were generated to try and map
possible pilot inputs, by varying the amplitude of input and different frequencies [125].
However, this led to a complicated method of application. Instead, it is now proposed
that signals of constant amplitude are used, and simulations are run within the allowable
range of vehicle safety constraints. An example is shown within Fig. 5.3. Here, input
signals are shown with respect to frequency and amplitude as dashed lines. The start
and end frequencies for each signal are governed through a number of constraints,
representing operational or structural limits of the aircraft. For example, Constraint
1 may govern the structural limits of the vehicle. This relationship is known, and the
aircraft should not be operated beyond this limit. Therefore, it should not be necessary
to determine PIO potential in this region, as it should never be entered. As another
example, Constraint 3 for example could represent the allowable roll attitude excursions
of the vehicle. Again, the vehicle should not be operated in this range and therefore,
the danger of this region is already known. After accounting for the constraints, the
user is left with a region to investigate.
The example shown in Fig. 5.3 suggests nine input signals, with frequencies ranging
from 0− 10rad/s. In studies, no signals have been defined above this frequency range,
because PIOs have historically occurred in the range of 1-8 rad/s [4]. Therefore, at
this stage, the criterion does not account for high-frequency events, those termed pilot-
assisted oscillations (PAO). However, the authors recognize that such an extension may
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Figure 5.3: Input frequency spectrum.
be feasible at a later stage in the development of the criterion.
5.2.2 C-PRE-PAC Method
The C-PRE-PAC model uses the same inner-loop system, but using this method an
outer-loop is added to represent the pilot response to a particular task. Rather than
applying unforced sinusoidal inputs, the pilot is required to respond to the vehicle
motion given through the outer-loop. Therefore, the motion of the vehicle, and the
response, is dependent on the characteristics of the vehicle. The typical system is
shown in Fig. 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Example of vehicle model used with C-PRE-PAC analysis.
Although C-PRE-PAC has been designed to operate systems similar to that shown
in Fig. 5.2, it is not restricted to this structure. It is envisaged that the system model
could include, for example, under-slung loads or other relevant external factors. These
could be incorporated within models akin to those shown in Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.4.
From the input signal and output response, both the Phase (Φ) and Aggression
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(AG) parameters can be calculated. This is completed in the same way as proposed for
the real-time detection method. Both Φ and AG are calculated with respect to time,
allowing one to observe when PIO incipient conditions exist. As each calculation of
parameters is specific to a point in time, for the O-PRE-PAC method, each point can
also be related to the known frequency at that time. Therefore, one can observe the
PIO tendencies with respect to frequency rather than with respect to time. For the C-
PRE-PAC method, results are still desired with respect to time, making the calculation
process the same as for the real-time method discussed in Chapter 4.
To determine PIO susceptibility, boundaries developed in Chapter 4 are used to
distinguish between PIO incipient and robust cases, and act as predictions. This is
true for both PRE-PAC methods, with the boundaries used dependent on both the
aircraft condition (speed, etc.) and the axis of interest.
For the C-PRE-PAC analysis, there is both the requirement for a pilot model and
for a closed-loop task. In this approach, the PAC algorithm is used to predict the
PIO incipience of a certain set of conditions. For this analysis, to demonstrate the
initial concept of the method, the McRuer cross-over model has been used, which
satisfies Eqn. 5.1. This approach applies for compensatory systems only. In this work,
the model has been used due to the ease of application. It is hoped that in follow-up
studies, the model may be extended to show predictions for more complex pilot models,
for non-compensatory, multi-loop task performance. This would give a more accurate
prediction of PIO susceptibility, and increase the confidence in results obtained.
All rotorcraft models investigated within this work feature Rate Command systems.
Therefore, the controlled element (i.e. the vehicle) is in the form Kc/s. According to
McRuer [3], as the human operator will attempt to control the vehicle to ensure that
the open-loop transfer function is given by Eqn. 5.2, the controller dynamics (i.e. of
the pilot) will be in the form given in Eqn. 5.3. Therefore, in order for Eqn. 5.2 to be
valid, KcKp = ωc. Furthermore, from McRuer’s experiments, τs was identified as 0.14
seconds [3].
YpYc =
ωce
τs
s
(5.1)
Yp =
ωce
τs
sYc(s)
= Kpe
−τs (5.2)
Yp = Kpe
−τs (5.3)
135
Therefore, the pilot gain (Kp) is tuned to provide a crossover frequency (ωco) that
occurs within an acceptable range. According to McRuer [12], pilot crossover frequency
for compensatory tasks can be approximated as ωco ≈ 2rad/s. The actual ωco will vary
based upon pilot strategy and task performance. Furthermore, pilots can vary their
ωco based on the situation, whereby a strategy is employed to improve control of the
vehicle through crossover regression.
The C-PRE-PAC method also requires a desired trajectory, based on the task. This
task should be both appropriate and realistic for the vehicle model tested. However, the
level of aggression demanded is specific to the user’s requirements. Tasks with lower
aggression are unlikely to display the full spectrum of PIO tendencies. Conversely,
higher aggression tasks may display tendencies that surpass those expected during
normal operation of the vehicle. For the C-PRE-PAC analysis, the selection of the task
is critical to the results which will be obtained.
Three examples of proposed tasks are shown in Fig. 5.5a to Fig. 5.5c. Figure 5.5a
displays the intended trajectory for completion of the Pitch Tracking task detailed in
Chapter 4. This task has been shown as suitable for exposing both Cat. I and Cat.
II RPCs. These are triggered through the sharp changes in pitch attitude, which force
the pilot to apply aggressive control input.
A similar task, shown in Fig. 5.5b, has been used to expose PIOs within the
lateral axis, for fixed-wing research campaigns (examples include results presented in
[56, 63, 71]). In the same way as the Pitch Tracking task, large changes in attitude
are intended to force high pilot aggression, to trigger PIOs. However, due to the low
frequency content, it is unlikely to expose Cat. I PIO tendencies in any but the most
PIO prone vehicles.
A final example is shown in Fig. 5.5c. This task is used in Ref. [57, 126], and is
generated by a series of sinosodial signals. The values of Ai, Ni, and ωi are shown in
Table 5.1. These are used to determine the command signal, given by Eqn. 5.4.
θcommand = ΣAi sin(ωit) (5.4)
ωi = 2pi
Ni
63
(5.5)
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Table 5.1: Sum-of-sines parameters.
i Ai Ni ωi
1 -1.0 2 0.1995
2 1.0 5 0.4987
3 1.0 9 0.8976
4 0.5 14 1.396
5 -0.2 24 2.394
6 0.2 42 4.189
7 -0.08 90 8.976
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(a) Desired task trajectory for completion of Pitch Track-
ing manoeuvre
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(b) Discrete tracking task used in previous fixed-wing re-
search campaigns
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(c) Sum-of-Sines Tracking Task.
Figure 5.5: Examples of proposed compensatory tasks.
5.3 O-PRE-PAC Linear Examples
This section details results that are obtained through the use of O-PRE-PAC. For the
sake of clarity, only simple linear roll models are used. This also allows the exploration of
the relationship between the PRE-PAC results and those obtained using the bandwidth-
137
phase delay criterion.
Equation 5.6 is an approximation for the roll attitude due to lateral cyclic control
displacement, for a rotorcraft with a Rate Command system. As shown, attitude (φ)
is dependent upon control sensitivity (Lθ1c), roll damping (Lp), and system transport
delay (τ).
φ
δθ1c
=
Lθ1c
s2 + Lps
e−τs (5.6)
5.3.1 Calculation of PIO Metrics
Using the method described above, metrics can be calculated through the use of O-PRE-
PAC. These metrics do not predict whether PIOs will be encountered, but show the
PIO susceptibility of the configuration. It is envisaged that metrics can allow objective
assessment of PIO potential. Such objective metrics have become common within HQ
investigations, and can be used to define boundaries or system limits. Metrics allow
the engineer to quantify the difference in PIO susceptibility between different vehicles.
Two metrics computed using O-PRE-PAC are discussed here: the trigger frequency
(ωt) and the change in phase following the trigger frequency (δφ).
The trigger frequency is a similar metric to the vehicle bandwidth. It defines the
frequency for which PIO susceptibility boundaries, defined on the Phase-Aggression
chart, are crossed for the first time. The metric is dependent on the input amplitude,
which should be clearly stated alongside any results. For the use of O-PRE-PAC
metrics, it is recommended that an input amplitude of 50% maximum travel is used.
This is to represent the normal control from the pilot, who would not be expected to
utilise the maximum travel range during flight. The trigger frequency can be calculated
at both the moderate boundary (ωtMOD) and severe boundary (ωtSEV ).
The change in phase metric (δφ) presents similar appraisal to the ‘phase-delay’ ele-
ment of BPD. The metric is defined by Eqn. 5.7, and is dependent on input amplitude.
Firstly, the phase at ωtMOD must be determined. Following, the phase at the frequency
equal to 1 rad/s above the ωtMOD must be calculated. The change in phase is the dif-
ference between these two phases determined. The metric displays the change in phase
following the trigger frequency. The faster the change in phase, the more likely it will
be for the pilot to enter severe PIO events.
δφ = φ |ωtMOD+1 −φ |ωtMOD (5.7)
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Essentially, if the pilot applies input signals at a greater frequency than the band-
width, the system is likely to become unstable. Using PRE-PAC, rather than the
‘bandwidth’ frequency, one can calculate the moderate and severe trigger frequencies
((ωtMOD and ωtSEV respectively) to determine the susceptibility. Figure 5.6 displays
some examples of the proposed PAC metrics for a number of different vehicle configu-
rations. Examples show results from vehicle models with LP = 1/s, 2/s, 4/s and 6/s.
Time delay, applied in the control channel, has been used to vary PIO susceptibility
of these models. The metrics have been calculated for 50% of maximum control input.
Results show that as the applied time delay increases, moderate trigger frequency de-
creases, whilst the phase difference increases. This is the trend that is expected as PIO
susceptibility increases. As the vehicle becomes more susceptible to PIO, the frequency
for which tendencies are encountered will become lower. For cases where the moderate
boundary is not triggered, no result is displayed in Fig. 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Metric examples (each point represents an increase in τ by 0.05 sec).
An interesting comparison is between results obtained through the use of bandwidth-
phase delay and the use of the PRE-PAC metrics. Figure 5.7a displays a matrix of
predictions made using BPD. Here it is shown that an increase in time delay and a
decrease in roll damping leads to degradation in vehicle HQs. Boundaries shown are
those included in ADS-33 for observation of HQLs for Target Tracking and Acquisition
Tasks (TTA) [16]. These types of task are those where PIOs are expected to occur,
making boundaries suitable for comparison.
Figure 5.7b shows results displayed in Fig. 5.6, with the boundaries from BPD TTA
mapped against the O-PRE-PAC results. The boundaries show consistency between
the two measures, as the results generated match the expected theory. It is expected
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that as the ωtMOD decreases and δφ increases, the PIO susceptibility will increase.
This is shown through the location of the boundaries. However, one point (Lp = 2,
τ = 0.1sec), leads to a ‘non-linear’ point in the boundary. This ‘non-linearity’ is on the
limit of the ADS-33 Level 2/3 boundary.
More suitable boundaries, based on these results, are shown in Fig.5.8. These
boundaries divide the range into ‘HQL 1’,‘HQL 2’, and ‘HQL 3’ cases. These are based
upon the HQLs for the simple linear models. The boundary between ‘HQL 2’ and ‘HQL
3’ cases is primarily dependent upon ωtMOD . This boundary is placed at ωtMOD = 2.45
rad/s.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.50
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
ωBW, rad/s
τ p
s,
 
s
 
 
ADS−33 HQL 1
ADS−33 HQL 2
ADS−33 HQL 3
Lp = 1, 
τ
e
 = 0.4s
Lp = 1, 
τ
e
 = 0.05s
Lp = 6, 
τ
e
 = 0.4s
Lp = 6, 
τ
e
 = 0.05s
Decreasing Lp
Increasing τ
e
(a) Matrix of bandwidth predictions for various linear rate
command roll models.
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Figure 5.7: Examples of O-PRE-PAC metrics
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Figure 5.8: Boundaries for PRE-PAC metrics.
Due to the lack of current rotorcraft boundaries for PIO prediction, there is no
possible way to directly correlate the PRE-PAC results with the PIO susceptibility.
The use of the fixed-wing PIO boundary can aid in the prediction of PIO. However, its
suitability has not been fully validated. This boundary is also shown as ‘PIO Bound.’
on Fig.5.8. Despite no direct PIO boundaries for rotocraft existing, due to the nature
of the prediction conducted with BPD criteria, it is possible to draw strong comparison
between predicted HQLs and PIO susceptibility. This is due to the fact that, in high
frequency closed-loop control, it is likely that HQL is driven by PIO susceptibility.
When the aircraft is predicted to have HQL 1 qualities, is should not be expected
that RPC/PIOs will be encountered during normal and aggressive operation. This
should be independent of assessing pilot, and the task which is attempted. RPC/PIOs
should not affect the closed-loop task performance, or the operation of the vehicle.
When the aircraft features predicted HQL 2 qualities, it should not be expected
to encounter RPC/PIO during normal operations. However, it may be susceptible
to RPC/PIO during aggressive manoeuvring. The PIO/RPC susceptibility may be
dependent on the strategy of the assessing pilot, and the task which is attempted.
RPC/PIOs may affect the closed-loop task performance, particularly during tasks which
require tight pilot control.
Finally, when the aircraft is predicted to have HQL 3 qualities, is should be ex-
pected that, at some point during its operation, RPC/PIO will be encountered. Whilst
the resultant response will be dependent upon the pilot strategy, the majority of pi-
lots would be expected to trigger RPC/PIO conditions. Closed-loop task performance
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would be affected, during normal operational tasks.
The use of HQLs, rather than specific PIO descriptors are used in the following
sections, to indicate the change in susceptability to RPC for various configurations.
5.3.2 Calculation of PIO envelope
A benefit of the O-PRE-PAC method is that regions of pilot control that are predicted
to cause PIO can be determined, by computing results for various control input magni-
tudes and frequencies. Boundaries can be determined based on both ωtMOD and ωtSEV .
Using varying magnitude of input control, the corresponding frequencies can be deter-
mined. These are then mapped onto a Frequency v. Amplitude chart. Applying a
line of best fit through the points determines both a moderate and severe boundary.
Boundaries show that if the pilot exceeds the amplitude at the given frequency, they
will enter control conditions that, if continued, will cause PIO. Figure 5.9a and Fig.
5.9b display two examples of susceptibility boundaries. The difference between these
cases is the Roll damping of configurations; 2 1/s and 6 1/s respectively. Using the
O-PRE-PAC metrics discussed above, the case where Lp = 21/s is predicted to be PIO
prone, whilst the case where Lp = 61/s is predicted to be PIO Incipient.
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(a) O-PRE-PAC, Lp = 2, and τs = 0.2sec
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(b) O-PRE-PAC, Lp = 6, and τs = 0.2sec
Figure 5.9: O-PRE-PAC results for cases with τs = 0.1sec
As shown, boundaries are affected by the roll bandwidth, and show the change
in trigger frequency with respect to input amplitude. As input amplitude decreases,
frequency to trigger oscillations increases. The change in frequency and the amplitude
for which this occurs is dependent on the roll damping value. As shown in Fig.5.9a,
trigger frequencies were predicted range from 2-8 rad/s. These frequencies were found
to be dependent on input amplitude. If the pilot were to apply control input signals
at 4 rad/s, the predictions state that if the amplitude of the input is above 30% of
maximum deflection (Amplitude = 0.3), Severe PIO will be triggered.
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Using the same boundary, if the pilot applies inputs at a maximum amplitude of
60% full travel, Severe PIOs will be triggered if the input frequency exceeds 3 rad/s.
However, the observation of PIO regions with both high frequency and/or amplitude
may not warrant concern. Applying full control magnitude at high frequency would
be considered extreme, and would likely be an unsafe operation. Therefore, knowledge
of the vehicle operational limits is beneficial when determining the impact of the PIO
region.
5.3.3 Influence of Control Gearing
In Ref. [127], Mitchell and Field showed that PIO potential was linked to both control
gearing and control sensitivity for fixed-wing aircraft. However, current criteria, includ-
ing BPD, do not consider the effects of the control gearing/sensitivity. For rotorcraft,
it is hypothesised that the control gearing and sensitivity also influence the PIO in-
cipience. Unlike BPD, the PRE-PAC method accounts for control gearing, as analysis
must be performed at known and stated control magnitudes. Therefore, PRE-PAC can
be used to observe directly the affects of control gearing and vehicle sensitivity.
The simple helicopter roll response approximation is shown in Eqn.5.6. For an
effective vehicle response, there is a dependency between the values of Lp and Lθ1c.
The combination helps to define the amount of roll rate per unit of control input,
which must be set to allow the pilot enough control to complete the required mission
tasks. Equation 5.8 shows the relationship between parameters. Therefore, it is usual
for the ratio pδ1c to be conserved. If
p
δ1c
is too high, pilot control may be over-sensitive,
leading to over-control of the vehicle and possibly PIO events. If pδ1c is too low, it may
not be possible to achieve the desired levels of roll rate to complete the task to required
performance standards. Whilst lower pδ1c may lead to inability for task completion, it
may also reduce the tendencies for oscillations through over control of the vehicle.
p
δ1c
=
Lθ1c
Lp
(5.8)
Figures 5.10a to 5.10d display four examples displaying how control gearing influ-
ences predictions made using O-PRE-PAC. These are for cases with τs = 0.2sec. Figure
5.10a displays results for a linear approximation with Lp = 1/s. For the investigation,
the control sensitivity (p/δ1c) was varied between the lowest value for which a ωtMOD
was determined and the point for which an increase in control sensitivity did not cause
any further change in the PIO susceptibility. For this case, the range was between
3-16 ◦/s/in. The control sensitivity heavily influences the PIO susceptibility, with the
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model ranging from ‘HQL 1’ qualities at 3 deg/s/in to ‘HQL 3’ qualities at sensitivity
above 8 ◦/s/in.
A similar change in PIO susceptibility is observed for the case where Lp = 2/s,
results for which are shown in Fig.5.10b. Here, the range of different predictions (3-12
deg/s/in) was found to be narrower than the approximation where Lp = 1/s. Ap-
proximations where Lp = 4/s and Lp = 6/s are shown in Fig.5.10c and Fig.5.10d
respectively. For both cases, whilst the control sensitivity affects PIO prediction, the
change in incipience is less than for the cases with lower roll bandwidth. Both config-
urations show a change from ‘HQL 1’ prediction to ‘HQL 2’ as the control sensitivity
is increased.
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Figure 5.10: Influence of control sensitivity on PIO susceptibility.
With results shown above, it is possible to draw boundaries to show PIO predictions
with respect to p/δ1c and Lp. These are shown in Fig.5.11, based upon the limited
examples shown above. The results show the link between Lθ1c and Lp, showing that
it is possible to engineer the control sensitivity to limit the susceptibility to PIO. The
drawback in limiting the control sensitivity is the reduction in vehicle manoeuvrability.
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The boundaries shown are valid for roll approximations with an applied time delay
τs = 0.2s only. Further results must be calculated in order to observe how the effects
of the roll sensitivity vary with differences in time delay.
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Figure 5.11: Proposed gearing boundaries.
5.4 Parametric Sweeps using C-PRE-PAC
One of the benefits of C-PRE-PAC is that it can be used to assess a wide range of
vehicle characteristics quickly and computationally cheaply. This can be achieved by
re-simulating tasks with changes in vehicle characteristics. The ability to complete this
analysis makes it easy to perform design sweeps of PIO incipient cases. A design study
was completed, by varying both Lp and τs of the linear roll model given by Eqn.5.6.
The sinusoidal tracking task, shown in Fig.5.5c, was used to obtain predictions with a
matrix of configurations. Results are shown as contour plots, with respect to both Lp
and τs.
Figure 5.12a displays the predicted vehicle closed-loop frequency during completion
of the task. As shown, for the range of Lp and τs values, frequency is within 1-8 rad/s,
the range for which PIOs are known to occur. Although some fluctuation is shown,
a frequency in the region of 3-5.5 rad/s is recorded for all cases. Frequency during
the task appears to be highest for configurations with high roll damping and low time
delay. However, the introduction of delay does not appear to significantly effect the
frequency. In contrast, Fig.5.12b shows a large change in the phase distortion between
pilot input and vehicle output with increasing time delay (as expected). In this case,
phase distortion is affected by both τs and Lp.
Figure 5.13a displays the variance in AG for the linear models. A similar relationship
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(a) Matrix of predictions of vehicle oscilla-
tion frequency, rad/s.
(b) Matrix of predictions of vehicle oscilla-
tion phase distortion, deg.
Figure 5.12: Matrices of predictions for a pilot model with ωco = 2.5rad/s.
as displayed for the phase distortion is shown for the change in AG. However, change in
AG appears to be predominantly dependent upon the time delay, with the exception of
cases with Lp < 2. As shown, for the majority of cases with τ < 0.2s, AG appears low
and relatively unaffected by roll damping. A similar change is observed with regards
to RMS tracking error, shown in Fig.5.13b. RMS Tracking error for the majority of
configurations was lower than 0.2◦, peaking at 0.7◦ for the case with lowest damping
and highest time delay.
(a) Matrix of predictions of Aggression
(AG), deg/s
2.
(b) Matrix of predictions of vehicle track-
ing error, (rad).
Figure 5.13: Matrices of predictions for a pilot model with ωco = 2.5rad/s (2).
From results obtained, PAC Predictions can be made using the boundaries defined
for real-time detection. These boundaries should be selected as so they are suitable
for the vehicle configuration being investigated. Through previously discussed inves-
tigations, it was possible to define both ‘Moderate’ and ‘Severe’ lateral susceptibility
boundaries. One method to determine the predicted PIO incipience is to calculate the
percentage of PAC points that lie either within the Moderate or Severe regions.
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Figure 5.14a displays the percentage of PAC points obtained within the moderate
region during simulation of the sinusoidal tracking task. Coloured regions denote areas
where PAC detections have been made. If a mesh is not present, it shows that no
points were determined in the PIO region for the configuration. For this task, using
the cross-over pilot model, the majority of cases are not found to lead to predicted
‘Moderate’ PIOs. The region that exists is both dependent upon the time delay and
roll damping. However, prediction percentages were found to be low. This is due to the
high observation of Severe PIOs within this region, shown in Fig.5.14b. Severe PIOs
are shown in a slightly smaller region, but with a much higher percentage observation.
The combination of Moderate and Severe PIOs predictions for these case are shown in
Figure 5.14c.
(a) Percentage of PAC points within MOD
region, % ωco = 2.0rad/s
(b) Percentage of PAC points within SEV
region, % ωco = 2.0rad/s
(c) Percentage of PAC points within both
MOD and SEV regions, % ωco = 2.0rad/s
Figure 5.14: PAC results for three cases completed using the sinusoidal tracking task
The results above show predictions based on the response to a simple crossover pilot
model, with ωco = 2.5rad/s. However, the effect of pilot gain can greatly influence the
proximity to PIO. Figures 5.15a to 5.15d display PAC predictions for a number of
different ωco. As expected, as ωco increases, the PIO region increases. An ωco =
2.0rad/s is considered as ‘normal’ pilot gain, often selected as a nominal value for pilot
models. The PIO region for this pilot gain is shown in Fig.5.15b. As shown, only
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with Lp < 2rad/s and τs > 0.25 are PIOs predicted. However, high percentage is
found for these cases. Figure 5.15d displays results for a pilot model with a high gain,
ωco = 3.0rad/s. As shown, the increase of pilot gain causes a significant increase in
PIO region. PIOs are predicted to occur with τs = 0.4s for all values of roll damping.
(a) Percentage of PAC points, (%) ωco =
1.5rad/s
(b) Percentage of PAC points, (%) ωco =
2.0rad/s
(c) Percentage of PAC points, (%) ωco =
2.5rad/s
(d) Percentage of PAC points, (%) ωco =
3.0rad/s
Figure 5.15: Effect of varying ωco on PIO predictions
The difference in PIO susceptibility is also shown through observation of tracking
error. Results for a number of pilot crossover frequencies are shown in Fig. 5.16a to
Fig. 5.16d. As pilot gain increases, the tracking error, particularly for cases with higher
time delay, significantly increases with increasing pilot ωco. As expected, the increase
in pilot gain causes the pilot model to encounter larger phase distortions due to the
applied delay. This leads to the higher tracking error.
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(a) Tracking error,(rad) ωco = 1.5rad/s (b) Tracking error, (rad) ωco = 2.0rad/s
(c) Tracking error, (rad) ωco = 2.5rad/s (d) Tracking error, (rad) ωco = 3.0rad/s
Figure 5.16: Effect of varying ωco on tracking error
5.4.1 Observation of PAC Based on Rate Limit Boundaries
A further advantage of PRE-PAC is its suitability to not only predict Category I type
PIOs but also Category II types. Historically, tools including BPD have been found
suitable for prediction of linear PIO dynamics. However, the ease and applicability
of Category II tools is still open for debate. As discussed in Chapter 2, the most
widely adopted Cat. II prediction method used in rotorcraft research has been OLOP.
However, questions regarding boundaries for its use, and its suitability when Cat. I
dynamics are also a factor, have bought its use into question. PRE-PAC has been
designed using the method outlined in Chapter 4 of this work, based primarily on
Rate Limited examples. Therefore, it is envisaged that the method can be seen as an
alternative to OLOP, whilst also improving consistency between predictions for linear
and quasi-linear dynamics.
To show how the introduction of RLE influences results obtained, a comparison of
PIO predictions are shown in Figs.5.17a and 5.17b. Fig.5.17a displays results for linear
roll approximations without a RLE within the control channel, and those in Fig.5.17b
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display results for approximations with a RLE = 2.5◦/sec. If mesh is not present, no
PAC points were found within the Moderate or Severe PIO regions. Although the RLE
has influenced PIO predictions, the range of configurations judged to be PIO prone
is similar. The RLE causes a change in control strategy, which has an influence of
proximity to PIO. Figures 5.18a and 5.18b display AG found during the closed-loop
oﬄine analysis. The RLE cause a significant reduction in AG for cases with large time
delays. Throughout, AG is limited to less than 20
◦/s2, 1/3 lower than for the highest
AG cases without RLE. This reduction is due to the limit on vehicle rate that the
limit provides. As a consequence, the pilot closed-loop frequency is lower, but the
tracking error is much higher. The difference in tracking error is shown in Fig.5.19a
and Fig.5.19b.
(a) Percentage of PAC points within both
MOD and SEV regions, no RLE %.
(b) Percentage of PAC points within both
MOD and SEV regions, RLE %.
Figure 5.17: Influence of Rate Limiting Elements on PIO predictions.
(a) Aggression during sinusoidal tracking
task, no RLE, ◦/sec.
(b) Aggression during sinusoidal tracking
task, RLE, ◦/sec.
Figure 5.18: Influence of Rate Limiting Elements on AG.
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(a) Tracking error during sinusoidal track-
ing task, no RLE, (rad).
(b) Tracking error during sinusoidal track-
ing task, RLE, (rad).
Figure 5.19: Influence of Rate Limiting Elements on tracking error.
5.5 Case Study Examples
To show some simple examples of application of PRE-PAC, four aircraft were selected,
representing a range of rotorcraft currently operational today. These are shown in
Fig.5.20a to Fig.5.20d. All rotorcraft shown have been previously modelled in the
Flight Simulation laboratory at the University of Liverpool. As previously discussed,
the Rigid Body dynamics of the helicopter roll motion can be approximated through
the simple roll approximation shown in Eqn.5.6. This equation contains three variables;
the vehicle roll damping (Lp), the control roll control sensitivity (Lθ1c) and the roll axis
transport delay (τ). The three values combined dictate the roll motion of the vehicle
following a pilot control input. They also give an indication of how the vehicle will
respond to external effects, such as disturbances or changes in atmospheric conditions.
Therefore, to approximate the PIO susceptibility of the selected aircraft models, only
these three parameters are required. Values taken from previous research are shown in
Table 5.2. These are also shown with the BO105 model created for use in this research.
The extent of accuracy of these parameters is not known, with the analysis only used
to show application of PRE-PAC to different types of rotorcraft. Final results do not
necessarily show accurately the PIO of the rotorcraft models shown in Fig.5.20a to
Fig.5.20d.
As shown, both BO105 and Lynx helicopters have similar characteristics. Both
feature stiff hingeless rotors, and are capable of high manoeuvrability and agility. The
Puma is a large helicopter, with a traditional articulated rotor. Its poor roll damping
characteristics mean that the response to control is sluggish. Due to the tilt-rotor
configuration of the XV-15, high roll inertia leads to sluggish response, and a long
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(a) Puma (b) Lynx
(c) XV-15 (d) Bell 412
Figure 5.20: Example aircraft used for comparison of roll dynamics
Table 5.2: Guidance Lp values.
Model LP 1/s Lθ deg/s
2 p/δ1c deg/s Ref.
BO105 14 170 12.14 [111]
Puma 2 25 12.5 [111]
Lynx 11 150 13.64 [111]
XV-15 5.75 23 4.10 [128]
Bell-412 2.194 54.47 24.82 [115]
period to steady state. The Bell-412 features very poor roll damping, with very high
roll sensitivity.
As stated in the previous section, a combination of Lp and Lθ1c must be engineered
to ensure that there is sufficient control to complete the desired aircraft mission capabil-
ities. The ratio of roll rate with respect to control input ( pδ1c ) for the roll approximations
are shown Table 5.2.
Fig.5.21 shows O-PRE-PAC metrics for the four of the rotorcraft shown in Table
5.2. Such analysis, where only simple roll approximations are used, may be performed
in the early design stage of any vehicle. Using boundaries derived previously within
this Chapter, one can observe the predicted PIO susceptibility of the four sets of linear
dynamics. Displayed on Fig. 5.21 are loci from τ = 0.05 to τ = 0.3 for the Puma
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and Bell-412, and loci from τ = 0.10 to τ = 0.3 for the XV-15 and Lynx. It is shown
that with a degree of time delay, all linear models exhibit PIO tendencies. The linear
characteristics of the Bell-412 bare airframe were found to be the most prone to PIO
(shown through the degradation in HQs), closely followed by those of the Puma. Both
were found to have points within the HQL 3 region with an applied time delay of 0.15
seconds. The Lynx characteristics were found to be in the HQL 1 regio with time delay
up to and including 0.2 seconds. However, 0.25 seconds delay was found to lead to
points within the HQL 2 region, and 0.3 seconds delay led to a point within the HQL 3
region. The susceptibility to time delay appears to be greater in the Lynx model than
in the XV-15 model. Both vehicles with time delay of 0.1 seconds show similar metrics.
However, due to the low control sensitivity in the XV-15, with applied time delay of
0.25 seconds, the model was found to be in the HQL 1 region. This analysis suggests
that lower control sensitivity can improve the robustness of the vehicle to RPC. Both
the Bell-412 and Puma aircraft have low roll damping values (approximately 2 rad/s).
However, due to the higher control sensitivity, the Bell-412 is predicted to be more
prone to RPC. Again, this shows the influence of control sensitivity, an aspect of the
vehicle that is not subject to assessment through BPD.
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Figure 5.21: Comparison of linear models representing linear lateral dynamics of a
number of rotorcraft.
As previously discussed, PRE-PAC can also be used to determine regions of sus-
ceptibility in terms of control input frequency and amplitude. Examples for the four
linear models used in Fig. 5.21 are shown in Fig. 5.22a to Fig. 5.22d. These are for
an applied time delay τ = 0.2sec. For these cases, metrics show that the Bell-412 and
Puma are both in the HQL 3 region, whilst the Lynx and XV-15 are both in the HQL
1 region. However, C-PRE-PAC regions show that all models do have susceptibility to
PIO for some region of the control envelope. However, for cases where the frequency
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and magnitude required is high, it is not likely that the region will be encountered.
However, it is important to remember that, even for these cases, there is the possibility
that PIO’s could be triggered.
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(c) PAC results from computation of Bell-
412 Model
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(d) PAC results from computation of XV-
15 model
Figure 5.22: Examples of pilot model output for sum-of-sines task, τs = 0.0sec
Ref. [129] contains safety limits used on the NRC Bell-412 Advanced Systems Re-
search Aircraft (ASRA). Here, a number of attitude and attitude rate limits are shown.
For roll attitude at low speed, a maximum roll rate of 35 deg/s is permitted. At this
point, the on-board safety management systems take control from the pilot to avoid
entering dangerous conditions. Figure 5.23 shows this safety limit plotted against the
boundaries determined through O-PRE-PAC analysis. It is shown that the safety limit
actually ensures that the boundary is not crossed for a large proportion of the envelope.
Only a small region, between 3 rad/s and 7 rad/s allows for possible ‘Moderate PIO’.
One application of PAC is to use it to draw these safety boundaries. For example, in
this case, the safety boundary must be lowered between 3-7 rad/s to ensure no PIO
tendencies. However, with the ASRA boundary it should not be possible to trigger
‘Severe PIO’, with applied τs = 0.2sec. Although the actual Bell-412 ASRA is a much
more complex than the simple linear approximation used, the analysis provides insight
into possible PIO tendencies in a vehicle of this configuration. The similarity between
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PAC and ASRA safety boundary should also be seen as a supporting result for the use
of PRE-PAC.
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Figure 5.23: Comparison of linear models representing different types of rotorcraft.
Further analysis was conducted using C-PRE-PAC analysis. In order to show PIO
susceptibility, linear configurations were used for completion of the sum-of-sines track-
ing task. A matrix of configurations was completed, varying the pilot cross-over fre-
quency and vehicle time delay. This was to appraise the vehicle susceptibility to PIO
for different types of pilot. Crossover frequencies in the range 2 rad/s to 3.5 rad/s
were investigated. Figures 5.24a to 5.24d display results, with respect to cross-over
frequency and time delay. Results display the percentage of PAC points found in ei-
ther ‘Moderate’ or ‘Severe’ PIO regions over the duration of the task. If mesh is not
present, the combination was not found to cause closed-loop PIO during completion of
the sum-of-sines task.
Results from the analysis reflect those obtained from the application of O-PRE-
PAC. Both the Puma and Bell-412 show the largest susceptible regions to PIO. For
the majority of cases where PIO is encountered, during this task and using the simple
cross-over model approximation, it is sustained for the complete manoeuvre. In reality,
it is likely that the pilot would break-out of the control loop, to suppress oscillations.
For the C-PRE-PAC cases, the Lynx was found to show the lowest susceptibility region,
which was very similar to the region obtained for the XV-15. Results show that for
completion of this task with linear dynamics akin to the Lynx, PIO is not predicted
for applied time delays lower than 0.3 seconds. Furthermore, with a pilot cross-over
frequency below 2.25 rad/s, no PIO instability is predicted to occur during completion
of the task.
To gain a further understanding of PIO susceptibility of the configurations, Fig.5.25a
to 5.25d display desired and actual vehicle trajectory during closed-loop analysis of the
PVS response to the sum-of-sines tracking task. These are for cases with τ = 0.2sec
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(a) PAC results from computation of Lynx
model
(b) PAC results from computation of Puma
model
(c) PAC results from computation of Bell-
412 model
(d) PAC results from computation of XV-
15 model
Figure 5.24: Examples of pilot model output for sum-of-sines task, τs = 0.0sec
and ωco = 2.5rad/s. All traces show sustained oscillations through the task. However,
for both the Lynx and XV-15 examples, the PVS still appears to be engaged in the
task, with oscillations occurring about the desired trajectory. For both the Bell-412 and
Puma examples, large oscillations occur, and appear to be completely independent of
the desired task trajectory. This shows Severe PIOs, which the pilot model is fighting
throughout the task attempt. Figures 5.26a to Fig.5.26d display control input and
vehicle output for all vehicle models. This shows that for both the Puma and Bell-412
models, Severe PIO has caused full oscillatory control input, resulting from divergent
control in the first 20 seconds of the task.
Figures 5.27b to 5.27c display PAC results for cases plotted on PAC charts. As
shown, PIOs are entered for and sustained for both the Puma and Bell-412 models.
One reason the XV-15 and Lynx configurations avoid PIO is the much lower Aggression
through completion of the task. Although the Lynx exhibits large phase distortions,
these do not lead to PIO, as ‘Moderate’ and ‘Severe’ regions do not show sustained
PAC points. This reflects findings from the application of O-PRE-PAC. This includes
observations regarding the influence of control gearing. Previously in this Chapter,
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Figure 5.25: Vehicle attitude during completion of closed-loop simulation
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Figure 5.26: Pilot input during completion of closed-loop simulation
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boundaries were drawn displaying the influence of control gearing and sensitivity. Fig-
ure 5.28 shows where the vehicle models investigated in this section lie with respect to
these boundaries.
Φ, deg
A G
,
 
de
g/
s2
NO PIO
MOD. PIO
SEVERE PIO
NO PIO
MOD. PIO
SEVERE PIO
0 50 100 150 2000
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
(a) PAC results from computation of Lynx
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(d) PAC results from computation of XV-
15 model
Figure 5.27: PAC results for simulation of closed-loop sum-of-sines task
Results from the application of control gearing boundaries correlate with the results
from closed-loop computation. Both the Bell-412 and Puma are within the HQL 3
region (with high control sensitivity and low roll damping).
Finally, Fig.5.29 shows comparison of BPD predictions for cases where τ = 0.2sec,
with respect to boundaries both included in and MIL-STD-1797 [15].
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Figure 5.28: Comparison of control gearing and O-PRE-PAC predictions.
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Figure 5.29: Comparison of linear models representing different types of rotorcraft.
Results from the application of PAC show that the Bell 412 and Puma character-
istics are more incipient to PIO. However, all models are shown to have similar char-
acteristics, and are all predicted to be PIO Robust based on the boundary included
within MIL-STD-1797 [15]. However, both the Bell-412 and Puma dynamics fall very
close to the boundary. The application of O-PRE-PAC has shown larger differences
than those shown from the application of BPD. Through the application of C-PRE-
PAC and closed-loop analysis, PIOs were clearly shown during completion of a realistic
tracking task. Using PRE-PAC, PIOs were clearly identified, showing recorded points
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within the Severe PIO region. Furthermore, the application of O-PRE-PAC showed a
large difference between the predicted HQs between the Bell-412 and Puma aircraft,
and the Lynx and XV-15 aircraft.
Table 5.3 shows the overall appraisal of the PIO susceptibility found through the
use of prediction tools. Using BPD fixed-wing PIO boundaries, all configurations were
predicted to be free from PIO tendencies. However, as shown, this was not predicted
to be the case through the application of PRE-PAC.
Table 5.3: Overall predictions using PRE-PAC.
Model LP
1/s
Lθ
deg/s2
O-PRE-
PAC
C-PRE-PAC
(ωco = 2.5rad/s)
BPD
Puma 2 25 HQL 3 SEV PIO NO PIO
Lynx 11 150 HQL 1 NO PIO NO PIO
XV-15 5.75 23 HQL 1 NO PIO NO PIO
Bell-412 2.194 54.5 HQL 3 SEV PIO NO PIO
5.6 Validation of PRE-PAC Criteria
The prediction criteria that have been developed in this Chapter were validated using
the FGR results from Chapter 4. A large number of Pitch Tracking tests were con-
ducted using two test pilots. These were conducted using a series of Rate Limits. In
this section, results from the tests are compared to predictions made using the PAC
Prediction criteria.
5.6.1 O-PRE-PAC Prediction
Figure 5.30 displays the O-PRE-PAC predictions made using the FGR model. Predic-
tions are shown for the vehicle both with the SAS-ON, and SAS-OFF configurations,
with various rate limits used in the investigation.
As shown, the rate limit was found to cause differences in predictions for both
models, causing the prediction to fall within the ‘HQL 3’ region for both configurations.
For both cases with RL = 20◦/s, predictions were found within the HQL 2 region. This
region indicates that PIOs are not expected to occur within normal operations, but may
be present during tasks featuring high pilot gain, or tight control.
Finally, when theRL = 30◦/s, different predictions were found between the SAS-ON
and SAS-OFF configurations. The SAS-ON configuration was found to be within the
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HQL 1 region, meaning that PIOs are not expected during piloted operation. However,
the SAS-OFF configuration was found in the HQL 3 region, suggesting that it is likely
that at some point PIOs will be encountered.
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Figure 5.30: Results of application of O-PRE-PAC metrics to FGR. Numbers on figure
denote rate limit value, in deg/s.
Table 5.4 shows a comparison between O-PRE-PAC predictions and those made
using OLOP and BPD criteria. If functioning as desired, the O-PRE-PAC prediction
should show both the PIO incipience to Cat.I and Cat.II PIO.
The comparison shows that, for the SAS-ON configuration, degradation from HQL
1 to HQL 2 is predicted with the application of RL = 20◦/s. For this configuration, no
PIO detection was made through either the use of BPD or OLOP. However, the OLOP
criteria shows PIO prone or PIO Robust predictions only. Results suggest that the
OLOP prediction of PIO occurring correlates with the O-PRE-PAC HQL 3 prediction.
This is consistent with the appraisal of boundaries discussed above.
5.6.2 C-PRE-PAC Prediction
As discussed in the preceding section, the C-PRE-PAC prediction requires both a pilot
model, and task to be simulated to show the prediction of the task-dependent PIO
susceptibility.
The Pitch Tracking task was used for the investigation with the FGR model. For
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Table 5.4: Comparison between predictions
Bound. Speed (Kts) Rate Limit, deg/s
50 30 20 10
BPD SAS-ON 7 7 7 7
OLOP SAS-ON 7 7 7 3
O-PRE-PAC SAS-ON HQL 1 HQL 1 HQL 2 HQL 3
BPD SAS-OFF - 3 3 3
OLOP SAS-OFF - 7 7 3
O-PRE-PAC SAS-OFF - HQL 2 HQL 2 HQL 3
simulation for the C-PRE-PAC prediction, the Pitch Tracking signal shown in Fig.5.31
was used. For tests completed in piloted simulation, three different tracking signals
were used to mitigate against pilot learning. As this is not an issue for closed-loop
simulation, only one tracking signal was used here.
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Figure 5.31: Example of Pitch Tracking trajectory
The closed-loop simulation was completed through the use of a linear approximation
of the FGR model. This was due to resources available to complete the closed-loop sim-
ulation. Predictions of the FGR susceptibility are shown in Table 5.4. However, these
predictions are generalised, and are not task specific. Therefore, it is not necessarily
the case that the C-PRE-PAC predictions will agree with the general predictions, as
the criteria are assessing different elements of the vehicle PIO susceptibility.
The closed-loop simulation was completed using a cross-over pilot model, as shown
in the preceding sections of this Chapter. The pilot model was set with a cross-over
frequency ωco = 2.5rad/s, representing normal pilot gain. Within the closed-loop
simulation, the task was set as a ‘point-tracking’ manoeuvre with no influence of the
boundaries on the performance of the pilot model. If a more sophisticated model had
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been utilised, it could be possible to include the effects of the boundaries, as shown in
BAT research and pilot modelling.
The closed-loop simulation was completed for all RLs, for both the SAS-ON and
SAS-OFF configurations. Figures 5.32a to 5.32f displays the vehicle attitude results
from completion of the closed-loop simulation.
Results show that for all cases completed using the SAS-ON configuration, the
task was achieved without any large oscillatory response in the vehicle attitude. Cases
showed little dependence on RL, with only minor corrections required to achieve the
desired trajectory of the Pitch Tracking task. At two points in the manoeuvre, the RL
appeared to affect the pitch attitude, at t = 22sec and t = 42sec. At both times, the
overshoot was increased as the RL was reduced.
For the SAS-OFF configuration, RL had a larger influence over results obtained.
For both cases with RL > 10◦/s, the task was not achieved successfully, with large
oscillations observed within the pitch attitude traces. However, with the RL = 10◦/s,
the pitch response was unstable, and divergent pitch attitude was found.
Results from the closed-loop simulations suggested that PIOs were experienced for
the SAS-OFF configuration but not for the SAS-ON configuration. The C-PRE-PAC
analysis was conducted to observe whether this was the case.
PAC ponts were determined for the configurations, and plotted on PAC charts to
observe whether PIOs were experienced. Both longitudinal and RL boundaries were
used to determine the susceptibility. All PAC results found are shown within 5.33 and
5.34 for the longitudinal and RL boundaries respectively.
As shown, for cases with the SAS-ON, PAC predictions show ‘No PIO’ for both
cases with RL = 20◦/s and RL = 30◦/s. However, when the RL = 10◦/s, ‘Moderate
PIO’ was found with points appearing within the region of the RL boundaries. These
points were not consequential, and were found following the larger overshoots shown in
Fig.5.32c. Although PIO is detected in the moderate region, it does not appear that
these have caused failure in task performance, and have been compensated for.
C-PRE-PAC results showed greater PIO tendencies during the task for the SAS-
OFF configuration. Using the longitudinal boundaries, Moderate PIO was identified
for both cases with RL = 30◦/s and RL = 20◦/s. For the case where RL = 10◦/s,
Severe PIO was found. Confirmation of Category II PIOs for this case is shown in Fig.
5.34f, whereby PAC points are shown within the Severe PIO region.
Overall, results shown through PAC predictions reflect results obtained during the
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(a) Simulation results, SAS-ON, RL = 30
deg/s
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(b) Simulation results, SAS-ON, RL = 20
deg/s
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(c) Simulation results, SAS-ON, RL = 10
deg/s
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(d) Simulation results, SAS-OFF, RL = 30
deg/s
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(e) Simulation results, SAS-OFF, RL = 20
deg/s
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(f) Simulation results, SAS-ON, RL = 10
deg/s
Figure 5.32: Vehicle attitude simulation for completion of Pitch Tracking task.
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(d) C-PRE-PAC results, long. boundary,
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Φ, deg
A G
,
 
de
g/
s2
NO PIO
MOD. PIO
SEVERE PIO
0 50 100 150 2000
20
40
60
80
100
(e) C-PRE-PAC results, long. boundary,
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(f) C-PRE-PAC results, long. boundary,
SAS-OFF, RL = 10 deg/s
Figure 5.33: PAC results from completion of Pitch Tracking simulation (1).
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(f) C-PRE-PAC results, RL boundary,
SAS-OFF, RL = 10 deg/s
Figure 5.34: PAC results from completion of Pitch Tracking simulation (2).
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piloted completion of the task. This is in spite of the simple pilot model used.
Figure 5.35 displays a comparison of example results obtained in the actual piloted
simulation and corresponding C-PRE-PAC predictions. As shown, the C-PRE-PAC
predictions reflect actual results obtained during piloted simulation. A large difference
between the simulated C-PRE-PAC points and the PAC points were the number of
oscillation points detected. This was due to higher pilot correction and activity within
the actual simulation. This is believed to have been a function of the boundaries
used within the task, causing a change in pilot behaviour. As a result, a number
of PIOs experienced by pilots were more Severe than those predicted using C-PRE-
PAC. Furthermore, the spread of phase distortion experienced during closed-loop task
completion was larger for data recorded from piloted simulations. It is believed that
using a more advanced pilot model, such as models in development [130] would improve
the predictions. However, results display how C-PRE-PAC can be used to offer the
task-based prediction, not shown through current prediction methods.
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Figure 5.35: Comparison between actual PAC results and C-PRE-PAC predictions
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5.7 Summary of Chapter 5
In this Chapter, a novel PIO prediction tool has been presented as a method of pre-
dicting both Cat. I and Cat. II PIO tendencies. The following are considered the main
benefits of the novel prediction method presented;
1. The PRE-PAC methods bring synergy between the prediction criteria and the
objective evaluation of PIO tendencies, by utilising the same structure and meth-
ods presented in Chapter 4. In this way, there should be more continuity and
understanding between prediction and detection of PIO, allowing for a greater
awareness of PIOs at, and beyond the design stage.
2. Results can be used in a number of ways, in order to offer a detailed appraisal of
the PVS incipience to PIO. The structure allows researchers to investigate both
specific and general conditions. In this way, the method can be used for both the
design of the vehicle and design of defined tasks for exposing PIO.
3. PRE-PAC can be used to generate predictions that can form the basis of alle-
viation techniques. For example, the use of O-PRE-PAC leads to the definition
of an unacceptable region of control magnitude with respect to frequency. These
can be included in system hardware or software systems in vehicle designs.
4. The validation of PRE-PAC has been shown through the application to the FGR
model. Results obtained from closed-loop simulation of the Pitch Tracking task
show similar PIO susceptibility as found during completion of the task by test
pilots. This shows how PRE-PAC can be used as a prediction tool, prior to flight
testing.
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Chapter 6
A New Subjective Method to
Assess A/RPCs
6.1 Objectives
Although subjective assessment methods currently exist for observation of A/RPC
tendencies, limitations in the methods make their use challenging. These are discussed
in detail in Chapter 2, and will be briefly recapped in this Chapter. Previously, re-
searchers have attempted to improve results obtained from subjective assessment meth-
ods through small modifications. However, these modifications have led to only minor
improvements in the use of the subjective results. The introduction of novel methods
has also caused inconsistency between research efforts. In this chapter, a new method
to assess APCs is presented, to provide an alternative means to assess A/RPCs. The
aim of this new method is to re-design the complete subjective scale, rather than apply-
ing minor changes. Within the chapter, the novel subjective rating scale is presented
and its use demonstrated with results obtained from a simulation campaign.
6.2 Recap of Previous A/RPC Scales
The review in Chapter 2 described the development of previous APC/PIO scales. A
summary of the main development of each of the rating systems discussed is shown in
Table 6.1. Since 1963, subjective rating methods have been developed for the assess-
ment of APC/PIO tendencies. These have been influenced by progress within other
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research areas, such as HQ investigations. The most common scale used today is a
combination of the assessment methods presented in 1967 and 1981. This ‘combined’
scale is shown in Fig. 6.1. Here, the scale is referred to as the PIO Tendency Scale.
It is believed that this scale has become the most widely used assessment method due
to its inclusion in MIL-STD-1797C [15]. Although other researchers have attempted
to improve results obtained using this scale, the adoption of newer scales has not been
widespread. The following subsections outline the perceived limitations of the PIO
Tendency Scale.
Table 6.1: Timeline of recent and notable PIO prediction and detection tools
Year Name Report/Group Ref. Dev.
1963 Pilot Opinion
Rating System
NATC-RAD32-
103
[94] Novel., numbered descriptions
1967 PIO Tendency
Scale
AFFDL-TR-66-
163
[95] Updated descriptions, kept
format.
1981 PIO Tendency
Scale (Decision
Tree)
AFWAL-TR-
81-3118
[97] Introduction of decision
tree structure
1984 Top-Down PIO
Scale
Powers [98] Change to a top-down Deci-
sion Tree
1990s PIO Tendency
Scale
Veridian Engi-
neering
[99] Minor changes to descrip-
tions, retained structure
1999 Comprehensive
PIO Rating
Mitchell [83] Novel rating system - depar-
ture from decision tree struc-
ture
2000 PIO Scale GARTEUR AG-
12
[99] One dimensional tree, intro-
duction of questions, changed
to descriptions
2012 Aircraft Pilot
Coupling Rating
Scale
FAA [101] One dimensional decision tree
- renaming of ratings
6.3 Critique of ‘the PIO Tendency Rating Scale’
As described above, despite suggested modifications to improve the utility of APC
scales, the PIO Tendency Rating Scale (PIOR), has remained the primary scale of
choice during pilot-in-the-loop investigations. This section presents the main problems
concerning the scale, identified during investigations as part of the current research.
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Figure 6.1: The PIO Tendency Rating Scale
6.3.1 Subjective Scale with Limited Subjectivity
The first observation made was the lack of subjectivity available to assessing pilots. This
is a result of the layout of the decision tree. The tree is set so that each single branch is
attached to a numerical rating. The Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating scale is
an example of how a decision tree can be used to aid the pilot in subjective assessment.
It has shown its benefits through its use in almost every rotorcraft HQ investigation
since its introduction [96]. In this scale, the decision tree guides the pilot to a specific
set of ratings, defined as ‘levels’. The tree assists the pilot in reaching the level, and
then it is his/her decision on the rating. This gives the pilot freedom of choice, the
describe deficiencies experienced.
However, if the PIOR scale is used as designed, each branch determines a numerical
rating. The questions that the pilots must answer to reach the numerical ratings do not
allow them to apply their subjective opinion. Twice the pilot must decide whether s/he
experienced oscillations, and once s/he must decide whether these were convergent or
divergent. Using the decision tree, the descriptions shown in Table 6.2 show the entirety
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Table 6.2: Decision tree descriptions
Rating Description from tree
1 No undesirable motions, no oscillations, in task
2 Undesirable motions, task performance not compromised, no oscillations
3 Undesirable motions, task performance compromised, no oscillations
4 Oscillations, not divergent, enter task
5 Oscillations, divergent, enter task
6 Oscillations, divergent
of subjective appraisal.
The decision tree does not give much information regarding the oscillations. How-
ever, referring to Fig.6.1, each strand is given a much larger description than the deci-
sion tree statements. As these detailed descriptions are ‘upstream’ of the decision tree,
either the pilot is using prior knowledge to reach the correct description, or they arrive
at the correct description by chance. These descriptive terms, shown in Fig. 2.6 were
fitted to the decision tree in 1981, as an aid to guide pilots in the decision process.
Often, for example in work conducted in Ref. [12], the descriptive terms are contained
within a separate table. Occasionally, as in Ref. [33, 34], only the descriptive terms or
the decision tree are presented with findings.
As the tree requires the pilot to make decisions to reach all eventual ratings, the
descriptive terms added after the decision process should not influence the results ob-
tained. The case may arise where the pilot disagrees with the descriptive outcome. For
this case, there is no clear decision for the pilot to make.
This leads to confusion among pilots and engineers alike. The problem results from
the fact that the decision tree and the descriptive terms do not represent the same
rating system. As a result, they should not be combined, used together, or referred
to as the same thing. As descriptions can be used alone, eliminating the decision tree
offers the pilot ample subjectivity. However, this gives little depth within the scale.
6.3.2 Severity: Poor Descriptors
As shown in Table 6.2, the decision tree itself does not directly portray a measure of
Severity. One can argue that severity is given through the divergence question, used
to decide between PIOR = 4 and PIOR = 5. However, the lack of Severity is also
shown in descriptions. In the descriptions, severity is inferred through the words used.
For example, for a PIOR = 4, the pilot must reduce gain and for a PIOR = 5, pilot
173
must open the loop. These descriptors infer the relative attention required to suppress
oscillations, perhaps the most important element to address.
The Cooper-Harper HQR Scale allows the trained test pilot to subjectively assess
the severity of HQ deficiencies. In the same way, it should be possible to directly assess
the severity of PIOs. It is believed that shrouding ‘Severity’ in other terms is not
required. Once pilots have been correctly briefed on what does and does not constitute
a ‘Pilot-Induced Oscillation’, there should be little reason why they cannot assess the
severity of oscillations they experienced.
6.3.3 Question of Divergence
A question that was found to cause difficulty for pilots during investigations was that
of ‘Divergence?’. Assessing whether oscillations are divergent can be challenging, par-
ticularly as pilots are often unwilling to wait and see whether oscillations are divergent.
This question is given significant weighting within the structure of the PIO rating scale.
It is the difference between the PIOR = 4 and a PIOR = 5. As a result, the ques-
tion is often treated as though it directly conveys severity. If pilots experience severe
oscillations, they are more inclined to award PIOR = 5, to convey the danger of the
oscillations. This highlights the observation that convergent or sustained oscillations
may be as dangerous as divergent oscillations. Unfortunately, on the current scale,
there is no way for the pilot to convey this difference in severity. In Ref. [100], Mitchell
stated that this problem, in flight test programmes, can cause pilots to spend an inor-
dinate amounts of time trying to decide between PIOR = 4 and PIOR = 5, when the
most important information has already been conveyed: there was an oscillation. This
observation was also made during investigations as part of this research.
6.3.4 The Three Point Scale
If the decision tree is ignored, and descriptions only are used, an interesting outcome
is found. Historically, a PIOR >= 4 is said to signify observed PIO and/or observed
PIO tendencies. This is due to the description tree separating the halves of the scale
with the question, ‘Caused Oscillations?’. When a pilot states that no oscillations have
been triggered during the test, anything less than PIOR = 4 does not refer to PIO.
The rating may refer to tendencies, that have not been exposed in the test.
Any observed PIOs are assessed using a 3 point scale only. This does not offer ample
resolution to asses all possible types of oscillations. The term ‘undesirable motions’ does
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not necessarily exclude oscillations. There is nothing in the statement that considers
that these motions are not a form of oscillation. Therefore, considering the descriptive
terms only, PIOs could be classified through a 5 point scale. During this investigation,
this was the preference taken by the pilots. A consistent observation made was a pilot
attempting to move from a PIOR = 4 to a PIOR = 3. Firstly, the pilot would
use the decision tree and decide that he experiences oscillations. He considers these
oscillations to be convergent, and as a result reaches PIOR = 4. Secondly, the pilot
reads the descriptor and feels that it is too harsh. The pilot then reads the description
for PIOR = 3. The pilot decides that this adequately describes the situation.
6.3.5 Task Dependency
At one point on the scale the pilot is asked to assess whether task performance has been
compromised. For assessment of HQs, ADS-33 has outlined a large number of MTEs
to assess vehicle handling deficiencies. However, currently, the same outline does not
exist for PIO studies.
Often in studies involving the use of the PIO scale, the task element is designed
specifically for the user requirements. This leads to tasks of different aggression and
difficulty. However, the task will define whether oscillations are experienced, and the
severity of these oscillations. Therefore, the complete scale is affected by the task,
which is not prominent within the scale.
Furthermore, questions relating to task performance are not prominent in the scale.
For example, ‘Caused Oscillations’ is the question that decides from which section of
the scale the rating is awarded. There is no indication as to whether these oscillations
have inhibited task performance, or caused the pilot problems. One element missing
from the scale is information as to whether the pilot successfully completed the task,
or if the oscillations caused failure to maintain task performance.
6.4 Solution: A Novel Adverse Pilot Coupling Scale
6.4.1 Development
It was decided that a novel scale was required to adequately address all issues discussed
in the preceeding section. The final scale that was created is shown in Fig. 6.2. It is
the result of several versions, which were modified based on experience with pilots, and
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their feedback.
Figure 6.2: Adverse Pilot Coupling scale.
Design of the APC Scale
The decision was taken to introduce a new term to describe the rating scale. The
primary reason for this was the perceived use of the scale. The term ‘Pilot-Induced Os-
cillation’ covers only a subset of Aircraft/Rotorcraft Pilot Coupling events [4]. However,
the intended use of the scale is to assess the complete range of coupling events that can
be experienced. The term ‘Adverse (Aircraft/Rotorcraft) Pilot Coupling’ encompasses
this broad range of couplings that could be experienced.
Here, the definition, as given by the Aviation Safety Council [4] is used;
“Inadvertent, Unwanted aircraft and flight path motions that originate in anomalous
interactions between the aircraft and pilot”.
All vehicle undesirable and unintentional motions induced through pilot control are
Adverse Pilot Couplings (APCs). Here, motions infers any translational or rotational
response of the vehicle, and includes oscillatory responses. Pilot-Induced Oscillations
(PIO) are a specific subset of APCs. This subset may be, but is not necessarily,
the most important set of APCs. Oscillatory response does not necessarily cause the
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greatest danger. Rapid departures that cause loss of control must also be considered
(e.g. Saab Grippen incident). Furthermore, the term ‘PIO’ is not really seen to cover
all ‘oscillatory’ vehicle responses due to pilot control, as discussed in Chapter 1.
Due to the continued use of the PIO Scale, it was hypothesised that a very large
departure from the traditional rating scale format was not desirable. This was intended
to introduce a similar feeling to the scale, for those prospective end users. For this
reason, the decision tree structure was maintained.
The tree was structured so that it can be applied to the situation where PIOs occur,
and offer an appraisal based on ‘what happened during’ the PIO, and how it relates to
what the pilot was doing. This was achieved by emphasising the ‘task-based’ element
of the scale, which can then assist in ascertaining when oscillations happened, and why
they are a problem.
As previously discussed, it was considered that a pilot can use his/her own subjective
opinion to assess the severity of oscillations. A trained pilot should be able to recognise
what sort of threat he feels from oscillations. If the pilot states that he/she feels the
oscillations are dangerous, then they should be considered as dangerous. This is the
approach currently taken when assessing HQs. Experience with the Cooper-Harper
HQR Scale [96] has shown pilots are able to apply subjective after initial guidance
through the use of a decision tree structure.
APCs should always be related directly back to the task for which they have been
exposed. It is important to know when, during what operational task, the pilot has
encountered PIOs. PIO tendencies that only occur at the ‘edge of the flight envelope’
are not likely to be as large a threat as those occurring within normal operational
flying tasks. APC, specifically PIO tendencies, should be assessed both in open-loop
and closed-loop flying tasks.
The scale is essentially divided into three regions (that may be considered as levels).
The desired level contains only one rating, APC = 1. Simply this level refers to
an aircraft which, during a specifically defined task, did not exhibit any undesirable
or unintentional responses. Pilots should in no way be discouraged from awarding
APC = 1.
The second region characterises APC tendencies experienced during (attempted)
completion of a defined MTE. This MTE may have been pre-defined, or may have been
improvised. However, the pilot should be able to define a ‘task’ for which APCs oc-
curred. For example, the pilot could be flying in tight formation, and tight tolerances
of flight path cause overcontrol and APC. These APCs would have been induced during
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the tight formation. This region of the scale requires detailed assessment and justifi-
cation to classify nature of APCs. APCs occurring in this region do not necessarily all
require action.
The third and final region of the scale characterises APC tendencies experienced
outside of (attempted) completion of MTE. This includes both open-loop control of the
vehicle and flight of the vehicle outside of a task. APCs in this region are considered
to always require further action. These results should show correlation to unacceptable
HQs, assessed using the Cooper-Harper HQR Scale.
When the scale was used in the research campaign described in the proceeding sec-
tions of this paper, descriptive terms were placed on the scale to assist the pilot in
decision making process. This was done as a measure to ensure pilot consistency; not
for the current investigation, but for the scale’s future use. From experience with the
traditional PIO scale, it was felt that there was a disconnect from the original meanings
of the terms. This has led to inconsistency through research campaigns, where inter-
pretation is used by both engineers and test pilots alike. Therefore, in the new APC
scale, the intention was to present these definitions next to the tree. However, from
feedback, it was considered that these descriptions made the scale ‘test-card’ look over
cluttered, and imposing on first inspection. Therefore, in the version presented here,
the descriptive terms are removed. These terms were as follows;
• Unintentional - Vehicle response which the pilot did not intend to induce through
their control strategy
• Undesirable - The vehicle motions are unwanted, and adversely affect task perfor-
mance
• Motions - Vehicle translational or rotational response due to pilot control
• Oscillations - Periodic control and vehicle motions exhibited during closed-loop flying
tasks
Using the APC Scale
When using the scale, pilot’s enter from the bottom left hand corner, and in order to
reach the desired APC = 1, they must answer ‘NO’ to all ‘top-level’ questions. When
entering the scale, the pilot is asked firstly to assess whether any uncontrollable or
unpredictable motion (a term which includes oscillations) occurs on entry to the control
loop. If the pilot believes they have experienced these motions, they are directly referred
to two descriptions, for which the most appropriate is selected to describe experiences.
On the traditional PIO scale (see Fig 2.6), ‘divergent oscillations’ occurring when the
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pilot enters the control loop are considered PIOR = 6. The description includes
both an appreciation of the situation (‘Disturbance of normal pilot control may cause
divergent oscillations’) and a required method of alleviation (‘Pilot must open control
loop by releasing or freezing the stick’). The APC scale proposed here divides resulting
motion in terms of “motions which the pilot can suppress (APC = 8)” or “motions
which the pilot cannot suppress (loss of control, APC = 9)”.
If the pilot can enter the task, but causes unintentional oscillations or motions,
s/he may award APC = 2 − 7 inclusive. The pilot is now in the ‘second region’.
At this stage, terms ‘non-oscillatory motions’ and ‘oscillations’ are placed in parallel,
rather than in series as shown in the traditional PIO scale. This is so that the pilot can
choose the rating. The pilot must decide whether s/he experienced actual oscillations or
oscillation tendencies. Unlike any ‘tendency references’ offered by previous scales, here
the question refers to what actually happened. If the pilot feels ‘non-oscillatory motions’
only, defined as “vehicle translational or rotational response due to pilot control”,
s/he may award APC = 2 or APC = 3 depending on his/her subjective opinion
of the situation. These ratings suggest PIO tendency, as originally intended for in
the traditional PIO scale. The scale asks the pilot to assess what actually happened.
Unintentional motions infers that the vehicle has qualities of incipient PIO. However,
whatever task the pilot is doing does not force pilot control far enough towards the
PIO situation.
If the pilot experiences oscillations, s/he may award subjective APC = 4 − 7 in-
clusive. These ratings are designed to describe oscillatory events, and can be thought
roughly equivalent to PIOR = 4 and PIOR = 5. The pilot can subjectively decide the
rating to award based on their experience during completion of the task. Furthermore,
descriptions seen for the first time here motivate the pilot’s choice. This is in con-
trast to the traditional ‘combined’ PIO scale, where the a significant amount of chance
matches the descriptions to the decision tree. In the new APC scale, ratings range
from ‘mild oscillations’ to ‘severe oscillations’. Additional terms are used in order to
ensure pilots show consistency, by relating the severity of oscillations to pilot workload
and experience. The pilot is asked to subjectively assess the severity of oscillations
based upon levels of ‘adaptation’ required following the triggering of oscillations. This
refers to ‘adaptation’ from control prior to triggering oscillations. If the pilot does
not need to apply changes to his/her control or task strategy, the situation would rep-
resent negligible pilot adaptation (s/he did not need to respond to the oscillations).
Considerable pilot adaptation refers to the situation where the pilot must consciously
act to suppress oscillations, but may have spare capacity to complete some other tasks
(multi-axis control/task requirements). Pilots may subjectively decide what consti-
tutes ‘Moderate’ or ‘Severe’ oscillations. This could convey the effect of amplitude,
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frequency, or operational situation on the overall severity.
In the APC Scale, the highly weighted dependency on divergence has been removed.
Instead, this has been appended as an additional ‘alpha’ rating. Upon awarding a
rating between APC = 4 and APC = 7, the pilot must also convey severity through
a letter. This describes oscillations during completion of the MTE. The numerical
severity reduces the overall importance of the ‘divergence’ question, but it is retained as
important information. Ultimately, the alphanumeric ratings present a ‘cost function’
of the oscillations.
These ratings describe what happens during completion of the task. This does
not include the situation where the pilot cannot complete the task due to oscillations.
This information is not conveyed through the traditional PIO scale. Through the
layout of the decision tree, and descriptions, pilots may only award PIOR = 6 if they
experience oscillations upon entry to the control loop. This is not applicable if pilots
have attempted a closed-loop task. An innovation in the APC scale presented here is
the ability for pilots to convey failure to maintain task performance. This is through
the ‘Note 1’ path shown in the scale. Note 1 states:
“If oscillations experienced during MTE cannot be suppressed without opening the
control loop, pilot may follow path. Once path is followed, pilot must award alpha-
numeric rating for his/her experience whilst attempting task”.
Essentially, if the pilot cannot complete the task, or is no longer engaged in the
task, s/he may also include APC = 8 and APC = 9. This includes the situation where
the pilot disengages with task performance but does not directly fail to maintain task
performance. For example, it is possible for the pilot to open the control loop, and not
abandon the task. This situation is considered to represent the case where the pilot is
essentially no longer engaged with the task. Furthermore, ‘Note 1’ uses the statement,
“may follow path”. If the pilot does not consider the oscillations warrant it, they may
remain in the second level.
In the final version of the scale presented above, a link is only drawn following
‘oscillations’. Some additional feedback has suggested that this link may include the
‘non-oscillatory motions’ strand. This includes rapid control divergence resulting from
dynamics during task completion. However, it is a concern here that if pilots are
allowed to draw a link from ‘motions’ to ‘open-loop’ control could cause pilots to include
handling deficiencies of the vehicle within their appraisal. If the pilot does have to open
the control loop, it is analogous to pilots again flying open-loop, as they are no longer
flying the task. In this situation, the task has triggered oscillations, which may now be
affecting successful control of the PVS. It is important that if the pilot does enter the
180
task, and follows the ‘Note 1’ path, s/he award an alphabetic character. This shows
that the ‘severe motions’ have been experienced after attempted task completion. If
the pilot does not enter the task, no alphabetic rating is awarded. Therefore, it can be
said that, in principle, APC = 8 denotes a more dangerous situation than APC = 8E,
regarding the general operations of the vehicle. However, an APC = 8E or APC = 9E
denote oscillations are potentially extremely dangerous; ones unseen until perhaps it is
too late.
Finally, as mentioned briefly, this is a scale used for the pilot to account what s/he
experienced during completion of an MTE. The scale is used to state what actually
happened. The original ‘tendency’ consideration is not used here. Instead, APC = 2
and APC = 3 should warn of PIO tendencies (particularly APC = 3). APC = 4 to
APC = 7 should show PIO tendencies. And APC = 8 and APC = 9 should warn of
some major problems regarding the open-loop flying tendencies of the vehicle.
6.5 Results Comparison
The following section outlines some of the results obtained using the novel APC scale
presented above. Results from this section were obtained from a simulated test cam-
paign conducted at UoL.
6.5.1 Experimental Setup
Four pilots (A,C,D and E) were asked to subjectively assess PIO tendencies and vehicle
characteristics through the use of the APC scale (shown in Fig. 6.2), the traditional PIO
tendency rating scale (shown in Fig. 2.6), and the Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities
Rating scale (shown in Fig. 3.11 [96]). The investigation was conducted using the
BO105 aircraft model, described in Chapter 3.
All pilots were familiar with the use of subjective ratings scales, particularly with
the Cooper-Harper HQR scale. Pilots A and E also had significant experience with
the use of the traditional PIO rating scale. However, Pilots C and D had very little
experience with this scale.
During tests, PIO incipience was engineered through forward control path transport
delays and rate limits. These were placed in both the pitch (longitudinal) and roll (lat-
eral) control channels. They were set through the use of prediction criteria. Table 6.3
shows all configurations from the study. As shown, the investigation hoped to unmask
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both Category I type (linear) and Category II type (quasi-linear) oscillations. Further-
more, Configuration 4 contained necessary triggers for both types of PIO, through the
combination of rate limits and transport delays.
Table 6.3: Configurations tested - BO105 Aircraft Model.
Conf. Long.
Delay
(sec)
Long.
Rate
Lim.
(deg/s)
Lat.
Delay
(sec)
Lat.
Rate
Lim
(deg/s)
BPD
(Cat.I)
OLOP
(Cat.II)
1 0 ∞ 0 ∞ NO NO
2 0 ∞ 250 ∞ YES NO
3 0 5 0 2.5 NO YES
4 180 5 250 2.5 YES YES
6.5.2 Task
For this study, the Precision Hover manoeuvre, used in Chapter 4, was selected. This
was chosen as it was desirable to investigate the low speed susceptibility, in multiple
axes. It is a manoeuvre that has both a translational element and a stabilisation
element. The translational element allows one to assess the performance of the aircraft
following large, slow control inputs whereas the stabilisation element of the task assesses
the performance during smaller, more frequent inputs.
In Chapter 4, the Precision Hover manoeuvre was used to expose both lateral and
longitudinal PIO tendencies. However, the manoeuvre has not been designed to specifi-
cally assess RPCs. The manoeuvre is intended to assess the vehicle HQs during routine
operational flying. RPCs as previously discussed, are not usually present in these rou-
tine situations. In Chapter 4, whilst the task was found to be suitable for exposing
lateral and longitudinal PIO, pilot strategy was found to be a dominant factor. It was
found that task performance tolerances could often be met through the use of an ‘open
loop’ control strategy. Therefore, in this further study, the tolerances of the Precision
Hover manoeuvre were engineered, in order to manipulate the RPC susceptibility.
Prior to the investigation, it was hypothesised that by tightening performance re-
quirements, the variability between pilots shown in Chapter 4 would reduce and the
consistency of PIO prediction would increase.
Three ‘Precision Hover’ manoeuvres were completed, with performance parameters
different to those contained within ADS-33 [16]. The manoeuvre task performance was
engineered by making changes to the reference pole location. The set-up of the course,
and the use of the reference pole is previously discussed in Chapter 4, with a schematic
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of the reference set-up shown in Fig. 4.24. During the manoeuvre, pilots are required to
maintain a stabilised hover whilst keeping the spherical marker within the hover board
from their point of view. This marker is positioned atop a reference pole, which is
midway between the helicopter and the hover board. This condition in the visual scene
is shown in Fig. 6.3a. ADS-33 tolerances state a distance of 150ft between the aircraft
and the hover board, with the pole located 75ft from the aircraft. If the reference pole
is moved closer to the aircraft, it decreases the tolerances for completion of the task. In
order to maintain the spherical marker within the hover board, the helicopter position
and heading allowances are reduced.
In the investigation, three pole locations were used; 75ft, 40ft, and 20ft from the
‘target hover position’. The distance between the aircraft and the hover board was
kept constant, at 150ft. The pole height was engineered to maintain an unchanged
hover height. Modifying the pole location caused changes to the lateral, longitudinal,
and height tolerances, given directly by the cueing environment. Figure 6.3b shows the
pole at the closest location (20ft). Excluding changes to the reference pole location,
the course was set-up to replicate performance standards for Scout/Attack and Car-
go/Utility rotorcraft (as outlined in ADS-33 [16]). All pilots completed the manoeuvre
for the four vehicle configurations and for the three reference pole locations. For each
configuration, pilots attempted the manoeuvre at least twice. The first attempt was
usually classed as the ‘practice’ run, whereas the last (or runs in which ratings were
awarded) were classed as evaluation runs.
(a) External view of standard ADS-33 Pre-
cision Hover course setup
(b) External view of modified Precision
Hover course setup
Figure 6.3: Examples of Precision Hover course layout used during the investigation
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6.5.3 Results
All subjective ratings obtained during this investigation are shown in Tables 6.4 to 6.6.
Pilot comments from these tests are contained within Appendix C.
Figure 6.4 displays all APC ratings awarded during the investigation. Numbers
displayed on the figure show the number of times each specific rating was awarded.
During the investigation, 13 unique APC ratings were awarded. The most common
oscillatory ratings awarded wereAPC = 5B andAPC = 5C, suggesting convergent and
sustained oscillations during completion of the task. For the more severe oscillations,
APC = 7C was awarded on a number of occasions. The results demonstrate the
increased range of oscillatory characteristics that can be conveyed, in comparison to
the traditional PIO scale. For example, PIOR = 4 covers the complete spectrum of
convergent or neutrally stable oscillations (according to the decision tree), which may
be encountered during evaluations. This type of ‘convergent’ or ‘sustained’ oscillation
is covered through ‘B’ and ‘C’ ratings awarded using the APC scale (and to a limited
extent ‘A’). As shown, ratings where the pilots have awarded ‘C’, cover the range
APC = 4− 7, covering ‘Mild oscillations’ to ‘Severe oscillations’.
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Figure 6.4: APC Ratings obtained, all pilots.
Results in Table 6.4 display subjective results obtained using standard ADS-33
Precision Hover tolerances. For these cases, both the PIO and APC ratings show PIOs
predominantly only for manoeuvres completed in Conf. 4. For these cases, pilots
awarded PIO = 3-5.
On two occasions, one pilot awarded PIO = 5, denoting divergent oscillations. It is
not known directly from this rating what impact the oscillations had when completing
the task. The HQR shows that intense pilot compensation was required, with major
vehicle deficiencies.
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Table 6.4: Results - Precision Hover - Pole Position 3 (75ft)
Pilot Case No. Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC
A PHH − PA− 1 1 NO 3 1 1
A PHH − PA− 2 1 NO 2 1 1
C PHH − PC − 1 1 NO 3 2 1
D PHH − PD − 1 1 NO 3 2 1
E PHH − PE − 1 1 NO 4 2 2
E PHH − PE − 2 1 NO 4 2 2
A PHH − PA− 3 2 CAT.I 4 3 2
C PHH − PC − 2 2 CAT.I 4 2 2
D PHH − PD − 2 2 CAT.I 4 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 3 2 CAT.I 3 2 2
A PHH − PA− 4 3 CAT.II 3 1 1
C PHH − PC − 3 3 CAT.II 3 2 2
D PHH − PD − 3 3 CAT.II 3 2 1
E PHH − PE − 4 3 CAT.II 4 2 2
A PHH − PA− 5 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5B
A PHH − PA− 6 4 CAT.I &II 7 3 7C
C PHH − PC − 4 4 CAT.I &II 5 3 3
D PHH − PD − 4 4 CAT.I &II 5 4 5C
E PHH − PE − 5 4 CAT.I &II 9 5 8E
E PHH − PE − 6 4 CAT.I &II 9 5 8E
For these cases, the pilot also awarded APC = 8E. The APC rating shows that the
oscillations experienced forced the pilot to abandon the task, but only during comple-
tion of the task. These oscillations forced the pilot to abandon the task. This supports
the HQR rating, and is consistent with the PIO rating.
Two pilots (A and C) awarded PIOR = 3 whilst completing the task with the
most prone configuration. Data traces from these examples are shown in Fig. 6.5a
to 6.5d. For both cases, the magnitude of oscillations in the lateral axis is shown to
be similar, with a higher oscillation frequency found for the completion by Pilot A.
However, a large difference is displayed between the response in the longitudinal axis.
In the case completed by Pilot C, there is very low activity throughout the manoeuvre.
However, for the case completed by Pilot A, clear and sustained oscillations are present.
These oscillations do not appear to decrease in magnitude during the completion of the
manoeuvre.
The large difference in the longitudinal response is not shown through the PIO
rating. The PIOR = 3 suggests that no undesirable oscillations have occurred, stated
through the elements of the decision tree. For the same case, Pilot A awarded APC =
7C, whilst Pilot C awarded APC = 3. APC = 3 remains consistent with the PIO Scale,
stating that only motions occurred during completion of the task. This is supported
through observation of the data traces, of vehicle motion and control input. However,
APC = 7C describes severe oscillations which require a high level of adaptation, and
were sustained throughout the completion of the task. This appraisal is consistent with
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Figure 6.5: Data traces displaying difference in pilot strategy, and resultant oscillations.
the result shown in Fig. 6.5a, whereby oscillations are large and sustained throughout
the manoeuvre.
For this case, the pilot commented that, due to the nature of the oscillation, he was
not required to break out of the control loop. They felt that there was no requirement
to reduce gain, and commented that he would have liked to award a PIOR = 5, based
upon the severity of the oscillations, but that this was not possible due to both the
descriptions and the branches of the decision tree. For this case, the APC rating
supports information conveyed through the HQR and shows that Severe PIOs have been
experienced. Figures 6.6a to 6.6d further support the subjective APC rating, displaying
PAC results for the cases. These are shown for both the lateral and longitudinal axes,
and respective boundaries.
PAC charts display the difference between the two tests runs. For the case awarded
APC = 7C, PIO is detected in both the lateral and longitudinal axes. In the longitudinal
axes, oscillations are severe during the period of large oscillations. In contrast, results
from the case where APC = 3 was awarded detect no oscillations. One point exists
within the moderate region of the lateral PAC chart, but as discussed in preceding
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chapters, this is not enough to warrant concern. Results from both the PAC charts and
the pilot comments support the rating awarded using the APC scale, and highlight one
of the deficiencies within the PIO Rating Scale.
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of PAC Results.
Table 6.5 displays ratings for the case where the pole was located 40ft from the
helicopter. For this case, PIOs were more frequently observed, which was conveyed
through both the PIO and APC ratings. As with cases where the pole was located 75ft
from the helicopter, consistency was shown between the HQR and the APC rating.
Furthermore, the APC rating again displayed information regarding both the severity
and nature of the oscillations occurring during the task. All subjective ratings suggested
an increase in PIO incipience over the case where the pole was located 75ft from the
aircraft. This was expected, due to the tighter performance tolerances.
Table 6.6 displays results from completion of the manoeuvre with the pole located
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Table 6.5: Results - Precision Hover - Pole Position 2 (40ft)
Pilot Case No. Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC
A PHH − PA− 7 1 NO 4 1 2
C PHH − PC − 5 1 NO 5 3 3
C PHH − PC − 6 1 NO 5 3 3
D PHH − PD − 5 1 NO 5 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 7 1 NO 5 3 3
A PHH − PA− 8 2 CAT.I 5 4 5C
C PHH − PC − 7 2 CAT.I 5 3 3
D PHH − PD − 6 2 CAT.I 5 4 4C
A PHH − PA− 9 3 CAT.II 4 1 1
C PHH − PC − 8 3 CAT.II 5 2 2
D PHH − PD − 7 3 CAT.II 6 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 8 3 CAT.II 5 3 5B
E PHH − PE − 9 3 CAT.II 5 3 5B
A PHH − PA− 10 4 CAT.I &II 9 5 7E
C PHH − PC − 9 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5C
D PHH − PD − 8 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 10 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 8E
E PHH − PE − 11 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 8E
closest to the helicopter. This resulted in the tightest manoeuvre tolerances from the
Precision Hover tests. The set of results obtained showed the strongest correlation
between predictions and observations, using both the PIOR and APC ratings. The
decrease in tolerances led to the desired increase in pilot gain, pushing the vehicle
beyond control expected for normal operation. The result was PIOs experienced for
Conf. 2, Conf. 3 and Conf. 4.
For Conf. 4, Pilot A and Pilot C both awarded PIOR = 5, denoting ‘divergent’
PIOs experienced during closed-loop control. The control inputs and vehicle responses
in the longitudinal axis are shown in Fig. 6.7a and Fig.6.7b. As shown, for both
cases, oscillations of similar magnitude are experienced during the completion of the
task. For Pilot A, these oscillations were experienced upon transition to hover from
translation (initiated at approximately 19 seconds). Following large oscillations, the
control response trace shows the pilot reducing his control input, reducing his gain.
For this case, the pilot awarded APC = 7D, suggesting severe divergent oscillations
suppressed through the change in control strategy. From the data trace shown in
Fig.6.7a it is not clear whether oscillations are divergent, but a change in pilot strategy
is shown. For the same configuration, Pilot C awarded APC = 5B, stating sustained
oscillations. As shown in Fig.6.7b, oscillations did not occur until the end of the
manoeuvre, during the stabilised hover. As the oscillations occur at different stages
during the manoeuvre, the demands of the pilot are different for both cases. For the
case flown by Pilot A, oscillations are experienced during transition to hover. At this
time, the pilot must both compensate for oscillations and fly and trajectory to position
the spherical marker in the correct position. In contrast, in the case flown by Pilot C,
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Table 6.6: Results - Precision Hover - Pole Position 1 (20ft)
Pilot Case No. Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC
A PHH − PA− 11 1 NO 5 1 1
A PHH − PA− 12 1 NO 5 1 1
C PHH − PC − 10 1 NO 5 3 3
D PHH − PD − 9 1 NO 7 4 5C
E PHH − PE − 12 1 NO 4 3 2
A PHH − PA− 13 2 CAT.I 5 2 2
C PHH − PC − 11 2 CAT.I 7 4 7D
C PHH − PC − 12 2 CAT.I 6 4 4A
D PHH − PD − 10 2 CAT.I 6 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 13 2 CAT.I 7 4 7C
A PHH − PA− 14 3 CAT.II 5 3 3
C PHH − PC − 13 3 CAT.II 5 4 4A
D PHH − PD − 11 3 CAT.II 6 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 14 3 CAT.II 6 3 7C
A PHH − PA− 15 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 7D
C PHH − PC − 14 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 5B
C PHH − PC − 15 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 6C
D PHH − PD − 12 4 CAT.I &II 6 4 5C
D PHH − PD − 13 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5D
D PHH − PD − 14 4 CAT.I &II 6 4 5C
E PHH − PE − 15 4 CAT.I &II 7 6 8
the pilot is only required to keep the vehicle stable at the hover position. Therefore,
he is only required to compensate for oscillations. This difference is shown through the
APC ratings, but not through the PIO ratings.
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Figure 6.7: Data traces displaying difference between two APC Ratings.
Figures 6.8a and 6.8b display PAC charts for the two cases. As displayed, similar
results were obtained, with both PAC results showing points within the Severe PIO
region. A larger percentage of Severe PAC points were found for the case flown by Pilot
A, which supports the APC rating awarded.
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of PAC results.
6.5.4 Comparison
One important aspect of the new scale is determining how results obtained compare
to those awarded using the traditional scale. Although the PIO Scale is considered to
have weaknesses, results obtained offer some value when determining PIO susceptabil-
ity. Any novel scale should display some correlation with the PIO Scale, whilst also
providing further information.
Figure 6.9 shows the spread of ratings awarded, for all tasks and by all pilots. Num-
bers shown denote the number of times the rating was awarded. Here, a comparison
is shown between results obtained using the traditional PIO scale, and those given by
the APC scale. Here, one can see that overall, the scales appear well correlated, with
consistent results attained using different scales. The most common correlation was
between PIOR = 4 and APC = 5. APC = 5 denotes oscillations which require con-
siderable pilot adaptation during task manoeuvres. PIOR = 4 denotes the situation
where the pilot must ‘reduce gain or abandon task’ to suppress oscillations. Due to the
similar descriptions, the correlation between the two ratings was expected. However,
aside from APC = 5, pilots also awarded APC = 4 and APC = 7 when PIOR = 4
was awarded. This spread confirms the hypothesis made prior to the investigation, that
PIOR = 4 alone does not provide adequate depth to describe the spread of oscillations.
Figure 6.10 displays APCs awarded when the corresponding PIOR = 4, display-
ing both alpha, and numeric parts of the rating. APC = 5 is shown to occur most
frequently with alpha ratings ‘B’, denoting sustained vehicle oscillations which natu-
rally converge during task completion, and ‘C’, denoting sustained oscillations which
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Figure 6.9: Comparison between PIOR and APCs obtained, all pilots.
do not naturally converge. However, ratings awarded range from APC = 4A, denoting
mild predictable well damped oscillations, to APC = 7D, denoting severe oscillations
requiring high levels of pilot adaptation, considered divergent.
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Figure 6.10: Spread of APC Ratings, for cases where PIOR = 4 was awarded, all
pilots.
6.6 Summary of Chapter 6
In this chapter, a novel ‘Adverse Pilot Coupling’ scale has been presented, proposed
as a replacement for the Pilot-Induced Oscillation tendency rating scale. This scale
has sought to improve understanding regarding ratings collected to characterise APCs
experienced during piloted command of an aircraft. It has been developed through
appraisal of existing methods, and recommendations of test pilots.
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1. The method brings synergy between the prediction criteria and the objective eval-
uation of PIO tendencies, by utilising the same structure and methods presented
in Chapter 4. In this way, there should be more continuity and understanding
between prediction and detection of PIO, allowing for a greater awareness of PIOs
at, and beyond, the design stage.
2. A novel ‘APC’ rating scale has been presented, that departs from the traditional
PIO scale approach. Incorporation of increased pilot subjectivity, further rating
points and an increase in the task dependent nature of the scale were all seen
as requisites, due to the way in which piloted test and evaluations are currently
conducted. Furthermore, the arrangement of the APC scale is such that visibility
and pilot confidence when awarding ratings is believed to have been improved.
3. The APC scale has been shown to give comparable ratings to those obtained using
the accepted PIO scale. However, ratings are believed to offer a more descriptive
and clearer view of what has occurred during the assessed manoeuvre. Separation
of ‘severity’ and the nature of the oscillations has led to a scale that offers the
pilot a much wider choice to describe the situations.
4. Ratings obtained were found to be consistent with predictions made prior to the
test campaign. Furthermore, results obtained using the scale were found to be
consistent between pilots, for vehicle and task configurations flown.
5. Data traces and pilot comments highlighted differences seen for cases where
PIOR = 4 was awarded. Results using the new APC scale highlighted these
differences, correlating with the data obtained and with pilot comments. The
feeling that PIOR = 3 conveys PIO incipience using the descriptions of the PIO
scale was confirmed through the use of the APC scale. The observation of PIO
through the use of the APC scale in this way is considered a major improvement
over the existing PIOR scale.
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Chapter 7
Simulation Case Study
7.1 Objective
This chapter presents analysis of data collected from a simulated test campaign, demon-
strating the use of the novel prediction, detection, and assessment tools presented in
the preceding chapters. The objective is to show the use of the criteria for analysis of
a specific vehicle model. This is completed using the BO105 model detailed in Chapter
3. The intention of this chapter is to show how PIO susceptibility can be assessed using
PAC methodology. To show this, the problem has been conceived to,
“determine the PIO susceptibility in the roll axis, at three speeds (hover,
60 knots, and 80 knots) for a vehicle required to complete aggressive ma-
noeuvring, such as completed during target tracking and acquisition tasks”.
7.2 Process
The goal of this research has been to improve safety with regards to RPC events,
through the conception of novel prediction, detection, and analysis techniques. The
tools have been developed to account for a number of aspects of research and testing,
and as a result can be used within a process, in order to improve both the quality of
assessment and the understanding of potential RPC events. The suggested process is
shown in Fig. 7.1.
The first step is to select a vehicle for analysis. To gain an understanding for
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Figure 7.1: Process for analysis.
the impact for which PIOs will have on the operation of the vehicle, it is essential to
know the planned role of the aircraft, and its operational requirements. From these
requirements, a suitable model for the analysis procedure can be generated. It is
important that the simulation model is suitable for the application of the vehicle. For
example, if the vehicle is subjected to vibrations of 1 Hz, the dynamics must include
those active at this frequency. Knowing the role of the aircraft also makes it possible
to define its overall mission requirements. The mission can be divided into a number
of individual MTEs. Correct division of the aircraft mission into MTEs allows for the
appraisal of PIO incipience at different stages of operation, covering the necessary range
of operations expected to be completed in the vehicle. ADS-33 [16] has successfully
employed this MTE approach for the analysis of rotorcraft HQs. As shown in the
preceding chapters, some of these MTEs can be used directly, to explore PIO tendencies.
Once tasks and the vehicle model have been defined, it should be possible to gen-
erate predictions, using PRE-PAC methods discussed in Chapter 5. This objective
assessment should inform the researcher of PIO susceptibility, within both open-loop
and closed-loop pilot control. As discussed in Chapter 5, O-PRE-PAC can be used to
assess the open-loop vehicle PIO characteristics, and should offer a task independent
appraisal of the PIO susceptibility. The main use of O-PRE-PAC is to define regions
of control that will likely cause PIO tendencies. C-PRE-PAC can be used to assess the
closed-loop vehicle PIO characteristics, and results are both task and pilot dependent.
Following predictions, the vehicle model should be tested through the use of pilot-
194
in-the-loop simulation. Currently, it is not considered possible to accurately model the
response of the human pilot during completion of dynamic multi-loop tasks and, as a
result, predictions alone cannot guarantee that the vehicle is PIO robust. As a result,
piloted simulation or in-flight tests must always be completed. During these piloted
tests, it is possible to use the PAC real-time detection tool to observe whether PIOs
are experienced. Furthermore, the APC scale, developed in Chapter 6, can be used to
offer subjective opinion. Ideally, both of these tools should correlate well, reflecting the
information conveyed by the other. In reality, this may not always be the case.
The correlation should lead to conclusions and recommendations from the investi-
gations. It may be that from results, modifications can be made to the vehicle, and
the process may be repeated. In this way, it should be possible to ‘design-out’ PIO
tendencies.
7.2.1 Vehicle
The BO105 model, discussed in Chapter 3, was used for analysis. Its hingless rotor
makes it very manoeuvrable, and as such, the helicopter without any control system
modifications, is not believed to be prone to PIO. In order to create ‘PIO-incipient’
configurations, control system time delays were used to engineer the PIO susceptibility
of the vehicle, added in the forward control channel. The addition of time delays
was guided by the use of the BPD results, using boundaries from the fixed-wing use
of the method [15]. For the investigation, it was desirable to have one PIO robust
configuration and one PIO prone configuration. The time delay for the PIO prone case
was selected by observing the applied delay to cause the predictions to fall within the
BPD PIO region. For Hover, this delay was found to be equal to 250ms, whilst for
forward flight (both 60 knots and 80 knots), it was found to be equal to 220ms.
It was also desirable to observe the effects of non-linear rate limiting elements during
the investigation. Therefore, to trigger Category II type PIOs, RLEs were added in the
forward control. A value of 2.5 deg/s of control rate limiting was selected, informed
through the use of the OLOP criterion. This was combined with the time delay to make
a final configuration, predicted to be prone to both Category I and II PIO. Table 7.1
displays the final configurations used during the investigation. As the vehicle properties
change with respect to forward airspeed, different time delays were selected for hover
and forward flight regimes. Table 7.1 displays an overview of configurations selected
for the investigation. Conf. 1-4 were used for assessment of PIO at low speed. Conf.
1,5-6 were used to evaluate PIO incipience in forward flight, at both 60 knots and 80
knots.
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Table 7.1: Configurations tested - BO105 Aircraft Model.
Conf. Long.
Delay
(sec)
Long.
Rate
Lim.
(deg/s)
Lat.
Delay
(sec)
Lat.
Rate
Lim
(deg/s)
BPD
(Cat.I)
OLOP
(Cat.II)
1 0 ∞ 0 ∞ NO NO
2 0 ∞ 250 ∞ YES NO
3 0 5 0 2.5 NO YES
4 180 5 250 2.5 YES YES
5 0 ∞ 220 ∞ YES NO
6 0 ∞ 220 2.5 YES YES
7.2.2 Requirements
The BO105 vehicle itself is not usually required to complete manoeuvres of high aggres-
sion1. However, for the purposes of this study it is used to investigate PIO tendencies of
highly manoeuvrable rotorcraft. Therefore, the requirement of the vehicle is to complete
a broad range of tasks, including ‘target-tracking’ and ‘acquisition-type’ tasks. The re-
quirement was to investigate the roll characteristics. In forward flight, this requires a
task that both incorporates high aggression manoeuvring and some ‘tracking’ element.
From previous experience, the ‘Roll Step’ task, described in detail in Ref. [119, 131],
was thought to be a suitable task.
The visual scene for completion of the Roll Step is shown in Fig. 7.2a. The ma-
noeuvre is a combination of an ADS-33 slalom task, and a tracking task. The task
begins with the aircraft in the position shown in Fig. 7.2a, trimmed at the desired
evaluation speed. The aircraft must translate through numbered gates (black posts
within Fig. 7.2a) positioned along the edge of the runway. The width of the gates
defines the lateral ‘adequate’ tolerances. Desired tolerances require the aircraft to pass
through the central 50% of the gates. Within the simulation environment, striped poles
are used to enhance vertical cueing. Due to the limited motion range of a hexapod mo-
tion base (as used in HELIFLIGHT-R), it can be difficult to recreate vertical cueing
experienced in the real aircraft. Therefore, the additional visual cues aid the pilots,
with each striped section of the pole representing 10 ft of altitude. After transitioning
through two ‘gates’, the pilot must perform a translation across the runway, and pass
through the first gate positioned on the other side of the runway. Tolerances are in
place to ensure that the task is performed to the level of aggression that requires the
pilot to arrest any roll attitude prior to translation through the gate. Fig. 7.2b shows
the view of the course from above. The red dashed line displays the required path to
1An exception is the Red Bull BO105, operated as an acrobatic aircraft
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be followed by the pilot to complete the manoeuvre.
(a) Roll Step visual scene.
(b) Top view of Roll Step course.
Figure 7.2: Roll Step Mission Task Element.
The Roll Step has recommended performance requirements, shown in Table 7.2.
However, modifications to the task aggression can be completed through changes to
these requirements. The easiest way to modify the necessary task performance is to
change the forward flight speed. An increase in speed leads to a decrease in time
taken to both translate across the runway and to pass through gates. This not only
increases the necessary speed of pilot control but also pilot reaction times. However,
modifications to the speed are not always suitable, as PIO tendencies within the vehicle
are often velocity dependent.
Table 7.2: Roll Step performance requirements.
Requirement Desired Adequate
Speed ± 5 kts ± 10 kts
Lateral Deviation (gates) ± 15 ft ± 30 ft
Heading (gates) ± 10 deg ± 15 deg
Roll Attitude (gates) ± 5 deg ± 10 deg
Height ± 10 ft ± 15 ft
Task performance can also be engineered through modifications to the Roll Step
‘gates’. Decreasing the distance between gates has a similar effect to increasing the
flight speed. The width of gates can also be decreased, causing a reduction in allowable
lateral track error, providing an increase in pilot aggression to maintain lateral track.
This modification increases the precision to which the pilot must fly alongside the
edge of the runway. Narrower gates mean that the pilot must decrease tracking error
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of the white line at the edge of the runway. In this investigation, four Roll Step
configurations were completed, with configuration parameters shown in Table 7.3. Roll
Step manoeuvres were completed at two flight speeds; 60 knots and 80 knots. Due
to pilot availability, not all pilots completed all courses at all flight speeds. However,
it was possible to complete a range of configurations, outlining the differences in PIO
susceptibility of each configuration and course.
Table 7.3: Roll Step performance requirements.
Requirement Course 1 Course 2 Course 3 Course 4
Lateral Deviation Desired
(gates)
± 15 ft ± 7.5 ft ± 15 ft ± 7.5 ft
Lateral Deviation Adequate
(gates)
± 30 ft ± 15 ft ± 30 ft ± 15 ft
Distance between Gates 1000ft 1000ft 666 ft 666 ft
Required Lateral Velocity 60
knots (Translation)
20 ft/s 20 ft/s 30.4 ft/s 30.4 ft/s
Required Lateral Velocity 80
knots (Translation)
27 ft/s 27 ft/s 40.5 ft/s 40.5 ft/s
To investigate low speed roll PIO potential, the Precision Hover manoeuvre, as
used in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, was selected. As for the Roll Step manoeuvre,
various task configurations were completed to change the task aggression. Precision
Hover courses used were those previously shown in Chapter 6. The aggression of the
manoeuvre was governed by the position of the vertical reference pole.
7.3 Prediction - Using PRE-PAC
Predictions were made using the O-PRE-PAC method described in Chapter 5. This
was selected in preference to C-PRE-PAC, as detailed pilot and task vehicle models
were not available at the time of the investigation.
PAC metrics were determined for the BO105 at the three primary airspeeds used for
the investigation; hover, 60 knots, and 80 knots. Figure 7.3 displays results obtained
for the hover cases against PRE-PAC boundaries developed in Chapter 5. For Conf. 1
in Hover, at no point in the control envelope does the vehicle configuration experience
‘Moderate’ PIO tendencies. Therefroe, no susceptability to PIO was found, and no
point appears for the case in Fig. 7.3. Both Conf. 2 and Conf. 3 are found to
have similar qualities, both with O-PRE-PAC points within the HQL 2 region. This
is due to different reasons. Conf. 2 features an applied time delay, whereas Conf. 3
features an applied rate limit. Both of the cases are believed to show PIO tendencies.
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These cases perhaps show some of the most dangerous PIO tendencies, whereby they
may remain undetected during routine testing and evaluation. Conf. 4, where the
combination of a RL and time delay is used, is predicted to be have HQL 3 qualities.
The configuration features a similar ωtMOD to Conf. 2, showing that the applied RL
more heavily influenced δφ.
If it is considered that both ‘HQL 3’ and ‘HQL 2’ denote PIO tendencies, as shown
through PIO prediction made using BPD and OLOP, the results displayed in Fig. 7.3
show agreement between criteria, and shows that the O-PRE-PAC metrics encompass
predictions made through the use of both BPD and OLOP.
Figure 7.4 displays PRE-PAC metrics for the 60 knot cases. Here, ωtMOD is found
for Conf. 1, showing that the increase in forward flight speed has increased the PIO
susceptibility. However, due to the high value of ωtMOD , and δφ = 0deg, the configura-
tion is found in the HQL 1 region (not considered prone to PIO). Conf. 5 and Conf. 6
were found to have results in the HQL 2 and HQL 3 regions respectively. The difference
between these configurations is the influence of the applied RL. The RL causes δφ to
increase by approximately 20◦.
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Figure 7.3: Metrics from O-PRE-PAC analysis (Precision Hover cases).
As shown in Chapter 5, O-PRE-PAC can be used to determine the susceptibility
regions of pilot control. Figures 7.5a to 7.5c display these boundaries for the three 60
knot cases. These reflect results shown through the metrics. Although there is a region
of ‘Moderate’ PIO susceptibility for Conf. 1, it requires both high amplitude (> 40%)
control input at high frequency (> 5rad/s), and is unlikely to be entered during closed-
loop flying. The region is the largest for the HQL 3 Conf. 6, and PIO are predicted to
be triggered at low amplitude control inputs, at relatively low input frequencies.
Overall, the predictions here state that all models, except Conf. 1 (no applied
time delay) display susceptibility to PIO within the roll-axis PIO, during both the
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Figure 7.4: Metrics from O-PRE-PAC analysis (Roll Step cases).
low speed and forward flight regimes. Overall, RLs are found to severely increase the
PIO susceptibility of configurations, shown in both the PAC metrics and the control
envelopes. The control envelopes show the frequencies of pilot control input that are
predicted to cause PIO tendencies. For example, concerning Conf. 1, any input above
40% of maximum control travel, above 5.5 rad/s is predicted to trigger Moderate PIOs.
Therefore, in order to expose incipient PIO, a task must be designed that will cause
the pilot to apply this level of control.
If the task does not warrant this level of control, it is likely that the pilot will avoid
encountering any PIO in assessment. Furthermore, the suitability of the task should
be assessed, as to whether it is appropriate for the vehicle.
7.4 Results
Four pilots (A, C, D and E) completed both Roll Step and Precision Hover configura-
tions in HELIFLIGHT-R, over a four day period. Pilots had all previously flown the
manoeuvres, with Pilots A and E having more experience.
7.4.1 Roll Step Results
All subjective ratings obtained from completion of the Roll Step manoeuvre are con-
tained within Tables 7.4 to 7.7. Additional comments are contained within the Ap-
pendix C. Using the four course configurations, the manoeuvre was found to expose
a large number of PIOs. Some of these PIOs forced the pilot to abandon the task in
order to stabilise the aircraft. This observation is conveyed through the use of APC
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Figure 7.5: Comparison between susceptibility regions
ratings.
However, one observation of the manoeuvre was the large differences in PIO suscep-
tibility found across the range of pilots used. The majority of differences were the result
of pilot strategy, and demonstrated how for one pilot PIOs can go un-detected whilst
for others, PIOs are consistent and repeatable. The majority of Roll Step tests were
completed at 60 knots. It was found after a limited number of tests that the demands
of the task at 80 knots were too excessive for pilots, particularly with configurations
featuring RLE and/or time delays.
Figure 7.6 displays APC ratings awarded following attempts of the Roll Step MTE
completed in Conf. 6, at 60 knots. This configuration was predicted to have the highest
susceptibility to PIO, due to low ωtMOD and high δφ. Predictions for the configuration
were found to be a result of both the linear and quasi-linear dynamics of the vehicle.
Results in Fig. 7.6 are shown with respect to Roll Step Course (RSC) layout. It should
be noted that not all pilots completed all courses, and each completed each course a
different number of times.
Looking at results from the completion of RSC 1, one can see that both Pilot A
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Table 7.4: Roll Step Results - Pilot A
Pilot Case No. Speed Case Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC
A RS − PA− 23 80 1 1 NO 3 1 1
A RS − PA− 25 80 1 3 CAT.I 4 1 1
A RS − PA− 27 60 1 3 CAT.I 2 1 1
A RS − PA− 29 60 3 3 CAT.I 9 1 1
A RS − PA− 31 60 1 9 CAT.II 3 1 1
A RS − PA− 32 60 2 9 CAT.II 9 5 7D
A RS − PA− 35 80 1 9 CAT.II 6 2 2
A RS − PA− 36 80 2 9 CAT.II 8 - 5E
A RS − PA− 38 80 2 3 CAT.I 4 1 1
A RS − PA− 48 80 1 1 NO 3 1 1
A RS − PA− 50 60 1 1 NO 2 1 1
A RS − PA− 52 60 3 1 NO 4 1 1
A RS − PA− 54 60 1 3 CAT.I 4 1 1
A RS − PA− 56 60 1 9 CAT.II 6 3 5C
A RS − PA− 57 60 1 9 CAT.II 3 1 1
Table 7.5: Roll Step Results - Pilot C
Pilot Case No. Speed Case Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC
C RS − PC − 30 80 1 1 NO 5 1 3
C RS − PC − 33 60 1 1 NO 3 1 2
C RS − PC − 36 60 1 3 CAT.I 4 2 2,3
C RS − PC − 39 60 3 3 CAT.I 5 2 3
C RS − PC − 42 80 1 9 CAT.II 7 4 5A
C RS − PC − 45 60 3 9 CAT.II 5 3 3
C RS − PC − 46 80 3 9 CAT.II 8 4 8E
C RS − PC − 49 80 3 9 CAT.II 7 4 7C
C RS − PC − 49b 80 1 1 NO 5 3 3
C RS − PC − 51 80 2 1 NO 5 3 3
C RS − PC − 52 80 2 9 CAT.II 8 4 7E
C RS − PC − 54 80 2 9 CAT.II 5 4 5C
C RS − PC − 56 60 2 9 CAT.II 5 3 3
C RS − PC − 58 60 4 9 CAT.II 5 3 3
C RS − PC − 60 80 2 3 CAT.I 7 3 3
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Table 7.6: Roll Step Results - Pilot D
Pilot Case No. Speed Case Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC
D RS − PD − 6 80 1 1 NO 6 3 3
D RS − PD − 7 80 1 1 NO 6 2 3
D RS − PD − 9 60 1 1 NO 5 2 3
D RS − PD − 11 60 1 1 NO 5 2 3
D RS − PD − 13 60 1 3 CAT.I 7 3 3
D RS − PD − 14 60 1 3 CAT.I 4 1,2 1
D RS − PD − 17 60 3 3 CAT.I 6 2 2
D RS − PD − 19 80 1 9 CAT.II - 4 4A
D RS − PD − 20 80 1 9 CAT.II 6 3 3
D RS − PD − 22 60 1 9 CAT.II 5 2 2
D RS − PD − 24 60 3 9 CAT.II 5 2 2
D RS − PD − 122 80 1 1 NO 6 1 1
D RS − PD − 124 80 2 1 NO 7 2 1
D RS − PD − 126 60 2 9 CAT.II 8 4 7D
D RS − PD − 128 60 2 9 CAT.II 5 1 1
D RS − PD − 129 60 4 9 CAT.II - - 8E
D RS − PD − 130 80 4 9 CAT.II 8 4 8D
Table 7.7: Roll Step Results - Pilot E
Pilot Case No. Speed Case Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC
E RS − PE − 8 80 1 3 CAT.I 5 3 5A
E RS − PE − 11 60 3 3 CAT.I 9 2 2
E RS − PE − 12 60 3 3 CAT.I 6 3 5B
E RS − PE − 13 60 1 3 CAT.I 5 2 3
E RS − PE − 14 60 1 3 CAT.I 4 2 2
E RS − PE − 16 60 1 9 CAT.II 10 5 8
E RS − PE − 18 80 1 9 CAT.II 10 5 8
E RS − PE − 19 80 1 1 NO 4 2 2
E RS − PE − 61 80 1 1 NO 2 1 1
E RS − PE − 63 60 1 1 NO 1 1 1
E RS − PE − 64 60 3 1 NO 3 1 1
E RS − PE − 67 60 1 3 CAT.I 4 2 4A
E RS − PE − 69 80 3 3 CAT.I 5 3 5B
E RS − PE − 71 60 1 9 CAT.II 7 4 7E
E RS − PE − 73 80 1 9 CAT.II 8 4 7E
E RS − PE − 75 80 1 3 CAT.I 4 2 4A
E RS − PE − 77 80 1 3 CAT.I 3 2 2
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Figure 7.6: APC results obtained during Roll Step.
and Pilot D, for the majority of cases, have recognised PIO tendencies only. On one
occasion, Pilot A entered what they believed to be a PIO event. Furthermore, both
pilots were able to complete the task comfortably. However, Pilot E was found to enter
into Severe PIO on both their attempts of the task. Figures 7.7a to 7.7d display some
examples from the completion of the task in vehicle Conf. 6 using RSC 1. Here, the
difference in PIO susceptibility is visible. The larger input made by Pilot E during both
their attempts has lead to he triggering of RLE in the control channel. On both runs
completed by Pilot E, the larger delay induced by the RLE has caused over-control of
the vehicle, and led to saturation of hardware. In examples for Pilot A and Pilot D,
although oscillatory control input is shown, the control used does not reach beyond
20% of maximum travel. As a result, RLE do not appear to be triggered for sustained
periods of the manoeuvre. As Pilot E encountered Severe PIOs during completion of
RSC 1, they did not complete any of the other configurations flying Conf. 6.
Figures 7.8a to 7.8d display results from the PAC analysis of the examples. For
cases shown in Fig.7.7a and Fig.7.7b, PAC points were found to appear within the
Severe PIO region. This is in agreement with visual observations of the cases, where
large oscillations exist following the first transition. For cases shown in Fig.7.7c and
Fig.7.7d, PAC results were predominantly found within the No PIO region. However,
some points were found either in the Moderate PIO region, or close to the boundary.
This shows that for both cases, pilots were close to sustained PIO, highlighting the
possibly that by increasing the task tolerances, sustained PIOs could be triggered.
Pilots A, C, and D all attempted RSC 2 in Conf. 6. Here again, a large difference
in APC ratings were found. For this configuration, Pilot A entered Severe PIO, whilst
Pilots C and D did not. Figure 7.9a displays recorded control trace and ground position
for the PIO case encountered by Pilot A, whereas Fig.7.9b and 7.9c display cases flown
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(c) PA - Roll Step - 60kts RSC 1
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(d) PD - Roll Step - 60kts RSC 1
Figure 7.7: Comparison of control and ground position traces during completion of the
RSC 1 whilst flying Conf.6
by Pilot C and D, where no PIOs were encountered. As shown, Pilot A abandoned the
task due to strong oscillations occurring following the initial translation. As displayed
in the control trace, both rate and position saturation were a factor during the test
run. In this case, the PIO has been triggered only by narrowing the gates, which caused
Pilot A to increase his control gain. Data traces from runs by Pilot C and Pilot D do
not show any clear oscillations. However, in the control channel, small oscillations in
pilot lateral control position are observed.
Figures 7.10a to 7.10c display the PAC charts for the three cases. Firstly, Fig.7.10a
shows results from the case where the pilot reported severe PIOs. However, PAC points
are found predominantly within the Moderate region and not in the Severe PIO region.
It is believed that this is a result of the extent of the oscillations, with large magnitude
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Figure 7.8: Comparison of PAC results from Roll Step examples
leading to lower phase distortion than expected. As the oscillations are so large, the
pilot reduced his frequency of control input, leading to PAC ‘Moderate’ PIOs only.
PAC charts from the cases shown in Fig.7.9b and Fig.7.9c are shown in Fig.7.10b and
Fig.7.10c respectively. As shown, predominantly PAC points for these cases appeared
within the ‘No PIO’ region. This was as expected from the data traces. However, for
the case shown in Fig. 7.10c, a number of PAC points were found within the Moderate
and Severe regions. These points are a result of the pilot’s control strategy, whereby
they applied very ‘sharp’ and large control inputs, followed by inputs of low magnitude.
This caused AG to increase, to levels close to the RL. The pilot’s strategy meant that
no sustained oscillations were found, with the PAC chart showing that PIO would
have resulted if the pilot had been forced to apply subsequent large control inputs
following runway transition. As a result of the pilot’s strategy, less than 5% of the PAC
points were found within the Moderate and Severe regions. Therefore, for this case
206
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000−200
0
200
400
600
X Position, ft
Y 
Po
si
tio
n,
 ft
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
X Position, ft
δ X
A,
 
in
(a) Pilot A - Roll Step - 60kts, Course 2
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000−100
0
100
200
300
X Position, ft
Y 
Po
si
tio
n,
 ft
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
X Position, ft
δ X
A,
 
in
(b) Pilot C - Roll Step - 60kts, Course 2
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(c) Pilot D - Roll Step - 60kts, Course 2
Figure 7.9: Comparison of control and ground position traces during completion of
RSC 2 whilst flying Conf.6
the conclusion of ‘No PIO’ is in agreement with pilot comments, and with the visible
inspection of the simulation data trace (See rules discussed in Chapter 4).
Pilots C and D believed they entered PIOs during completion of RSC 4. On the first
occasion that the task was attempted, both pilots caused PIOs leading to loss of control,
forcing them to abandon task. Because of the aggression of the task, pilots were required
to make a very large, and fast control input to achieve runway translation. This action
was found to trigger RLE, causing phase distortion when the pilot came to arrest the
roll rate. The slow control reversal caused pilots to enter PIO, and led to the inescapable
PIO events. On the second attempt of the manoeuvre, pilots reduced the initial control
gain in an attempt to avoid system RLE. Examples of these cases are shown in Fig.7.11a
and Fig.7.11b. On both attempts, both pilots manage to ‘navigate the course’, but do
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Figure 7.10: Comparison of PAC points during completion of RSC 2 whilst flying Conf.6
not complete it to performance standards. As shown in Fig. 7.11b, large oscillations
are apparent following the initial translation, which the pilot achieves to performance
standards. However, the second translation is not completed adequately, with the pilot
‘missing’ two of the required gates. For the case completed by Pilot D shown in Fig.
7.11b, translations are also not completed to necessary standards. This means that, on
these occasions, the pilots are not controlling the vehicle with the necessary aggression.
As a result, RLE’s are not triggered to the same extent as during the runs where
the pilots failed to maintain control. The failure to achieve performance requirements
suggests that RSC 4 is too difficult to achieve with the PIO prone vehicle.
It is important that the task difficulty does not cause the task to become impossible.
To attain accurate observation of PIO, it is important that pilots do not abandon task
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until it is safety critical. Making the task too difficult or impossible, even without
the influence of PIOs, would likely cause pilots to become frustrated, causing them to
prematurely abandon task or reduce their gain. This could shroud a number of PIO
issues, and may give the pilot difficulty when identifying PIO tendencies.
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(b) Pilot D - Roll Step - 60kts, Course 4
Figure 7.11: Comparison of control and ground position traces during completion of
the Roll Step manoeuvre completed using Course 4
Overall, results from completion of the Roll Step show that the manoeuvre is suitable
for exposing PIOs in the roll axis. However, results obtained using the configurations
used in this study may suffer from pilot variability. Due to results found, perhaps all
RSC had negative aspects, which could be improved with future course modifications.
The difference between pilots suggest the tolerances of the task, and performance re-
quirements, need to be revisited. Applying further constraints to the task may ensure
that all pilots apply the same methods of control, increasing consistency between them.
7.4.2 Precision Hover Results
All pilot subjective ratings obtained from completion of the Precision Hover manoeuvre
are contained within Appendix B. There are a number of observations that can be
made through the appraisal of these ratings. For the Precision Hover manoeuvre, a
large difference was observed between the results obtained from Conf. 1 and Conf. 4.
This was expected from predictions. APC ratings awarded for Conf. 4 show strong
tendencies for PIO. It was found that Conf. 4 was susceptible to PIO for all hover
course configurations. However, it was found that, as the tolerances were tightened
through changes to the hover course, PIO incipience in other cases increased. Figures
7.12a to 7.12c display APC ratings awarded for all completions of the Precision Hover
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manoeuvre.
When the pole location was closest to the vehicle, all pilots were shown to experience
some form of undesirable and unintentional oscillations. For all other cases, incipience
to PIO was found to be a result of pilot control strategy. For this task, the difference in
acceptable task performance strategy is demonstrated through observation of strategies
employed by Pilot A and Pilot D. Pilot A was found to be very ‘high gain’ during
task completion. The pilot always fought to achieve the best performance possible.
Furthermore, he was very resistant to abandoning the task, or to apply a reduction in
control amplitude/frequency to improve vehicle handling characteristics. Conversely,
Pilot D was found to be very ‘low gain’ throughout. The pilot was keen to ‘break
out’ of the loop whenever there was an opportunity. Furthermore, he was much more
reluctant to apply tight control and was only interested in achieving the minimum
performance required to achieve desired completion of the task. This means that the
pilot would make no effort to achieve performance greater than given by the required
standards. This led to the suggestion that the task performance standards were not
tight enough for the evaluation of PIO tendencies. A difference in their strategies
may be a result of their experience. Pilot A has been a consultant test pilot for the
University of Liverpool for over 10 years, and no longer performs HQ evaluations of
helicopters. Pilot D however is a current military test pilot for the Royal Netherlands
Air Force with much less experience than Pilot A. This pilot is more familiar with HQ
evaluations in real aircraft, usually where safety is a priority.
Figure 7.13a and Fig.7.13d show two results from Precision Hover manoeuvres com-
pleted by Pilot A and D, showing the typical control strategy and the resultant oscil-
lations experienced by the pilots. The cases show pilot control activity with respect to
time for both lateral and longitudinal channels.
Both pilots approach the task in similar ways; they both disturb the aircraft from
trim and begin a translation using small, non-oscillatory control inputs. Figure 7.14
displays the ground speed during completion of the manoeuvres. Between t = 10s and
t = 20s, both pilots reach maximum ground speed, at a similar time and amplitude.
Both pilots arrest the vehicle translational rate through a commanded oscillatory con-
trol input. However, following this input, Pilot D almost opens the control loop, and
applies only very small control inputs. Furthermore, the pilot keeps translations slow
(i.e. a ground speed lower than 1 knot). Pilot A however maintains closed-loop control,
to achieve performance parameters to the best of their ability. However, this results
in a faster translational rate, requiring sustained control inputs for a longer period of
the manoeuvre. Furthermore, throughout the manoeuvre, Pilot D is almost inactive
on the longitudinal, collective and pedals. Only small corrections are made during the
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(b) APC Ratings for PH completed with pole loca-
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(c) APC Ratings for PH completed with pole loca-
tion = 20ft
Figure 7.12: APC Ratings obtained from completed Precision Hover manoeuvres.
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(b) Precision Hover example, Pilot D,
Conf.4
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Conf.4
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(d) Precision Hover example, Pilot D,
Conf.4
Figure 7.13: Comparison of control input during completion of Precision Hover ma-
noeuvre
transition from translation to hover. Pilot A makes an effort to use all controls, and
possibly becomes susceptible to vehicle cross-couplings in the process.
The predicted increase in PIO tendencies for Conf. 2 and Conf. 3 was shown when
the reference pole location was moved closer to the pilot. This showed the influence
of the performance requirements on the task’s ability to trigger PIO tendencies. An
example is shown by observation of time history traces of pilot control during two
evaluations of Conf.2. The examples, given in Fig. 7.16a and Fig. 7.16b, show pilot
lateral control input with respect to time. In these examples, the transition to hover
occurs at approximately 20 seconds. As illustrated, in the case where the Pole Location
is placed 75ft from the vehicle, an oscillatory vehicle response occurs between 20 and
40 seconds. This is during the stabilisation period. However, one can see that at
approximately 40 seconds, the pilot ‘freezes’ the control stick, as he has reached the
desired hover position. From this point, there are no significant oscillatory inputs, and
the pilot is almost open-loop.
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Figure 7.14: Comparison of ground speed during completion of Precision Hover exam-
ples.
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Figure 7.15: Comparison of control input during completion of Precision Hover ma-
noeuvre
For the case where the Pole Location is 20ft from the vehicle, the same oscillations
on stabilisation are observed (i.e. between 20 and 30 seconds). However, in this case,
the pilot is unable to ‘freeze the stick’, as he must continue to correct position. However,
rather than the oscillations subsiding during the stabilised period, they are driven by the
task performance. At approximately 60 seconds, oscillatory control amplitude increases,
remaining at this increased level until the attempt is stopped at approximately 100
seconds.
The difference displayed in Fig. 7.16a and Fig. 7.16b perhaps shows why many
RPCs currently go undetected in current evaluations. Testing only the ‘normal’ oper-
ations of the rotorcraft will not necessarily expose dynamics that will be experienced
at one stage in the rotorcraft life-cycle.
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(a) Precision Hover example, Pilot E, Conf.2, Pole loca-
tion = 75ft
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(b) Precision Hover example, Pilot E, Conf.2, Pole loca-
tion = 20ft
Figure 7.16: Comparison of control input during completion of Precision Hover ma-
noeuvre
Although changes in task performance increased the susceptibility to PIO, a dif-
ference in susceptibility of each pilot, based on their strategy, was observed. Pilot D
consistently exhibited the lowest change in performance, and did not appear to en-
counter full ‘PIO events’. Pilot A however often was not able to enter the task, as his
high gain strategy led to unmasking PIOs during transition to hover.
7.5 Correlation
An important use of PAC is the correlation between PAC PIO detection and the sub-
jective opinion of the pilot. In this study, subjective opinion of PIO tendencies has been
collected using the novel APC scale presented in Chapter 6. According to definitions
contained within Chapter 6, simplified meanings of APC ratings are shown in Table
7.8. As shown, APC = 1− 3 denote cases where ‘No PIO’ is observed during comple-
tion of the test manoeuvre. These ratings do not conclude that the vehicle is free from
PIO tendencies, but state that, in the pilot’s subjective opinion, he did not encounter
PIOs during completion of the task. Ratings APC = 4− 7 denote situations where the
pilot feels s/he have encountered PIOs during the closed-loop completion of the MTE.
Severity and frequency of these events are conveyed through the alpha-numeric ratings.
APC = 8− 9 denote PIOs which have either caused the task to be abandoned or have
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inhibited entry to the task. Such oscillations should always be treated as ‘Severe PIOs’.
Table 7.8: Descriptive terms for APC Ratings.
APC Meaning PAC Equivalence
1 No tendency for APCs, no PIO observed NO PIO
2-3 Causes non-oscillatory APCs, no ‘PIO’ observed NO PIO
4-7 PIO caused during completion of MTE MOD/SEV PIO
8-9 PIO caused prior to entry of MTE or PIO causes pilot
to abandon MTE
SEV PIO
Subjective ratings can be compared directly with PAC results, through post-processing
the simulated test data. In order to assess the correlation between subjective ratings
and objective observations made using PAC, a system previously used by researchers
in GARTEUR AG-16 was used [26] (to compare predictions with results from piloted
simulations).
Table 7.9 displays a key for the validation method. Outcome ‘B’ denotes the number
of cases where both the objective and subjective results agree that ‘NO PIO’ has oc-
curred during the simulation run. Outcome ‘D’ denotes cases where both the objective
and subjective results agree that PIO has occurred during the simulation. Therefore,
outcomes B and D describe the situation where there is a match between the PIO
prediction and the resultant subjective rating. Outcomes ‘A’ and ‘C’ denote situations
where there is a disagreement between the objective and subjective results. Outcome
‘C’ denotes the case where the objective PAC has shown PIO during the run, which
has not been recognised by the pilot. This outcome is more desirable that ‘outcome
A’, where the pilot detects PIO but the objective tool does not. In operational flight,
the pilot would not perform evaluations and provide ratings. Furthermore, many oper-
ational pilots will not be trained test pilots, and will be less able to distinguish what is,
and what is not, a dangerous PIO event. However, it is envisaged that PAC could be
used as a constant monitoring tool. As a result, it is considered more important that
PAC recognises all PIOs, than the pilots recognising all PIOs.
Table 7.9: Evaluation of PIO detection
Number of Cases Subjective Rating
NO PIO PIO
Objective PAC NO PIO B A
PIO C D
The effectiveness of the PIO criterion in predicting PIO can be evaluated according
to the following performance metrics;
1. I1 = Global Success Rate, 100(B+D)/(A+B+C +D), the percentage of cases
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in which agreement between subjective and objective measures is found, where
the vehicle is determined to be either PIO prone or PIO free.
2. I2 = Index of Conservatism, D/(A+D), the percentage of cases where PIO has
been identified subjectively with respect to the total number of cases observed by
both objective and subjective PIO prone cases.
3. I2 = Safety Index, D/(C + D), the percentage of cases where PIO has been
identified objectively with respect to the total number of cases observed by both
objective and subjective PIO prone cases.
The Global Success Rate shows the total correlation between pilot opinion and the
PAC detection tool. This shows the overall correlation between the tools. In this use of
the performance metrics, the Index of Conservatism shows how conservative the PAC
detection is. For example, a reduction in percentage shows that PAC has predicted
more PIOs than relayed by the pilot. This could represent the over-prediction of PIOs,
perhaps causing unnecessary warning of PIO tendencies when they cause no impact
to performance. The Safety Index refers to the safety offered by PAC. A reduction
in percentage shows an increase in the number of PIOs observed by the pilot and not
detected by PAC. The system is considered to be 100% safe if PAC detects PIO each
time that the assessing pilot does.
7.5.1 Roll Step Correlation
Results from the Roll Step manoeuvre are shown in Appendix D, with the correla-
tion between PAC detections and pilot subjective opinion also shown in Appendix
C. Tables display both the pilot subjective ratings, and the results obtained through
post-processing using the PAC detection tool. Tables also include the index results for
calculation of the correlation.
Overall, correlation between the subjective and objective measures was considered
good, both with regards to the observation of ‘PIO’ and ‘NO PIO’ conditions. This
includes detections made through the use of both Category I and II detection bound-
aries.
Figure 7.17 shows the outcomes obtained with respect to assessing pilot for Roll
Step runs where subjective ratings were awarded. One can see that on no occasion
did the assessing pilots award a subjective rating indicating PIO when PAC did not
detect a PIO (Observation A). This is encouraging, and shows that for these cases,
PAC provides a very safe method of detecting PIOs tendencies. However, a number
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of cases were found where PAC detected PIOs not conveyed through the use of the
subjective ratings, shown through outcome ‘C’. The suggestion here is that PAC has
over predicted PIO tendencies for these cases.
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Figure 7.17: Resultant correlation outcomes - Roll Step.
Overall correlation between pilot subjective opinion and PAC detection for results
obtained during completion of the Roll Step is shown in Table 7.10. As shown, the
global success rate for all pilots is equal to or above 60%. This shows that for 60% of
cases, subjective and objective results agree. Index of Conservatism was found to be
significantly lower than the global success rate, due to an apparent over-detection by
PAC. It is thought that a number of cases detected by PAC, but not detected by the
pilots, were short sporadic PIO events. Therefore, they did not have a high impact
on the pilot’s ability to complete the task. The encouraging result is the 100% Safety
Index that was found when using PAC as a detection tool.
Table 7.10: Overall correlation metrics for the Roll Step.
Pilot Global Success, % Index of Con-
servatism, %
Safety Index,
%
A 60 33 100
C 77 69 100
D 67 45 100
E 79 72 100
For the majority of cases, the Roll Step was found to expose RPCs when expected.
This shows promise for this task as one suitable to expose RPCs in the lateral axis
during forward flight. During the simulation, certain pilots and configurations were
found to be more PIO prone. A useful application of PRE-PAC is to observe the
incipience of pilots to PIO, through the observation of their control input within the
frequency domain.
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Pilot A for example was found to be susceptible to a decrease in allowable lateral
track width. When the track of the course was decreased by 50%, the pilot was found
to encounter Severe PIOs, not present before the reduction. The ground position and
lateral pilot control input for these cases are shown in Fig. 7.18. Case 32 is an example
of the Roll Step completed with the narrower lateral tolerances. During the tracking
section of the manoeuvre, following the translation across the runway, the pilot input is
oscillatory in nature, increasing with respect to time. Towards the end of the tracking
section, the vehicle rapidly diverges from the desired lateral track. Conversely, for Case
57, where the lateral track requirement is not as tight, no oscillatory control input is
present during the tracking phase of the manoeuvre. As a result, the pilot completes
the MTE, without inducing any apparent PIOs.
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Figure 7.18: Comparison between two cases flown by Pilot A.
Table 7.11 displays the percentage of cases where PIOs were observed with respect
to Roll Step and vehicle configurations. This shows the influence of the course on
exposing PIOs. As shown, for the majority of cases for vehicle Conf. 5 and Conf.
6, PIO was found during simulation for all RS Courses. However, an increase in the
percentage of observations was observed through both the narrowing of lateral gate
width and shortening the course.
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Table 7.11: Influence of Roll Step Course on PIO observations.
Model Course 1 Course 2 Course 3 Course 4
1 0/7 0% - - -
5 7/10 70% 1/1 100% 6/6 100% -
6 5/6 83% 3/4 75% 2/2 100% 5/5 100%
7.5.2 Precision Hover Correlation
Results from the Precision Hover manoeuvre are shown in Appendix D, with correla-
tions between PAC detections and subjective opinion shown in Appendix C. Tables dis-
play both the pilot subjective ratings, and the results obtained through post-processing
using the PAC detection tool. Tables also include the index results for calculation of
the correlation.
As for Roll Step results, for the majority of cases, good correlation between subjec-
tive and objective measures was found. Unlike the RS results however, on a number
of occasions the subjective rating indicated PIO when none was found through the use
of PAC. This highlighted a potential limitation of the novel APC scale. The Precision
Hover manoeuvre is a multi-axis task, that may require control input in all four control
axis. However, an APC rating is a single rating that the pilot awards based on their
experience of PIO tendencies during the completion of the MTE. The APC rating is
awarded alongside subjective comments, often as important as the rating itself. How-
ever, as the Precision Hover manoeuvre is a multi-axis task, ratings do not necessarily
relate to the axes of primary investigation. In this study, the requirement was to in-
vestigate PIO potential in the lateral axis. However, results from the Precision Hover
manoeuvre also include the incipience to longitudinal PIO, directional PIO, and heave
PIO. PAC is applied directly to the roll axis. Therefore, it does not assess PIO ten-
dencies in the other axes. For the majority of simulation results, this was not an issue,
as pilot comments and ratings were dominated by the lateral axis. However, for Pilot
D, a larger difference in rating occurred due to the pilots concern regarding oscillations
in the heave axis. Other pilots did not state that they encountered oscillations in the
axis whereas, on almost every run, Pilot D felt that they encountered oscillations. This
pilot however was not found to encounter any PIOs in the lateral during completion of
the Precision Hover using PAC. Unfortunately, due to only one APC rating per run,
for these cases results seem uncorrelated. In reality, as with the RS, Pilot D had very
low susceptibility to PIO in the lateral axis, due to his open-loop, low gain control
strategy. The recommendation from the use of the APC scale here is the need to award
axis-specific ratings when the axis of investigation (or oscillations) is not certain. This
is likely to be more of an issue in rotorcraft than fixed-wing equivalents, due to the
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nature of axis cross-couplings within the vehicles.
Outcomes of correlation between pilot subjective and PAC objective are shown
in Fig.7.19. As shown, due primarily to disagreements between Pilot D’s subjective
ratings and PAC results, a large number of ‘A’ results were obtained. However, good
correlation between measures was found through a large number of ‘B’ and ‘D’ results.
B D A C0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Outcome
N
um
be
r
 
 
Pilot A
Pilot C
Pilot D
Pilot E
Figure 7.19: Resultant correlation outcomes.
Table 7.12 displays overall correlation between the tools. As explained above, due to
perceived PIOs in the heave axis which were not predicted using PRE-PAC, correlation
between measures for Pilot D was found to be low. However, for all other pilots, good
overall correlation (> 70) was found. This shows the suitability of PAC for the detection
of PIOs in the roll axis, as there is good agreement with pilot opinion.
Table 7.12: Overall correlation metrics for the Precision Hover.
Pilot Global Success, % Index of Conser-
vatism, %
Safety Index, %
A 88 80 80
C 75 100 42
D 19 - -
E 93 89 100
Table 7.13 shows the number of cases detected to result in PIO with respect to the
Precision Hover course. This shows how changes to the performance tolerances have
affected the PIO incipience of the PVS. Conf. 1 was predicted to be HQL 1, with no
tendency for oscillations across the entire pilot control input range between 0−10 rad/s.
This prediction is confirmed through PAC detections; in 18 individual completions of
the manoeuvre, no PIOs were detected. Conf. 2 is predicted to have PIO tendencies,
with PRE-PAC detecting a large region of PIO susceptibility at frequencies greater
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than 3 rad/s For this case, the position of the hover pole was found to have an effect.
No PIOs were detected for the configuration until the pole was brought closest to the
pilot. For all other cases, PAC detected no PIOs during completion of the manoeuvre.
This shows that for this manoeuvre, the decrease in performance tolerances is required
to expose PIOs predicted. Using standard ADS-33 tolerances, PIOs for this case would
go undetected.
The same trend of increasing amount of PIOs detected was shown for Conf. 3, where
the vehicle was prone to PIO caused by RLE. Here, with all pole locations, at least one
PIO event was detected. However, with the pole positioned closest to the pilot, half
the cases flown resulted in PIO. Finally, PAC detections for Conf. 4, predicted to have
the strongest PIO tendencies, did not appear to be heavily influenced by the position
of the pole. This case was found to be very prone to PIO and, as a result was exposed
in over 50% of the test runs.
Table 7.13: Percentage of cases detected to result in PIO - Precision Hover.
Conf. Pole = 20ft Pole = 40ft Pole = 75ft
1 0/6 0% 0/5 0% 0/7 0%
2 2/5 40% 0/4 0% 0/5 0%
3 2/4 50% 2/5 40% 1/4 25%
4 3/7 43% 3/4 75% 2/4 50%
7.6 Overall Observations
Overall, results for both manoeuvres show good agreement with predictions made
through previous methods. The advantage is an increased understanding of what sit-
uations will lead to PIO. Table 7.14 displays a comparison of results obtained from
this study. PIO detection results are shown for all manoeuvres undertaken, giving an
overview of the amount of PIO events that were observed with respect to predictions.
Agreement was found with all methods used in the study. For the PIO Robust case,
no PIOs were found during the completion of 25 simulation runs. For PIO Incipient
cases, PIOs were observed. For the Precision Hover manoeuvre, these did not make up
the majority of cases. Finally, the majority of cases undertaken using the PIO Prone
vehicles led to detected PIOs. This was the case for both MTEs investigated.
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Table 7.14: Configurations tested, and results obtained using PAC methods.
Conf. BPD OLOP PRE-PAC PIO DETECT
(PAC)
1 NO NO HQL 1 0/25 (0%)
2 YES NO HQL 2 2/14 (14%)
3 NO YES HQL 2 5/13 (38%)
4 YES YES HQL 3 8/15 (53%)
5 YES NO HQL 2 14/17 (82%)
6 YES YES HQL 3 2/2 (88%)
7.7 Summary of Chapter 7
Novel tools designed and validated in previous chapters have been brought together to
provide an appraisal of PIO susceptibility for a number of different vehicle configura-
tions. The following are the key findings from results shown in this chapter;
1. PRE-PAC results for all configurations show predictions in agreement with more
traditional methods. PIO susceptibility is predicted both in the presence of time
delays and rate limits. This shows the applicability of one tool for the analysis
rather than two separate methods.
2. The PIO susceptibility of vehicle configurations to PIO using MTEs designed for
analysis of HQs is heavily dependent upon the pilot’s control strategy.
3. Modification to manoeuvre tolerances provide significant changes to RPC sus-
ceptibility. Forcing the pilot to apply more aggressive control to complete MTEs
provides more consistent observations of PIOs, by ensuring that pilots operate
using a closed-loop control strategy throughout the manoeuvre.
4. PRE-PAC predictions show good agreement with results obtained during piloted
simulation. Predictions and detection are in agreement for all configurations.
Furthermore, PRE-PAC results help to reason why PIOs have not been triggered
in simulation when they were expected. Interception of prediction boundaries can
be avoided through the use of low-gain pilot control.
5. Based upon observations made during this analysis, it is recommended that in
future axis-specific APC ratings are awarded. This would improve the ability to
correctly identify contributing causes to undesirable couplings.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and
Recommendations
8.1 Conclusions
The following are the key conclusions that have been ascertained from the research
contained within. These conclusions have arisen from the questions posed following the
literature review in Chapter 2. Overall, these conclusions satisfy the objectives set in
Section 1.3.
Q1: Is it possible to detect PIO tendencies using a method that uses a
standardised approach to determining susceptibility?
PIOs can be observed, described and characterised by simple observation of both the
PVS Phase distortion and Pilot input rate. When the combination of the two parameters
is used, it is possible for one to determine whether oscillations experienced by the PVS
should be classified as PIOs
Within Chapter 4, a novel method, entitled the Phase-Aggression Criterion, was
developed to observe PIO tendencies within real-time, closed-loop flying tasks. The
method was developed through the observation of results obtained from a number of
simulated test campaigns, using a range of pilots and helicopter configurations. Differ-
ences in Phase distortion and Aggression were used to define preliminary susceptibility
boundaries, which were validated through further investigations. Results showed a
strong correlation between both subjective observation and pilot subjective opinion
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from test campaigns. Furthermore, detections showed good correlation with ‘predic-
tions’. Consistent observation between predictions, detections, and subjective opinion
was found across all pilots, and vehicle models showing the ability to detect PIOs with
the two parameters. This work was substantiated through the use of a larger number of
test pilots and better simulation resources than have been available for previous similar
investigations.
Q2: Can the standardised method be engineered to allow real-time pre-
diction, allowing for direct feedback of PIO incipience during closed-loop
flying tasks?
Real-Time observation of PIO tendencies is possible during completion of closed-loop
piloting tasks. One can observe entry and exit to PIO, which offers future installation
of alleviation and/or warning systems
Chapter 4 displayed the real-time integration of the Phase-Aggression Criteria. Us-
ing standard control modelling program SIMULINK, it was possible to compute pre-
viously developed equations to observe real-time PIO conditions. When modelled in
SIMULINK, the real-time code can be implemented within a running simulation model,
and results can be processed ‘near-real time’. PAC results are time dependent, and al-
low direct feedback to the pilot during real-time flight.
Q3: Could a novel prediction method also be used for prediction, to
achieve clearer understanding of PIO tendencies prior to closed-loop piloted
simulation?
Synergy between Prediction and Detection tools can be achieved through the use of
PAC.
In Chapter 5, previously developed criteria were used to form a novel prediction
tool, capable of observing PIO tendencies for both the Open-Loop and Closed-Loop
vehicle systems. Here, it was demonstrated that methods developed offered predic-
tions comparable to bandwidth-phase delay criteria, that offered increased information
regarding overall pilot and vehicle susceptibility. Differences in PIO predictions were
shown through a number of simple examples. In Chapter 7, developed prediction cri-
teria were used to determine the susceptibility of a number of configurations, tested in
closed-loop flying tasks. Here, results were found to be in agreement with observations
and pilot subjective opinion.
Q4: Would a novel system of subjectively assessing A/RPC tendencies
provide benefits over current methods?
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The use of a novel Adverse Pilot Coupling scale offers a new perspective on both the
Severity and propriety of APCs during the completion of MTEs
In Chapter 6, a novel APC scale was developed that can improve understanding re-
garding the influence of PIOs during completion of closed-loop flying tasks. This scale
was developed through help from a number of experimental test pilots, and through
detailed appraisal of strengths and weaknesses of previous attempts to quantify pilot
subjective opinion. Results were obtained from completion of two MTEs, demonstrat-
ing the use of the scale for observation of APCs in both hover and forward flight. Results
demonstrated that the scale could offer more information than previous methods, whilst
also demonstrating improved consistency.
Q5: Can current Handling Qualities tasks be used to improve detection
of A/RPC tendencies within piloted simulation?
For complete observation of PIO tendencies, ADS-33 task requirements should be
engineered to ensure that conditions beyond those experienced during normal flight are
investigated.
In Chapter 7, the influence on task performance requirements was shown for both
the Precision Hover (taken from ADS-33) and Roll Step manoeuvres (used in previous
research at the University of Liverpool). In experiments detailed in Chapter 4, pilot
strategy was found to play a key role in the observation of PIOs during the Precision
Hover manoeuvre. This led to the observation that, in order to force pilot aggression
to levels beyond normal operation of the rotorcraft (as akin to APC situations), the
task tolerances needed to be tightened. In Chapter 7, it was shown that by moving the
Precision Hover reference pole closer to the helicopter, frequency of PIO occurrences
increased. This led to greater consistency between pilot experience (results from real-
time simulation) and PIO/APC predictions.
8.2 Recommendations
The following are the recommendations for further development of this work. These
have been found following investigations, and experience with tools used.
The primary recommendation is to test the tools developed here in full flight trials.
The added complexity of both hardware and software requirements in real-flight add
challenges that have not been dealt with within the scope of this work. The goal of
the work presented has been to present novel tools for the prediction and detection of
PIOs, and throughout the study, tools have been developed with implementation to
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aircraft in mind. However, due to facilities available within this project, it was only
possible to test tools within simulation. Many elements that have been investigated
using simulation must be confirmed through flight testing, such as the validity of the
boundaries posed for detection of PIO. Furthermore, during flight testing, there must
be further focus on the safety of implementing such systems, and the influence they
have over the operation of the complete operation.
Due to the availability of pilots, and the flight simulators, it was not possible to test
the real-time acquisition of the PAC method. All data presented from flight simulation
was post-processed using PAC. In order to demonstrate the real-time capability of
the PAC method, it is recommended that further testing is conducted through piloted
simulation.
The use of tools presented in this work has been restricted to simplified, rigid body
dynamics and linear approximations. Future work should apply the tools developed to
more complex system models, such as those which feature elastic properties and ad-
vanced flight control systems. Furthermore, the research presented has been restricted
to Rate Command systems. Future evaluations should seek to determine the prop-
erties of other command systems, such as Attitude Command or advanced ‘hybrid’
configurations.
Furthermore, all results shown have been based around the prediction and detection
of Category I and II type PIOs. Within the scope of the research, it was not possible
to tests the applicability of methods to Category III type PIOs. These are possibly the
most dangerous of oscillations, and still have only a very limited number of prediction
criteria available. Elements of Category III type PIOs are shared with PIOs observed
within this research, and it is hypothesised that the criteria developed should be directly
applicable. However, further research must be conducted to show this, and to prove
that the susceptibility boundaries are valid for this further set of PIOs.
Finally, it is recommended that work is continued to use the tools developed to
establish a new test procedure to evaluate RPC/PIO tendencies. Currently, there is
no standard method for evaluating RPC/PIO tendencies. In order to see benefit from
the tools developed in this research, further investigation of their use in flight test and
evaluation must be conducted. This is required to observe the advantages (and possible
disadvantages) of methods developed.
226
Bibliography
[1] Padfield, G. and Lawrence, B., “The birth of the practical aeroplane: An ap-
praisal of the Wright brothers’ achievements in 1905,” The Aeronautical Journal ,
Vol. 109, No. 1100, 2005.
[2] Ashkenas, I. L., Jex, H. R., and McRuer, D. T., “Pilot-Induced Oscillations:
Their Cause and Analysis,” Tech. Rep. STI TR-239-2, Systems Technology Inc.,
1964.
[3] McRuer, D. T., “Pilot-Induced Oscillations and Human Dynamic Behavior,”
Tech. Rep. NASA Contractor Report 4683, NASA, 1995.
[4] McRuer, D. T., Droste, C. S., Hansman, R. J., Hess, R. A., LeMaster, D. P.,
Matthews, S., McDonnell, J. D., McWha, J., Melvin, W. W., and Pew, R. W.,
Aviation Safety and Pilot Control: Understanding and Preventing Unfavorable
Pilot-Vehicle Interactions, National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 1997.
[5] Mattaboni, M., Quaranta, G., Masarati, P., and Jump, M., “Experimental identi-
fication of rotorcraft pilots’ biodynamic response for investigation of PAO events,”
35th European Rotorcraft Forum, Politecnico di Milano, Italy, European Rotor-
craft Forum, Hamburg, Germany, 2009.
[6] Shweyk, K. M. and Weltz, G. L., “Design and validation of flight control law
changes intended to minimize pilot-induced oscillations in a large transport air-
craft,” AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, Vol. 1, Boeing Com-
pany, Long Beach, CA, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Inc,
San Francisco, CA, United states, 2005, pp. 112–116.
[7] A’Harrah, R., “The Process for Addressing the Challenges of Aircraft Pilot
Coupling,” Flight Vehicle Integration Panel Workshop on Pilot Induced Oscil-
lations, Flight Systems High-Speed Research, Aeronautics NASA, Washington,
DC, AGARD, Neuilly-sur-Siene, France, February 1995.
[8] Gibson, J. C., Development of a design methodology for handling qualities excel-
lence in fly by wire aircraft , Ph.D. thesis, Delft University of Technology, 1999.
227
[9] Pavel, M. D., Jump, M., Vu, B. D., Masarati, P., Genaretti, M., Ionita, A., Zaicek,
L., Smaili, H., Quaranta, G., Quaranta, G., Yilmaz, D., Jones, M., Serafini, J.,
and Malecki, J., “Adverse Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings - Past, present and future
challenges,” Progress in Aerospace Sciences, Vol. 62, 2013, pp. 1–51.
[10] Walden, R. B., “A Retrospective Survey of Pilot-Structural Coupling Instabilities
in Naval Rotorcraft,” American Helicopter Society 63rd Annual Forum, American
Helicopter Society, 1-3 May 2007.
[11] Mitchell, D. G. and Klyde, D. H., “Identifying a PIO signature - New tech-
niques applied to an old problem,” 2006 Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Confer-
ence, Vol. 2, Keystone, CO, August 2006, pp. 992–1006.
[12] Hess, R. A., “Unified theory for aircraft handling qualities and adverse aircraft-
pilot coupling,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 20, No. 6,
1997, pp. 1141–1148.
[13] McRuer, D., “Human dynamics in man-machine systems,” Automatica, Vol. 16,
No. 3, 5 1980, pp. 237–253.
[14] Heﬄey, R. K., “Application of Task-Pilot-Vehicle (TPV) Models in Flight Simu-
lation,” 66th American Helicopter Society Annual Forum, 2010.
[15] Anon., “Flying Qualities of Piloted Aircraft,” Tech. Rep. MIL-STD-1797, De-
partment of Defense, 1997.
[16] Anon., “Aeronautical Design Standard Performance Specification Handling Qual-
ities Requirements for Military Rotorcraft,” Tech. Rep. ADS-33E-PRF, United
States Army Aviation and Missile Command Aviation Engineering Directorate,
2000.
[17] McRuer, D. T., “PIO - A Historical Perspective,” Advisory Group for Aerospace
Research and Development, Flight Vehicle Integration Panel Workshop on Pilot
Induced Oscillations, Febuary 1995.
[18] Brieger, O., Kerr, M., Leissling, D., Postlethwaite, I., Sofrony, J., and Turner,
M. C., “Flight testing of a rate saturation compensation scheme on the ATTAS
aircraft,” Aerospace Science and Technology , Vol. 13, No. 2-3, 3 2009, pp. 92–104.
[19] Arguelles, P., Bischoff, M., Busquin, P., Droste, B. A. C., Evans, R., Kroll, W.,
Lagardere, J.-L., Lina, A., Lumsden, J., Ranque, D., Rasmussen, S., Reutlinger,
P., Robins, R., Terho, H., and Wittlov, A., “European Aeronautics: A Vision
for 2020: Meeting society’s needs and winning global leadership,” Tech. rep.,
European Commission, 2001.
228
[20] Anon, “Flightpath 2050: Europe’s Vision for Aviation,” Tech. Rep. EUR 098
EN, European Union, 2011.
[21] Pavel, M. D., Malecki, J., DangVu, B., Masarati, P., Genaretti, M., Jump, M.,
Jones, M., Smaili, H., Ionita, A., and Zaicek, L., “Present and Future Trends in
Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings (RPCs) - A Retrospective Survey of Recent Research
Activities within the European Project ARISTOTEL,” European Rotorcraft Fo-
rum, Varese, Italy, 13-15 September 2011.
[22] Pavel, M. D., Malecki, J., Vu, B. D., Masarati, P., Quaranta, G., Gennaretti, M.,
Jump, M., Smaili, H., Ionita, A., and Zaichik, L. E., “Aircraft and Rotorcraft
Pilot Coupling: a survey of recent research activities within the European project
ARISTOTEL,” 3rd CEAS Air and Space Conference, October 24-28 2011.
[23] Smith, R. E., “Effects of Control System Dynamics on Fighter Approach and
Landing Longitudinal Flying Qualities (Volume 1),” Tech. Rep. ADA067550,
Calspan Advanced Technology Center, 1978.
[24] Chalk, C. R., “Another Study of the T-38A PIO incident,” Tech. rep., Calspan
Advanced Technology Center, August 1978.
[25] Pavel, M. and Yilmaz, D., “Background, definition and classification of A/RPC
(D1.1),” Tech. rep., ARISTOTEL, 2010.
[26] Dieterich, O., Gotz, J., Vu, B. D., Haverdings, H., Masarati, P., Pavel, M. D.,
Jump, M., and Gennaretti, M., “Adverse Rotorcraft-Pilot Coupling: Recent
Research Activities in Europe,” 34th European Rotorcraft Forum, Eurocopter
Deutschland GmbH DLR ONERA NLR Politecnico di Milano University of Liv-
erpool Universita Roma Tre, RAeS European Rotorcraft Forum, Liverpool, UK,
September 2008.
[27] Mariano, V., Guglieri, G., and Ragazzi, A., “Application of Pilot Induced Os-
cillations Prediction Criteria to Rotorcraft,” American Helicopter Society 67th
Annual Forum, AHS, Virginia Beach, Virginia, 3-5 May 2011.
[28] Neal, T. P. and Smith, R. E., “A Flying Qualities Criterion for the Design
of Fighter Flight-Control Systems,” Journal of Aircraft , Vol. 8, No. 10, 1971,
pp. 803–809.
[29] Smith, R. H. and Geddes, N. D., “New Criteria for Advanced Aircraft Design,”
Tech. rep., Systems Research Laboratories, Inc., September 1978.
[30] Bailey, R. E. and Bidlack, T. J., “Unified Pilot-Induced Oscillation Theory Vol-
ume IV: Time-Domain Neal-Smith Criterion,” Tech. Rep. WL-TR-96-3031, Flight
Dynamics Directorate, Wright Laboratory, 1995.
229
[31] Duda, H., “Prediction of pilot-in-the-loop oscillations due to rate saturation,”
Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1997, pp. 581–587.
[32] Duda, H., “Frequency domain analysis of rate limiting elements in flight control
systems,” Tech. Rep. DLR-FB–94-16, Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fuer Luft und
Raumfahrt e.V (DLR), Braunschweig, Germany, 1994.
[33] Zeyada, Y., Hess, R. A., and Siwakosit, W., “Aircraft handling qualities and pilot-
induced oscillation tendencies with actuator saturation,” Journal of Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1999, pp. 852–861.
[34] Hess, R. A. and Stout, P. W., “Assessing aircraft susceptibility to nonlinear
aircraft-pilot coupling/pilot-induced oscillations,” Journal of Guidance, Control,
and Dynamics, Vol. 21, No. 6, 1998, pp. 957–964.
[35] Klyde, D. H. and Mitchell, D. G., “A PIO case study - Lessons learned through
analysis,” AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, Vol. 1, 15-18 August
2005, pp. 127–143.
[36] Lampton, A. and Klyde, D. H., “Power Frequency: A Metric for Analyzing Pilot-
in-the-Loop Flying Tasks,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 35,
No. 5, 2012, pp. 1526–1537.
[37] Mitchell, D. G., Hoh, R. H., Aponso, B. L., and Klyde, D. H., “Proposed In-
corporation of Mission-Orientated Flying Qualities into MIL-STD-1797A,” Tech.
Rep. WL-TR-94-3162, Systems Technology Inc., Hawthorne, CA, October 1994.
[38] Blanken, C. L. and Pausder, H. J., “Investigation of the Effects of Bandwidth and
Time Delay on Helicopter Roll-Axis Handling Qualities,” Journal of the American
Helicopter Society , Vol. 39, No. 3, 1994, pp. 24–33.
[39] Klyde, D. H., “Unified Pilot-Induced Oscillation Theory, Vol I: PIO analysis with
linear and non-linear effective vehicle characteristics, including rate limiting,”
Tech. Rep. WL-TR-96-3028, Air Force Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base, OH, December 1995.
[40] Mitchell, D. G., Doman, D. B., Key, D. L., Klyde, D. H., Leggett, D. B., Moor-
house, D. J., Mason, D. J., Raney, D. L., and Schmidt, D. K., “Evolution, Revo-
lution, and Challenges of Handling Qualities,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and
Dynamics, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2004, pp. 12–28.
[41] Blanken, C. L., Hoh, R. H., Mitchell, D. G., and Key, D. L., “Test Guide For ADS-
33E-PRF,” Tech. Rep. AMSRD-AMR-AF-08-07, Army Research, Development,
and Engineering Command, Moffett Field, CA, July 2008.
230
[42] Anon., “Handling Qualities Requirements for Military Rotorcraft,” Tech. Rep.
ADS-33C, U.S Army AVSCOM Aeronautical Design Standard, 1989 1989.
[43] Jump, M., Hodge, S., Vu, B. D., Masarati, P., Quaranta, G., Mattaboni, M.,
Pavel, M. D., and Dieterich, O., “Adverse Rotorcraft-Pilot Coupling: Test Cam-
paign Development at the University of Liverpool,” 34th European Rotorcraft
Forum, Liverpool, UK, September 2008.
[44] Pavel, M. D., Vu, B. D., Gotz, J., Jump, M., and Dieterich, O., “Adverse
Rotorcraft-Pilot Couplings - Prediction and Suppression of Rigid Body RPC
Sketches from the Work of Garteur HC-AG16,” 34th European Rotorcraft Fo-
rum, Liverpool, UK, September 2008.
[45] Blanken, C. L., Lusardi, J. A., Ivler, C. M., Tischler, M. B., Hofinger, M. T.,
Decker, W. A., Malpica, C. A., Berger, T., and Tucker, G. E., “An investigation
of rotorcraft stability-phase margin requirements in hover,” American Helicopter
Society 65th Annual Forum, Grapevine, Texas, 27-29 May 2009.
[46] Duda, H., “Flight control system design considering rate saturation,” Aerospace
Science and Technology , Vol. 2, No. 4, 1998, pp. 265–275.
[47] Wilmes, T. and Duda, H., “Investigation of electronic filters to prevent aircraft-
pilot-coupling,” Tech. Rep. IB 111-98/39, Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fuer Luft
und Raumfahrt e.V (DLR), 1998.
[48] Duda, H., Duus, G., Hovmark, G., and Forssell, L., “New flight simulator experi-
ments on pilot-involved oscillations due to rate saturation,” Journal of Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2000, pp. 312–318.
[49] Tischler, M. B., Ivler, C. M., Mansur, M. H., Cheung, K. K., Berger, T., and
Berrios, M., “Handling Qualities Optimization and Trade-offs in Rotorcraft Flight
Control Design,” RAeS Rotorcraft Handling Qualities Conference, Liverpool, UK,
4-6th November 2008.
[50] Shafer, M. F., Smith, R. E., Stewart, J. F., and Bailey, R. E., “Flight test experi-
ence with pilot-induced oscillation suppression filters,” Tech. Rep. NASA Techni-
cal Memorandum 86028, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1984.
[51] Shafer, M. F., “In-Flight Simulation Studies at the NASA Dryden Flight Research
Facility,” AIAA Simulation Technology Conference, 12-14 August 1991.
[52] Klyde, D. H., Liang, C.-Y., and Schulze, P. C., “Applying Flight Test Lessons
Learned ‘On-the-Fly’,” AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, 2009.
231
[53] Bailey, R. E. and Smith, R. E., “An In-Flight Investigation of Pilot-Induced
Oscillation Suppression Filters during the Fighter Approach and Landing Task,”
Tech. Rep. Calspan Report No. 6645-F-9, Calspan Advanced Technology Center,
1981.
[54] Alcala, I., Gordillo, F., and Aracil, J., “Phase compensation design for prevention
of PIO due to actuator rate saturation,” American Control Conference, 2004.
Proceedings of the 2004 , Vol. 5, 2004, pp. 4687–4691.
[55] Leggett, D. B., “On-Board PIO Detection/Prevention,” Presentation at the PIO
Workshop, 6-8 April 1999.
[56] Johnson, D. A., Suppression of Pilot-Induced Oscillation (PIO), Master’s thesis,
Air Force Institute of Technology, 2002.
[57] Hanley, J. G., “A Comparison of Nonlinear Algorithms to Prevent Pilot-Induced
Oscillations Caused by Actuator Rate Limiting,” 2003.
[58] Brandstrom, A., Coping with a Credibilty Crisis: The Stockholm JAS Fighter
Crash of 1993 , Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 2003.
[59] Klyde, D. H. and Mitchell, D. G., “Investigating the Role of Rate Limiting in
Pilot-Induced Oscillations,” AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference,
Systems Technology, Inc. Hawthorne, California; Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Lomita,
CA, AIAA, Austin, Texas, August 11-13, 2003 2003.
[60] Rundqwist, L., Sjooberg, B., Elgcrona, P.-O., Hillgren, R., and Stahl-Gunnarsson,
K., “Method and apparatus for phase compensation in a vehicle control system,”
1996.
[61] Yildiz, Y. and Kolmanovsky, I. V., “A control allocation technique to recover
from pilot-induced oscillations (CAPIO) due to Actuator Rate Limiting,” 2010
American Control Conference, IEEE Computer Society, Baltimore, MD, June 30
- July 2 2010, pp. 516–523.
[62] Deppe, P. R., Chalk, C. R., and Shafer, M. F., “Flight evaluation of an aircraft
with side and center stick controllers and rate-limited ailerons,” Tech. Rep. NASA
CR-198055, National Aeronautics and Space Administation, 1996.
[63] Chapa, M. J., A nonlinear pre-filter to prevent departure and/or Pilot-Induced
Oscillations (PIO) due to actuator rate limiting , Master’s thesis, Air Force Insti-
tute of Technology, March 1999.
[64] Gatley, S. L., Turner, M. C., Postlethwaite, I., and Kumar, A., “A compari-
son of rate-limit compensation schemes for pilot-induced- oscillation avoidance,”
Aerospace Science and Technology , Vol. 10, No. 1, 2006, pp. 37–47.
232
[65] Postlethwaite, I., Turner, M. C., and Prempain, E., “An H Infinity Approach
to Rate Limit Compensation for Pilot-Induced Oscillation Avoidance: Concept,
Demonstration, and Comparison (Preliminary Version),” Tech. Rep. GARTEUR
FM(AG-12)/TP-120-06, 2001.
[66] Gatley, S. L., Turner, M. C., Postlethwaite, I., and Kumar, A., “A compari-
son of rate-limit compensation schemes for pilot-induced-oscillation avoidance,”
Aerospace Science and Technology , Vol. 10, No. 1, 1 2006, pp. 37–47.
[67] Sofrony, J., Turner, M. C., Postlethwaite, I., Brieger, O., and Leissling, D., “Anti-
windup synthesis for PIO avoidance in an experimental aircraft,” 45th IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control , San Diego, CA, December 13-15 2006, pp.
5412–5417.
[68] Sofrony, J., Turner, M. C., and Postlethwaite, I., “Anti-windup synthesis for sys-
tems with rate-limits using Riccati equations,” International Journal of Control ,
Vol. 83, No. 2, 2010.
[69] Brieger, O., Kerr, M., Leissling, D., Postlethwaite, I., Sofrony, J., and Turner,
M. C., “Anti-windup compensation of rate saturation in an experimental air-
craft,” American Control Conference, 2007, pp. 924–929.
[70] Sofrony, J., Turner, M. C., and Postlethwaite, I., “A Simple Anti-Windup Com-
pensation Scheme for Systems with Rate-Limited Actuators,” ICROS-SICE In-
ternational Joint Conference, 2009.
[71] Liebst, B., Chapa, M. J., and Leggett, D. B., “Nonlinear prefilter to prevent
pilot-induced oscillations due to actuator rate limiting,” Journal of Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2002, pp. 740–747.
[72] Chapa, M., Fick, E., Kraabel, D., Letourneau, M., and Parker, T., “Results of
Attempts to Prevent Departure and/or Pilot-Induced Oscillations (PIO) due to
Actuator Rate Limiting in Highly-Augmented Fighter Flight Control Systems
(HAVE FILTER),” Tech. Rep. AFFTC-TR-98-26, United States Air Force, Ed-
wards Air Force Base, CA, March 1999.
[73] Menon, P. P., Herrmann, G., Turner, M., Lowenberg, M., Bates, D., and Postleth-
waite, I., “Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion Based Anti-windup - An Aerospace Ap-
plication,” Proceedings of the 17th World Congress, The International Federation
of Automatic Control , 2008.
[74] Klyde, D. H. and McRuer, D. T., “Smart-Cue and Smart-Gain Concepts Develop-
ment to Alleviate Loss of Control,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics,
Vol. 32, No. 5, 2009, pp. 1409–1417.
233
[75] Klyde, D. H. and Liang, C.-Y., “Approach and Landing Flight Evaluation of
Smart-Cue and Smart-Gain Concepts,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dy-
namics, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1057–1070.
[76] Hess, R. A. and Snell, S. A., “Flight control system design with rate saturating
actuators,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997,
pp. 90–96.
[77] Mitchell, D. G., Arencibia, A. J., and Munoz, S., “Real-time detection of pilot-
induced oscillations,” AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, Vol. 1,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Inc, Providence, RI, August
16-19 2004, pp. 1–12.
[78] Yildiz, Y., Kolmanovsky, I. V., and Acosta, D., “A control allocation systems
for automatic detection and compensation of the phase shift due to actuator rate
limiting,” Proceedings of the American control conference, IEEE , 2011.
[79] Yildiz, Y. and Kolmanovsky, I., “Stability properties and cross-coupling perfor-
mance of the control allocation scheme CAPIO,” Journal of Guidance, Control,
and Dynamics, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2011, pp. 1190–1196.
[80] Cox, C. J. and Lewis, C. E., “Pilot-Induced Oscillation Detection and Compen-
sation Apparatus and Method,” 10 August 1999.
[81] Cox, C., Lewis, C., and Suchomel, C., “A neural network based, real-time algo-
rithm for detection and mitigation of pilot induced oscillations,” Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics, 2000 IEEE International Conference on, Vol. 1, 2000, pp. 500–
505.
[82] Mitchell, D. G. and Hoh, R. H., “Development of Methods and Devices to Predict
and Prevent Pilot-Induced Oscillations,” Tech. Rep. AFRL-VA-WP-TR-2000-
3046, Hoh Aeronautics, 2000.
[83] Mitchell, D. G. and Klyde, D. H., “Testing for pilot-induced oscillations,” AIAA
Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, San Francisco, CA, 15-18 August
2005, pp. 98–111.
[84] Weltz, G. L., Shweyk, K. M., and Murray, D. M., “Application of new and
standard Pilot-Induced Oscillation (PIO) analysis methods to flight test data of
the C-17 transport aircraft,” AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference,
Vol. 1, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Inc, Hilton Head, SC,
20-23 August 2007, pp. 266–291.
234
[85] Suliman, S., Yilmaz, D., and Pavel, M. D., “Harmonizing the Real Time Oscilla-
tion Verifier (ROVER) with Handlng Qualities Assessment for enhanced Rotor-
craft Pilot Couplings Detection,” 38th European Rotorcraft Forum, 4-7 September
2012.
[86] Gray, W., “Boundary-avoidance tracking: A new pilot tracking model,” AIAA
Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, United States Air Force Test Pilot
School, Edwards AFB, CA 93524, San Francisco, CA, 15-18 August 2005, pp.
86–97.
[87] Brinkerink, N. and Pavel, M. D., “Capturing the switch between point track-
ing and boundary avoiding pilot behaviour in a PIO event,” RAeS Rotorcraft
Handling Qualities Conference, Liverpool, UK, 4-6 November 2008.
[88] Lu, L., Padfield, G. D., and Jump, M., “Optical Tau in Boundary-Avoidance
Tracking - A New Perspective on Pilot-Induced Oscillations,” 36th European Ro-
torcraft Forum, Paris, France, 2010.
[89] Warren, R. D., An investigation of the effects of boundary avoidance on pilot
tracking , Master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, September 2006.
[90] Gray, W. R., “Handling Qualities Evaluation at the USAF Test Pilot School,”
AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, Chicago, IL, 10-13 August
2009.
[91] Niewind, I., “Investigations on boundary avoidance tracking and pilot inceptor
workload,” CEAS Aeronautical Journal , 2011, pp. 147–156.
[92] Klyde, D. H., Liang, C.-Y., Alvarez, D. J., Richards, N., Adams, R. J., and
Cogan, B., “Mitigating Unfavorable Pilot Interactions with Adaptive Controllers
in the Presence of Failures Damage,” 2011.
[93] Lu, L., Jump, M., and Jones, M., “Tau Coupling Using Positive Wavelett Analy-
sis,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2013, pp. 920–
934.
[94] McPherson, T. M. and Jr., E. J. H., “Low Altitude High Speed Flight Evaluation
of the F-4A/B (F4H-1F/-1) Airplane,” Tech. Rep. ANTC-RAD32-103, 1963.
[95] DiFranco, D. A., “Flight Investigation of Longtudinal Short Period Frequency Re-
quirements and PIO Tendencies,” Tech. Rep. AFFDL-TR-66-163, Cornell Aero-
nautical Lab, 1967.
[96] Cooper, G. E. and Harper, R. P., “The Use of Pilot Rating in the Evaluation of
Aircraft Handling Qualities,” Tech. Rep. AGARD Report 567, Advisory Group
235
for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD), North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization, 1969.
[97] Weingarten, N. and Chalk, C. R., “In-flight Investigation of Large Airplane Flying
Qualities for Approach and Landing,” Tech. Rep. AFWAL-TR-81-3118, Calspan,
1981.
[98] Powers, B. G., “Space Shuttle Pilot-Induced Oscillation Research Testing,” Tech.
Rep. TM-86034, NASA Ames Research Centre, 1984.
[99] Hovmark, G., Mehl, H.-J., Smaili, H., and Crouzet, M., “Test Techniques for
Experimental Detection of PIO: Work from GARTEUR FM/AG12,” Tech. Rep.
GARTEUR/TP-120-03, GARTEUR, 2000.
[100] Mitchell, D. G., “Flight and ground testing for pilot-induced oscillations,” IEEE
Aerospace Applications Conference Proceedings, 1999, pp. 89–98.
[101] Anon., “Flight Test Guide For Certification of Transport Airplanes,” Advisory
Circular AG 25-7C, U.S. Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, 2012.
[102] Gilbreath, G. P., Prediction of Pilot-Induced Oscillations (PIO) due to actuator
rate limiting using the Open-Loop Onset Point (OLOP) Criteria, Master’s thesis,
Air Force Institute of Technology, 2001.
[103] Witte, J. B., An investigation relating longitudinal Pilot-Induced Oscillation ten-
dency rating to describing function predictions for rate-limited actuators, Master’s
thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, March 2004.
[104] Mitchell, D. G. and Klyde, D. H., “Recommended Practices for Exposing Pilot-
Induced Oscillations or Tendencies in the Development Process,” Woodland Hills,
CA, 16 - 18 November 2004.
[105] Gray, W., “A generalized handling qualities flight test technique utilizing bound-
ary avoidance tracking,” Air Force T and E Days, Los Angeles, CA, 5-7 Febuary
2008.
[106] Anon., “FLIGHTLAB Development Software,” Advanced Rotorcraft Technology
Inc., Sunnydale, CA, 2011.
[107] Pavel, M. D., “Letter of Request for Accessing and Using GARTEUR HC (AG-16)
Results within ARISTOTEL Project,” 2010.
[108] Anon., “Photograph of Red Bull BO105,” Available Online at
http://commons.wikimedia.org/, 2009.
236
[109] Anon., “A U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter with Bravo Company, 2nd
Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, and a CH-
47F Chinook helicopter with Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 25th Aviation
Brigade,” Available online at http://commons.wikimedia.org/, 2013.
[110] Howlett, J. J., “UH-60A Black Hawk Engineering Simulation Program Volume
I - Mathematical Model,” Tech. Rep. NASA Contractor Report 66309, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1981.
[111] Padfield, G. D., Helicopter Flight Dynamics: The Theory and Application of
Flying Qualities and Simulation Modelling , Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, United
Kingdom, 2nd ed., 2007.
[112] Johnson, W., Helicopter Theory , Dover Publications, Inc., New York, NY, 1980.
[113] Cook, M. V., Flight Dynamics Principles, Elsevier Ltd., Oxford, UK, 2nd ed.,
2007.
[114] Ockier, C. J., “Flight Evaluation of the New Handling Qualities Criteria Using
the BO 105,” Journal of the American Helicopter Society , Vol. 41, No. 1, 1996,
pp. 67–76.
[115] White, M., Perfect, P., Padfield, G., Gubbels, A. W., and Berryman, A., “Ac-
ceptance testing and commissioning of a flight simulator for rotorcraft simulation
fidelity research,” Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part
G: Journal of Aerospace Engineering , Vol. 227, No. 4, 2013, pp. 655–678.
[116] Hodge, S., Perfect, P., Padfield, G. D., and White, M., “Optimising the Vestibular
Cues Available from a Short Stroke Hexapod Motion Platform,” 67th American
Helicopter Society Annual Forum, Virginia Beach, VA, 3-5 May 2011.
[117] Stroosma, O., Paassen, M. M. V., and Mulder, M., “Using the SIMONA re-
search simulator for human-machine interaction research,” AIAA Modeling and
Simulation Technologies Conference and Exhibit , 2008.
[118] Anon., “The SIMONA Research Simulator,” 2012.
[119] Cameron, N. and Padfield, G. D., “Tilt rotor pitch/flight-path handling qual-
ities,” 63rd American Helicopter Society International Annual Forum, Vol. 3,
Virginia Beach, VA, United states, 1-3 May 2007, pp. 1768–1782.
[120] Blake, R., Boundary Avoidance Tracking: Consequences (and uses) of imposed
boundaries on pilot-aircraft performance, Master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of
Technology, 2009.
237
[121] Ockier, C. J., “Pilot Induced Oscillations in Helicopters - Three Case Studies,”
Tech. Rep. IB 111-96/12, Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur Luft- und Raumfahrt,
e.V (DLR), 1996.
[122] Jones, M. and Jump, M., “Generic Research Simulator Requirements for Predic-
tion of Adverse Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings in the Heave Axis,” 68th American
Helicopter Society Annual Forum, Fort Worth, TX, 1-3 May 2012.
[123] Mitchell, D. G. and Stadler, B. K., “Simulation Investigation of Category I and
II PIO,” 24th Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, Portland, OR, 9-11
August 1999.
[124] Masarati, P., Quaranta, G., Jump, M., and Lu, L., “Theoretical and Experimental
Investigation of Aeroelastic Rotorcraft-Pilot Coupling,” 68th American Helicopter
Society Annual Forum, May 1-3 2012.
[125] Jones, M. and Jump, M., “Prediction of Rotorcraft Pilot Induced Oscillations
using the Phase-Aggression Criterion,” 69th American Helicopter Society Annual
Forum, Phoenix, AZ, 2013.
[126] Mitchell, D. G., Kish, B. A., and Seo, J. S., “A flight investigation of pilot-induced
oscillation due to rate limiting,” IEEE Aerospace Conference Proceedings, Vol. 3,
1998, pp. 59–74.
[127] Mitchell, D. G. and Field, E. J., “Nonlinearities and PIO with Advanced Aircraft
Control Systems,” RTO A VT Symposium on Active Control Technology for En-
hanced Performance Operational Capabilities of Military Aircraft, Land Vehicles
and Sea Vehicles, Brauschweig, Germany, 8-11 May 2000.
[128] Harendra, P. B., Joglekar, M. J., Gaffey, T. M., and Marr, R. L., “V/STOL Tilt
Rotor Study Volume 5 A Mathematical Model for Real Time Flight Simulation
of the Bell Model 301 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft,” Tech. Rep. Np. 301-099-001,
Bell Helicopter Company, 1973.
[129] Gubbels, A. W. and Craig, G. L., “The NRC Bell 412 ASRA safety system: a hu-
man factors perspective on lessons learned from an airborne incident,” Reliability
Engineering & System Safety , Vol. 75, No. 2, 2 2002, pp. 273–283.
[130] Lu, L. and Jump, M., “Multiloop Pilot Model for Boundary-Triggered Pilot-
Induced Oscillation Investigations,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynam-
ics, , No. 1-17, 2014.
[131] Meyer, M. A. and Padfield, G. D., “First Steps in the Development of Handling
Qualities Criteria for a Civil Tiltrotor,” 58th American Helicopter Society Annual
Forum, Montreal, Canada, June 11-13 2002.
238
Appendix A
Helicopter Reference Data
A.1 Bo105 Reference Data
Figure A.1: Three view drawing of Bo105.
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Table A.1: General Helicopter Data.
Description Value Unit
Mass 2200 kg
Helicopter Roll Moment of Inertia 1433 kgm2
Helicopter Pitch Moment of Inertia 4973 kgm2
Helicopter Yaw Moment of Inertia 4099 kgm2
660 kgm2
Helicopter Centre of Gravity ([forward;right;down], from ref-
erence point)
[0.08;0.00;0.52] m
Table A.2: Main Rotor.
Description Value Unit
Rotor radius 4.912 m
Rotor nominal speed 44.4 rad/s
Rotor blade chord 0.27 m
Number of blades 4 −
Precone angle (positive upwards) 2.5 deg
Main rotor rotational inertia 950 kgm2
Shaft angle (positive forwards) 3 deg
Spanwise location of pitch-link lever 0.169 m
Flap frequency ratio 1.248 −
Flap hinge offset 0.746 m
First aerodynamic section 1.1 m
Blade linear twist -6.2 deg
Effective blade mass 24.2 kg
First moment of mass of rotor blade 51.1 kgm
Second moment of mass of rotor blade 142 kgm2
Hub location ([forward;right;down], from reference point) [0.05;0.00;-0.96] m
Blade section NACA 23012 −
Table A.3: Tail Rotor.
Description Value Unit
Tail rotor radius 0.95 m
Tail rotor nominal speed 233 rad/s
Tail rotor blade chord 0.179 m
Number of blades 2 −
Shaft angle (positive forwards) -4.2 deg
Blade linear twist 0 deg
Effective blade mass 1.15 kg
First moment of mass of rotor blade 0.62 kgm
Second moment of mass of rotor blade 1.06 kgm2
Pitch-flap coupling 45 deg
Hub location ([forward;right;down], from reference point) [-5.95;-0.32;-1.20] m
Blade section NACA 0012 −
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Table A.4: Horizontal Tailplane.
Description Value Unit
Tail plane area 0.8 m2
Tail plane span 2.0 m
Tail plane chord 0.4 m
Tailplane centre of pressure ([forward;right;down], from ref-
erence point)
[-4.51;0.00;-0.08] m
Blade section NACA 0010/0020 −
Table A.5: Vertical Fin.
Description Value Unit
Fin area 0.71 m2
Fin span 1.25 m
Fin chord 0.57 m
Vertical fin centre of pressure ([forward;right;down], from
reference point)
[-5.37;0.00;-0.08] m
Blade section NACA 65-3-618 −
Table A.6: Flight Control System.
Description Value (Linkage) Unit
Collective 0.16 deg/%
Longitudinal cyclic 0.15 deg/%
Lateral cyclic 0.10 deg/%
Rudder pedal 0.24 deg/%
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Appendix B
Mission Task Elements
The following section details all Mission Task Elements completed during this research.
The descriptions were given to pilots during completion of the manoeuvres.
B.1 Accel-Decel
B.1.1 Objectives
•Check pitch axis and heave axis handling qualities
•(Good Visual Environment, GVE) Check for aggressive manoeuvring near the rotor-
craft limits of performance
•Check for undesirable couplings between the longitudinal and lateral-directional axes
•Check for harmony between the heave axis and pitch axis controllers
B.1.2 Description of Manoeuvre
The manoeuvre starts from a stabilised hover. In a GVE, rapidly increase power to
approximately maximum, maintaining altitude constant with pitch attitude, and hold
collective constant during the acceleration to an airspeed of 40 knots. Upon reaching
the target airspeed, initiate a deceleration by aggressively reducing the power and
holding altitude constant with pitch attitude. The peak nose-up attitude should occur
just before reaching the final stabilised hover. Complete the manoeuvre in a stabilised
hover for 5 seconds over the reference point at the end of the course.
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B.1.3 Description of Test Course
The test course is shown in the figure below. The desired track is indicated by a series
of cones alone the centre-line of the course, with markers to the left and right indicating
the boundaries of desired and adequate lateral tracking performance.
Table B.1: Accel-Decel Performance Standards (from ADS-33).
Performance Desired
Perfor-
mance
Adequate
Perfor-
mance
Within X seconds from initiation of the manoeuvre,
achieve at least the greater of 95% maximum contin-
uous power or 95% maximum transient limit that can
be sustained for the required acceleration, whichever
is greater. If the 95% power results in objectionable
pitch attitudes, use the power corresponding to the
maximum nose-down pitch attitude that is felt to be
acceptable. This pitch attitude shall be considered as
a limit of the OFE for NOE flying
1.5 3
Maintain altitude below X feet 50 70
Maintain lateal track within X feet 10 20
Maintain heading within X◦ 10 20
Decrease power to less than 5% within X seconds to
intiate deceleration
3 5
Significant increase in power are not allowed until just
before the final stabilised hover
30 10
Longitudinal tolerance on the final hover point is X
feet
21 42
Rotor RPM shall remain within the limits of X with-
out undue pilot compensation
OFE SFE
B.2 Lateral Reposition/Sidestep
B.2.1 Objectives
•Check roll axis and heave axis handling qualities during moderately aggressive ma-
noeuvring.
•Check for undesirable coupling between the roll controller and the other axes.
•With an external load, check for dynamic problem resulting from the external load
configuration.
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Figure B.1: Accel-Decel.
B.2.2 Description of Manoeuvre
The test course shall consist of any reference lines or markers on the ground indicating
the desired track and tolerances for the acceleration and deceleration, and markers to
denote the starting and endpoint of the manoeuvre. The course should also include
reference lines or markers parallel to the course reference line to allow the pilot and
observers to perceive the desired and adequate longitudinal tracking performance.
Table B.2: Side Step Performance Standards.
Performance Desired
Perfor-
mance
Adequate
Perfor-
mance
Maintain longitudinal track within X feet 10 20
Maintain heading within X◦ 10 15
Maintain altitude within X feet 10 15
Complete the manoeuvre within X seconds 18 22
B.3 Precision Hover
B.3.1 Objectives
•Check ability to transition from translating flight to a stabilised hover with precision
and a reasonable amount of aggressiveness
•Check ability to maintain precise position, heading and altitude
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Figure B.2: Lateral Reposition/ Sidestep.
B.3.2 Description of Manoeuvre
The manoeuvre is initiated with the aircraft travelling at a ground speed of between
6 and 10 knots, at an altitude of less than 20 feet. The target hover point is to be
oriented at 45◦ relative to the heading of the rotorcraft. The ground track should be
such that the rotorcraft will arrive over the target hover point. The hover should be
captured in one smooth manoeuvre following the initiation of deceleration it is not
acceptable to accomplish most of the deceleration well before the hover point and then
to ‘creep up’ to the final position.
B.3.3 Performance Standards
Table B.3: Precision Hover Performance Standards.
Performance Desired
Perfor-
mance
Adequate
Perfor-
mance
Attain stabilised hover within X seconds of initiation
of deceleration
5 8
Maintain a stabilised hover for at least X seconds 30 30
Maintain the longitudinal and lateral position within
X feet on the ground
3 6
Maintain altitude within X feet 5 10
There shall be no objectionable oscillations during the
transition to hover or during the stabilised hover
Applies Does not
apply
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Figure B.3: Precision Hover.
B.4 Vertical Manoeuvre
B.4.1 Objectives
•Check for adequate heave damping, i.e the ability to precisely start and stop vertical
rate
•Check for undesirable coupling between collective and the pitch, roll and yaw axis
B.4.2 Description of Manoeuvre
From a stabilised hover at an altitude of 15ft, initiate a vertical ascent of 25ft, stabilise
for two seconds, then descend back to the initial hover position.
B.4.3 Description of Test Course
The course consists of poles sighted around two hover boards. Pilots can use the poles
to determine their performance. Each stripe on the poles represents a 10ft height incre-
ment. Two hover boards are positioned 25 ft apart, with the manoeuvre commencing
with the sight reference contained within the lower hover board and the helicopter
stationed above the hover marker.
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Figure B.4: Vertical Manoeuvre.
B.4.4 Performance Standards
Table B.4: Vertical Manoeuvre Performance Standards.
Performance Moderate
Aggression
High Ag-
gression
Maintain the longitudinal and lateral position within
X feet of a point on the ground
3 ft 6 ft
Maintain start/finish altitude within X ft 3 ft 3 ft
Maintain heading within X deg 5 deg 3 deg
Complete the manoeuvre within X seconds 13 10
Performance Moderate
Aggression
High Ag-
gression
Maintain the longitudinal and lateral position within
X feet of a point on the ground
6 ft 10 ft
Maintain start/finish altitude within X ft 6 ft 6 ft
Maintain heading within X deg 10 deg 6 deg
Complete the manoeuvre within X seconds 18 15
B.5 Slalom
B.5.1 Objectives
•Check ability to manoeuvre aggressively in forward flight and with respect to objects
on the ground.
•Check turn coordination for moderately aggressive forward flight manoeuvring.
•Check for objectionable inter-axis coupling during moderately aggressive forward flight
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manoeuvring
B.5.2 Description of Manoeuvre
Initiate the manoeuvre in level un-accelerated flight and lined up with the centreline of
the test course. Perform a series of smooth turns at 500 ft intervals (at least twice each
side of the course). The turns shall be at least 50ft from the centreline, with a maximum
lateral error of 50 ft. The manoeuvre is to be accomplished below the reference altitude.
Complete the manoeuvre on the centreline in straight and coordinated flight.
B.5.3 Description of Test Course
The test course consists of vertical poles denoting ‘gates’ for the slalom. It is suggested
that the pilot travels through the left gate if it is red, and the right gate if it blue. The
course has been made of variable length and width to allow tuning if required. There
are also additional tests to be completed with a wall on either side of the slalom. This
is to observe the effects of boundaries on performance.
Figure B.5: Slalom Schematic.
B.5.4 Performance Standards
Table B.5: Slalom Performance Standards.
Performance Desired
Perfor-
mance
Adequate
Perfor-
mance
Maintain an airspeed of at least X knots throughout
the course
60 40
Accomplish manoeuvre below reference altitude of X
ft
100 100
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B.6 Roll Step
B.6.1 Objectives
•Check ability to manoeuvre in forward flight with respect to the ground level.
•Check roll and heave co-ordination.
•Check turn co-ordination for moderately aggressive forward flight manoeuvring.
•Check for objectionable inter-axis coupling during moderately aggressive forward flight
manoeuvring.
B.6.2 Description of Manoeuvre
Both sides of a 200ft wide runway are flanked by a series of coloured gates 500ft apart,
Depending on flight mode and speed, the pilot is required to fly through an ordered
series of these gates which form the roll-step task. The manoeuvre requires the pilot to
traverse the runway over the specified distance. When passing through each of these
gates the pilot must meet a set of performance criteria, which do not vary with aircraft
mode or speed. The manoeuvre starts with a constant forward flight condition lined
up with the left edge of the test course at 30ft.
B.6.3 Description of Test Course
The course cosists of a series of gates, spaced along a runway.
Figure B.6: Roll Step Schematic.
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B.6.4 Performance Standards
Table B.6: Roll Step Performance Standards.
Performance Desired
Perfor-
mance
Adequate
Perfor-
mance
Lateral Deviation (through gates) 15ft 30ft
Speed Deviation 5 kts 10 kts
Heading Deviation (through gates) 10 deg 15 deg
Roll Attitude (through gates) 5 deg 10 deg
Height Deviation 10 ft 15 ft
B.7 Roll Tracking
Figure B.7 shows the pilot view of the Roll Tracking task. The task is displayed to the
pilot through the use of the head-up display within the simulator.
Figure B.7: View of the Head Up Display used for the Roll Tracking Task.
•Aircraft Bar. This bar remains fixed to the aircraft body axis and provides an
indication to the pilot of the aircraft roll angle in relation to the outside world.
•Command Bar. This bar is independent of the aircraft body axis and is fixed with
respect to the inertial or earth axis system.
•Adequate Performance Marker Bars. These bars are set at an angle of 8 to the centre
of the aircraft bar and would flash from between two and zero seconds prior to the next
command bar angle change.
The pilot’s task is to maintain alignment between the aircraft and command bars
as far as practicable. The ‘alignment’ will be judged satisfactory if the aircraft bar lay
between the adequate performance marker bars. Prior to the adequate bars starting
to flash, this level of alignment must be achieved. The command bar sequence is
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pre-determined, and four different sequences are used, to prevent pilots from learning
defined sequences.
B.8 Pitch Tracking
B.8.1 Objectives
•Check ability to capture new flight attitude.
•Check for RPCs in the pitch axis following change in attitude, and ability to maintain
new flight attitude within defined tolerances.
•Check control sensitivity and gearing for longitudinal manoeuvring
B.8.2 Description of Manoeuvre
Figure B.8 shows the Head Up Display used for the pitch tracking task. Figure B.9
shows an example of the boundaries used during the pitch tracking task.
Figure B.8: Pitch Tracking.
The pilot is required to position the aircraft boresight (denoted by A in B.8) within
the boundaries (B, C) which are located a visual angle of 5 degrees apart. At 5 second
intervals, the boundaries will instantaneously move to a new vertical position on the
visual scene. The pilot is required to reposition the boresight within the boundaries
within 2 seconds, and stabilise for the remaining 3 seconds. The test run with varying
boundary repositions, each lasting approximately 40 seconds.
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Figure B.9: Example of Pitch Tracking boundary C1.
B.8.3 Performance Standards
The Performance Standards for the Pitch Tracking manoeuvre are shown in Table B.7.
As shown, for both Adequate and Desired performance, pilots were required to capture
the new pitch attitude within 2 seconds. This is to force the aggression of the task, and
to ensure that RPC tendencies are exposed. For adequate performance, pilots were
allowed to overshoot the desired attitude on capture. During the task, the aircraft
attitude can be held at any point within the boundaries. As the pilot does not have
prior knowledge of the sequence used, this should not offer any advantage during task
completion.
Table B.7: Pitch Tracking Performance Standards.
Performance Desired
Perfor-
mance
Adequate
Perfor-
mance
Capture Pitch Attitude 2secs 2secs
Overshoot on Capture No Allowable
Pitch Attitude ±5 deg ±10 deg
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Appendix C
Detailed Subjective Ratings
The following section details all subjective ratings obtained during the investigations.
These are shown alongside vehicle configuration and predictions for reference. All pilot
comments are also shown, to give justification to the ratings.
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Table C.1: Pitch Tracking Results - Pilot G
Pilot Case Number Course Rate Lim. SAS
(O/X)
Pred. HQR PIO Comments
G PT − PG− 1 1 30 O - 3 4
G PT − PG− 2 3 30 O - 3 4
G PT − PG− 3 1 20 O CAT. II 2 2
G PT − PG− 4 2 20 X CAT. II 6 4
G PT − PG− 5 3 20 O CAT. II 6 4
G PT − PG− 6 3 10 X CAT. II 6 4
G PT − PG− 7 2 30 X CAT. I 6 4
G PT − PG− 8 1 10 O CAT. II 7 4
G PT − PG− 9 1 30 X CAT. I 5 4
G PT − PG− 10 2 10 O CAT. II 7 4
G PT − PG− 11 3 30 X - 5 4
G PT − PG− 12 2 10 X CAT. II 9 6
G PT − PG− 13 2 20 O CAT. II 6 4
G PT − PG− 14 3 20 X CAT. II 6 4
G PT − PG− 15 1 10 X CAT. II 6 4
G PT − PG− 16 2 30 O - 7 4
G PT − PG− 17 3 10 O CAT. II 9 6
G PT − PG− 18 1 20 X CAT. II 6 4
G PT − PG− 19 1 50 O - 2 1
G PT − PG− 20 2 50 O - 4 4
G PT − PG− 21 1 50 O - 4 3
Table C.2: Pitch Tracking Results - Pilot H
Pilot Case Number Course Rate Lim. SAS
(O/X)
Pred. HQR PIO Comments
H PT − PH − 1 1 30 O - 5 4
H PT − PH − 2 3 30 O - 4 4
H PT − PH − 3 1 20 O CAT. II 5 4
H PT − PH − 4 2 20 X CAT. II 6 4
H PT − PH − 5 3 20 O CAT. II 4 4
H PT − PH − 6 3 10 X CAT. II 7 4
H PT − PH − 7 2 30 X CAT. I 4 4
H PT − PH − 8 1 10 O CAT. II 8 5
H PT − PH − 9 1 30 X CAT. I 6 4
H PT − PH − 10 2 10 O CAT. II 5 4
H PT − PH − 11 3 30 X - 5 4
H PT − PH − 12 2 10 X CAT. II 5 4
H PT − PH − 13 2 20 O CAT. II 4 4
H PT − PH − 14 3 20 X CAT. II 5 4
H PT − PH − 15 1 10 X CAT. II 6 5
H PT − PH − 16 2 30 O - 4 4
H PT − PH − 17 3 10 O CAT. II 4 4
H PT − PH − 18 1 20 X CAT. II 5 4
H PT − PH − 19 1 50 O - 3 4
H PT − PH − 20 2 50 O - 4 4
H PT − PH − 21 1 50 O - 3 4
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Table C.3: Pitch Tracking Results - Pilot A
Pilot Case Number Course Rate Lim. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred. HQR PIO Comments
A PT − PA− 1 1 20 0 NO - -
A PT − PA− 2 1 20 0 NO - -
A PT − PA− 3 1 20 0 NO 5 3
A PT − PA− 4 1 10 0 NO - -
A PT − PA− 5 1 10 0 NO 3 -
A PT − PA− 6 1 5 0 CAT. II - -
A PT − PA− 7 1 5 0 CAT. II 5 3
A PT − PA− 8 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
A PT − PA− 9 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
A PT − PA− 10 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 7 5
A PT − PA− 11 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
A PT − PA− 12 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 9 6
Table C.4: Pitch Tracking Results - Pilot B
Pilot Case Number Course Rate Lim. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred. HQR PIO Comments
B PT − PB − 1 1 20 0 NO - -
B PT − PB − 2 1 20 0 NO 3 2
B PT − PB − 3 1 20 0 NO - -
B PT − PB − 4 1 10 0 NO - -
B PT − PB − 5 1 10 0 NO 4 4
B PT − PB − 6 1 5 0 CAT. II - -
B PT − PB − 7 1 5 0 CAT. II 4 1
B PT − PB − 8 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
B PT − PB − 9 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 5 4
B PT − PB − 10 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
B PT − PB − 11 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 5 4
B PT − PB − 12 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
B PT − PB − 13 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 4 1
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Table C.5: Pitch Tracking Results - Pilot C
Pilot Case Number Course Rate Lim. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred. HQR PIO Comments
C PT − PC − 1 1 20 0 NO - -
C PT − PC − 2 1 20 0 NO 3 1
C PT − PC − 3 1 10 0 NO 3 2
C PT − PC − 4 1 10 0 NO 3 2
C PT − PC − 5 1 5 0 CAT. II - -
C PT − PC − 6 1 5 0 CAT. II 3 2
C PT − PC − 7 1 5 0 CAT. II - -
C PT − PC − 8 1 5 0 CAT. II - -
C PT − PC − 9 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
C PT − PC − 10 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 6 4
C PT − PC − 11 1 5 200 CAT. II - -
C PT − PC − 12 1 5 200 CAT. II 5 3
C PT − PC − 13 1 2.5 200 CAT. II - -
C PT − PC − 14 1 2.5 200 CAT. II 8 5
C PT − PC − 15 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
C PT − PC − 16 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 5 3
Table C.6: Pitch Tracking Results - Pilot D
Pilot Case Number Course Rate Lim. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred. HQR PIO Comments
D PT − PD − 1 1 20 0 NO - -
D PT − PD − 2 1 20 0 NO 3 2 Easy to control
D PT − PD − 3 1 10 0 NO - -
D PT − PD − 4 1 10 0 NO 3 2 Desired still achievable
D PT − PD − 5 1 5 0 NO - -
D PT − PD − 6 1 5 0 CAT. II 4 2
D PT − PD − 7 1 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
D PT − PD − 8 1 2.5 0 CAT. II 5 3 Prone to PIO, but not ‘real’
D PT − PD − 9 3 2.5 0 CAT. II - -
D PT − PD − 10 3 2.5 0 CAT. II 4 3 Performance requires com-
pensation. PIO-wise, over-
shoots
D PT − PD − 11 1 20 200 CAT. I - -
D PT − PD − 12 1 20 200 CAT. I 5 3 Went just into adequate,
close to HQR 6
D PT − PD − 13 1 10 200 CAT. I - -
D PT − PD − 14 1 10 200 CAT. I 4 3 Model looked like previous
D PT − PD − 15 1 5 200 CAT. II - -
D PT − PD − 16 1 5 200 CAT. II 4 3
D PT − PD − 17 1 2.5 200 CAT. II - -
D PT − PD − 18 1 2.5 200 CAT. II 5 3
D PT − PD − 19 1 2.5 200 CAT. II - -
D PT − PD − 20 1 2.5 200 CAT. II 6 3
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Table C.7: Precision Hover Results - Pilot A
Pilot Case Number Cse. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Lat.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred.
(CAT.I)
HQR PIO WLR Comments
A PH − PA− 1 1 0 0 NO - - -
A PH − PA− 2 1 0 0 NO - - -
A PH − PA− 3 1 0 0 NO - - -
A PH − PA− 4 1 0 0 NO 3 1 3 Achieved desired, enough
spare capacity
A PH − PA− 5 1 0 200 NO - - -
A PH − PA− 6 1 0 200 NO - - -
A PH − PA− 7 1 0 200 NO 4 2 4 Edge of desired perfor-
mance, mostly on heading
A PH − PA− 8 1 200 200 LONG - - - Task performance effected
but not compromised.
Marked by delay
A PH − PA− 9 1 200 200 LONG - - - Seems like cliff edge configu-
ration, PIO incipient
A PH − PA− 10 1 200 200 LONG 5 4 6 Performance requires com-
pensation. PIO-wise, over-
shoots
A PH − PA− 11 1 100 0 NO - - No initial problems
A PH − PA− 12 1 100 0 NO N/A 1 3
A PH − PA− 13 1 100 200 NO - - Benine motion cues, vehicle
motion feels different
A PH − PA− 14 1 100 200 NO 3 1 3 Relatively low workload,
highest workload was on
capture
A PH − PA− 15 1 200 0 LONG - - -
A PH − PA− 16 1 200 0 LONG 4 3 5 Inital axis pitch, response
delay incipient, capture rel-
atively benine, would be in-
teresting in the DVE, force
the gain
A PH − PA− 17 1 100 400 LAT 6 4 6 HQR for brief periods only,
Reduction in gain is required
A PH − PA− 18 1 200 400 LONG
/LAT
- - -
A PH − PA− 19 1 200 400 LONG
/LAT
6 4 8 Marked cliff-edge, PIO for
anything but a reduction in
gain. Pilot held collective on
leg, to stop biodynamic feed-
back
A PH − PA− 20 1 0 400 LAT - - -
A PH − PA− 21 1 0 400 LAT - - -
A PH − PA− 22 1 0 400 LAT 5 3 5
A PH − PA− 23 1 200 200 LONG - - -
A PH − PA− 24 1 200 200 LONG - - -
A PH − PA− 25 1 200 200 LONG 8 5 10 Mostly oscillatory be-
haviour, not divergent but
uncomfortable. Break in
control required
A PH − PA− 26 1 0 0 NO - -
A PH − PA− 27 1 0 0 NO 7 3 9
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Table C.8: Precision Hover Results - Pilot B
Pilot Case Number Cse. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Lat.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred.
(CAT.I)
HQR PIO WLR Comments
B PH − PB − 1 1 0 0 NO - - -
B PH − PB − 2 1 0 0 NO - - -
B PH − PB − 3 1 0 0 NO - - -
B PH − PB − 4 1 0 0 NO 6(T)
3(H)
3 5(T)
2(H)
Hardest part of the manoeu-
vre is the translate
B PH − PB − 5 1 100 200 NO - - - Incipient PIO
B PH − PB − 6 1 100 200 NO 5 4 6 Translation slightly easier.
Non-divergent oscillations.
Most annoying axis - pitch.
B PH − PB − 7 1 0 200 NO - - -
B PH − PB − 8 1 0 200 LONG 5 4 5 Slightly less sensitive in all
axes. Gently oscillating
back out to stop undesirable
motions happening.
B PH − PB − 9 1 100 0 LONG - - -
B PH − PB − 10 1 100 0 LONG - - - Nice, no tendency to PIO
B PH − PB − 11 1 0 400 NO - - -
B PH − PB − 12 1 0 400 NO 6 5 7 Possibly experienced diver-
gence in roll. At times, per-
haps PIOR 6
B PH − PB − 13 1 0 0 NO - -
B PH − PB − 14 1 0 0 NO - - -
B PH − PB − 15 1 0 0 LONG - - - Slightly undamped in pitch.
Did not cause oscillations,
undesirable motions - yes
B PH − PB − 16 1 200 0 LONG - - -
B PH − PB − 17 1 200 0 LAT 5 4 5 Real problems experienced
in pitch
B PH − PB − 18 1 200 400 LONG
/LAT
- - - Divergence observed
B PH − PB − 19 1 200 400 LONG
/LAT
- - -
B PH − PB − 20 1 200 400 LAT 7 5 7 PIOR 5 when making ini-
tial translation. Cliff edge.
Once sorted, tighter control
in hover.
B PH − PB − 21 1 200 200 LAT - - -
B PH − PB − 22 1 200 200 LAT - - -
B PH − PB − 23 1 200 200 LONG 5 3 5 PIO based on pitch re-
sponse. At times, felt over-
sensitive
B PH − PB − 24 1 100 400 LONG - - -
B PH − PB − 25 1 100 400 LONG 6 4(P)
5(R)
6
B PH − PB − 26 1 200 200 NO - - - Tightened Aggression.
B PH − PB − 27 1 200 200 NO 7 5 8 Tightened Aggression.
Bucking bronco, PIO in
both axes hard to discrimi-
nate.
B PH − PB − 28 1 0 0 NO - - - Tightened Aggression.
B PH − PB − 29 1 0 0 NO 4 2 3 Tightened Aggression. Very
slight undesirable motion
B PH − PB − 30 1 100 400 NO - - -
B PH − PB − 31 1 100 400 NO 6 5 7 Had to release stick
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Table C.9: Precision Hover Results - Pilot C
Pilot Case Number Cse. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Lat.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred.
(CAT.I)
HQR PIO WLR Comments
C PH − PC − 1 1 0 0 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 2 1 0 0 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 3 1 0 0 NO 4 2 5
C PH − PC − 4 1 0 0 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 5 1 0 200 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 6 1 0 200 NO 3 2 3
C PH − PC − 7 1 200 200 LONG - - -
C PH − PC − 8 1 200 200 LONG - - -
C PH − PC − 9 1 200 200 LONG - - -
C PH − PC − 10 1 200 200 LONG 4 2 3 Not significantly different to
the previous run
C PH − PC − 11 1 100 0 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 12 1 100 0 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 13 1 100 0 NO 3 2 3 Easiest to fly so far. Tighter
control possible
C PH − PC − 14 1 0 0 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 15 1 0 0 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 16 1 0 0 NO 3 2 2 Some cross coupling effects
but to really a problem. Sat-
isfactory without improve-
ment
C PH − PC − 17 1 100 200 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 18 1 100 200 NO - - -
C PH − PC − 19 1 100 200 NO 3 2 3 There was a noticeable time
delay
C PH − PC − 20 1 200 0 LONG - - -
C PH − PC − 21 1 200 0 LONG - - -
C PH − PC − 22 1 200 0 LONG 3 2 3 Feels more damped, heave
axis delay. Not enough dif-
ference between PIOR 1-2-3
C PH − PC − 23 1 100 400 LAT - - -
C PH − PC − 24 1 100 400 LAT - - -
C PH − PC − 25 1 100 400 LAT 5 3 4 Moved out of the box. Ade-
quate performance only.
C PH − PC − 26 1 0 400 LAT - - -
C PH − PC − 27 1 0 400 LAT 4 2 3
C PH − PC − 28 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - -
C PH − PC − 29 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - -
C PH − PC − 30 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
5 3 4(5) Capture of hover was hard,
oscillatory. Initial cross
coupling induced a PIO.
Smaller inputs
C PH − PC − 31 1 200 200 LONG - - - Tightened boundaries
C PH − PC − 32 1 200 200 LONG 3 2 4(3) Tightened boundaries
C PH − PC − 33 1 0 0 NO - - - Tightened boundaries
C PH − PC − 34 1 0 0 NO 3 2 3(2) Tightened boundaries. (3)
for translation, (2) for Hover
C PH − PC − 35 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - - No Motion
C PH − PC − 36 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - - No Motion
C PH − PC − 37 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
5 3(4) 6(4) No Motion. Lateral oscilla-
tion, longer stabilisation
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Table C.10: Precision Hover Results - Pilot D
Pilot Case Number Cse. Long.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Lat.
Time
Delay
(ms)
Pred.
(CAT.I)
HQR PIO WLR Comments
D PH − PD − 1 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 2 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 3 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 4 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 5 1 0 0 NO 3 2 4(2) During decel, workload was
higher, Dropped signifi-
cantly during hover
D PH − PD − 6 1 0 200 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 7 1 0 200 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 8 1 0 200 NO 5 3 6(3) Workload 6 during decel
- During stop, experienced
slight oscillation
D PH − PD − 9 1 200 200 LONG - - -
D PH − PD − 10 1 200 200 LONG - - -
D PH − PD − 11 1 200 200 LONG 5 3 6(3) At stoping in cross, experi-
enced damped oscillation
D PH − PD − 12 1 100 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 13 1 100 0 NO - - -
D PH − PC − 14 1 100 0 NO 4 3 5(3) Feels a bit aggressive
D PH − PD − 15 1 100 200 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 16 1 100 200 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 17 1 100 200 NO 3(4) 2 5(3) It feels less damped, pilot us-
ing less gain
D PH − PD − 18 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 19 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 20 1 0 0 NO 3 2 5(3)
D PH − PD − 21 1 200 0 LONG - - -
D PH − PD − 22 1 200 0 LONG - - -
D PH − PD − 23 1 100 400 LAT 3 2 4(3) Motions are sensed and not
present
D PH − PD − 24 1 100 400 LAT - - -
D PH − PD − 25 1 100 400 LAT 4 2 5(3) Not sure if performance is
satisfactory. Oscillations on
first run, not divergent
D PH − PD − 26 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - -
D PH − PD − 27 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - - Need to be careful in roll
D PH − PD − 28 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
5 4 6
D PH − PD − 29 1 0 400 LAT - - -
D PH − PD − 30 1 0 400 LAT - - -
D PH − PD − 31 1 0 400 LAT 4 2 6
D PH − PD − 32 1 200 200 LONG - - - Tighter boundaries
D PH − PD − 33 1 200 200 LONG - - - Tighter boundaries
D PH − PD − 34 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 35 1 0 0 NO - - -
D PH − PD − 36 1 0 0 NO 5 3 6(4) Adequate not difficult
D PH − PD − 37 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - - No Motion
D PH − PD − 38 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
- - - No Motion
D PH − PD − 39 1 200 400 LONG/
LAT
6 4 6 No Motion. Stable but need
to keep attention
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Table C.11: Precision Hover Results - Pole Position 3 (75ft)
Pilot Case No. Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC Comments
A PHH − PA− 1 1 NO 3 1 1
A PHH − PA− 2 1 NO 2 1 1
C PHH − PC − 1 1 NO 3 2 1
D PHH − PD − 1 1 NO 3 2 1
E PHH − PE − 1 1 NO 4 2 2
E PHH − PE − 2 1 NO 4 2 2 Acquiring the hover point is dif-
ficult. One in the hover, mini-
mal compensation. Slight ten-
dency to overshoot.
A PHH − PA− 3 2 CAT.I 4 3 2 Balancing a marble on an upside
down bowl. Shallow bowl. Fre-
quency longitudinal higher than
lateral. Once reducing gain,
problem went away. Uncom-
fortable, higher pitch. Desired
performance, capture phase was
considerable.
C PHH − PC − 2 2 4 2 2
D PHH − PD − 2 2 4 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 3 2 3 2 2 Completely different parts to
MTE
A PHH − PA− 4 3 CAT.II 3 1 1 Once stable, no tendency for
problems, stable.
C PHH − PC − 3 3 3 2 2
D PHH − PD − 3 3 3 2 1
E PHH − PE − 4 3 4 2 2
A PHH − PA− 5 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5B Right on the edge of perfor-
mance, didn’t drift backwards.
Excursions extreme.
A PHH − PA− 6 4 7 3 7C Seemed to be a longitudinal
case. Stuck with the manoeu-
vre, control strategy, ballpark.
Will look good on video! I
didn’t break out of the loop, and
didn’t reduce gain. Want to say
PIOR 5, but tree gives PIOR 4,
and descriptor is PIOR 3
C PHH − PC − 4 4 5 3 3
D PHH − PD − 4 4 5 4 5C
E PHH − PE − 5 4 9 5 8E Clear divergent oscillations on
capture, didn’t feel as though
they were converging. Ade-
quate performance not attain-
able. Didn’t lose control,
marginal. Intense pilot com-
pensation required for control.
Oscillations only occurred when
begun tight tracking task
E PHH − PE − 6 4 9 5 8E Can get to the hover point. The
moment you are in tight track-
ing task, you cant get into the
MTE!
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Table C.12: Precision Hover Results - Pole Position 2 (40ft)
Pilot Case No. Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC Comments
A PHH − PA− 7 1 NO 4 1 2
C PHH − PC − 5 1 NO 5 3 3
C PHH − PC − 6 1 NO 5 3 3
D PHH − PD − 5 1 NO 5 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 7 1 NO 5 3 3 Tighter tracking task, tendency
to overshoot more obvious.
A PHH − PA− 8 2 CAT.I 5 4 5C Finding in hard to charac-
terise. Perceived delay, vehicle
response not crisp. Having qui-
escent periods.
C PHH − PC − 7 2 CAT.I 5 3 3 Bit of a delay, less damping.
D PHH − PD − 6 2 CAT.I 5 4 4C Oscillations during first run.
Could be suppressed through a
change in strategy.
A PHH − PA− 9 3 CAT.II 4 1 1
C PHH − PC − 8 3 CAT.II 5 2 2
D PHH − PD − 7 3 CAT.II 6 4 5B Stopping difficult.
E PHH − PE − 8 3 CAT.II 5 3 5B Clear oscillations, perception is
that achieved adequate perfor-
mance. Roll oscillations on cap-
ture, overshooting in both direc-
tions. In hover, minimal com-
pensation required
E PHH − PE − 9 3 CAT.II 5 3 5B
A PHH − PA− 10 4 CAT.I &II 9 5 7E Had to give up on the task to
stabilise the vehicle. Oscilla-
tions induced whilst in task, not
before. Highest possible rating
on PIOR scale = 5.
C PHH − PC − 9 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5C Oscillations not divergent, had
to reduce gain to recover.
D PHH − PD − 8 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5B
E PHH − PE − 10 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 8E Can’t get into the MTE. Can’t
even start to capture MTE.
Maintain control. As soon as
you come out of control loop, ve-
hicle stabilises.
E PHH − PE − 11 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 8E
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Table C.13: Precision Hover Results - Pole Position 1 (20ft)
Pilot Case No. Conf. Pred. HQR PIO APC Comments
A PHH − PA− 11 1 NO 5 1 1 Oscillatory response on capture, not sure
if response at start was PIO, think due to
apparent gain.
A PHH − PA− 12 1 NO 5 1 1
C PHH − PC − 10 1 NO 5 3 3 Bordering adequate, maintaining box is
easiest tolerance
D PHH − PD − 9 1 NO 7 4 5C Controllability not an issue. Oscillations
in heave axis, need to reduce collective.
Sensitive. Had oscillations, left, right, up,
down, made fewer control inputs.
E PHH − PE − 12 1 NO 4 3 2 Achieved desirable, really working quite
hard, in both pitch and roll.
A PHH − PA− 13 2 CAT.I 5 2 2 Tough, difficult manoeuvre, changes the
whole game bringing the pole inwards.
Rating second run only. Workload for
whole manoeuvre high.
C PHH − PC − 11 2 CAT.I 7 4 7D Severe oscillations, perhaps divergent.
Had to reduce gain.
C PHH − PC − 12 2 CAT.I 6 4 4A
D PHH − PD − 10 2 CAT.I 6 4 5B Hard to stop, oscillations in heave axis.
E PHH − PE − 13 2 CAT.I 7 4 7C Subtle on the old PIO scale
A PHH − PA− 14 3 CAT.II 5 3 3 Challenging. Felt like my hover gain sig-
nificantly increased. Well into adequate on
more than one occasion. One one occasion,
oscillatory, not sustained.
C PHH − PC − 13 3 CAT.II 5 4 4A Sensitive in heave, prone to up-and-down
motion. Not divergent. Reduce gain, oscil-
lations go away. Oscillations never get out
of hand. Well damped.
D PHH − PD − 11 3 CAT.II 6 4 5B Could get into adequate, desired no way.
Kept oscillating a bit at the end. Deficien-
cies, heave axis.
E PHH − PE − 14 3 CAT.II 6 3 7C Difference great between two scales.
Didn’t have to open the loop, or reduce
gain. On the traditional scale, really a
PIOR = 3.
A PHH − PA− 15 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 7D Change in strategy in PIO, change in gain.
No longer engage in MTE. Pilot driven
oscillations, making larger inputs, out of
phase. Damping and coupling way off tar-
get. Aprupt manoeuvre, capture cannot
be accurate. Trigger causes degradation in
control response characteristics.
C PHH − PC − 14 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 5B Pitch oscillation, clear, includes cross-
couplings, get in trouble. As soon as back
out, still in control.
C PHH − PC − 15 4 CAT.I &II 7 5 6C In roll, still in control. Vehicle swaying left
and right. Stayed in the loop, giving a ‘C’
D PHH − PD − 12 4 CAT.I &II 6 4 5C
D PHH − PD − 13 4 CAT.I &II 7 4 5D Assessing when to stop is difficult. Did not
have to freeze the stick, therefore it is a
4 on the old scale. Constant oscillations.
Moderate, as amplitude was not ‘huge’
D PHH − PD − 14 4 CAT.I &II 6 4 5C
E PHH − PE − 15 4 CAT.I &II 7 6 8 In control of the aircraft, but clearly a se-
vere PIO. Cannot enter task.
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Table C.14: Roll Step Results - Pilot A
Pilot Case No. Speed Cse., CONF. Pred. HQR PIO APC Comments
A RS − PA− 23 80 1, 1 NO 3 1 1 Largely visual manoeuvre, mo-
tion good, corrected heave a
couple of times.
A RS − PA− 25 80 1, 3 CAT.I 4 1 1 Desired tolerances flown - Big-
ger inputs. Delay on input.
Higher workload. Control mar-
gin - momentary only.
A RS − PA− 27 60 1, 3 CAT.I 2 1 1 Still some minor corrections,
predicable flight path.
A RS − PA− 29 60 3, 3 CAT.I 9 1 1 Performance too great, control
reversal, Pilot anxiety is too
high. PIO difficult to judge.
A RS − PA− 31 60 1, 9 CAT.II 3 1 1 Minimal compensation, re-
sponse to input delay, aggres-
sion level low. Commanded roll
rates reversal low gain.
A RS − PA− 32 60 2, 9 CAT.II 9 5 7D Control margins full stick - cliff
edge for someone who wants to
be accurate
A RS − PA− 35 80 1, 9 CAT.II 6 2 2 Adequate on first gate capture -
workload extensive. Stick mar-
gin issue. On capturing 2nd
gate - divergent
A RS − PA− 36 80 2, 9 CAT.II 8 - 5E Increasing the percieved aggres-
sion, control margin lost - tried
to capture bank angle. Broken
out of the loop, almost linear di-
vergent model before breaking
out. Beyond adequate.
A RS − PA− 38 80 2, 3 CAT.I 4 1 1 Achievable, didnt percieve PIO.
Oscillations throughout. Rea-
sonable hard.
A RS − PA− 48 80 1, 1 NO 3 1 1 Collective to roll coupling.
Flight path control good.
Predictable
A RS − PA− 50 60 1, 1 NO 2 1 1
A RS − PA− 52 60 3, 1 NO 4 1 1 Touching full left from right to
left. Stick migrated to the left
A RS − PA− 54 60 1, 3 CAT.I 4 1 1
A RS − PA− 56 60 1, 9 CAT.II 6 3 5C Deficiencies with first capture,
initial response type turning
left-right.
A RS − PA− 57 60 1, 9 CAT.II 3 1 1 Inputs down from first runs.
Strategy was different.
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Table C.15: Roll Step Results - Pilot C
Pilot Case No. Speed Cse., CONF. Pred. HQR PIO APC Comments
C RS − PC − 30 80 1, 1 NO 5 1 3 Think achieving speed. Heading
ok
C RS − PC − 33 60 1, 1 NO 3 1 2 Maintained desired perfor-
mance. Minimal compensation,
as far as can tell, within
performance criteria.
C RS − PC − 36 60 1, 3 CAT.I 4 2 2,3 Roll and height, not sure about,
managed to get close to desired.
C RS − PC − 39 60 3, 3 CAT.I 5 2 3 Not desired, find it difficult to
judge the performance. Not in
tight control
C RS − PC − 42 80 1, 9 CAT.II 7 4 5A Went well outside adequate.
Had to reduce gain to suppress
C RS − PC − 45 60 3, 9 CAT.II 5 3 3 Outside of desired, roll atti-
tude especially. But control-
lable. Task performance com-
promised.
C RS − PC − 46 80 3, 9 CAT.II 8 4 8E Leg restricting, considerable
compensation. But control-
lable.
C RS − PC − 49 80 3, 9 CAT.II 7 4 7C Didnt get adequate performance
C RS − PC − 49b 80 1, 1 NO 5 3 3 Not sure about performance,
turn a bit too soon
C RS − PC − 51 80 2, 1 NO 5 3 3
C RS − PC − 52 80 2, 9 CAT.II 8 4 7E
C RS − PC − 54 80 2, 9 CAT.II 5 4 5C Reduced gain to dampen out os-
cillations
C RS − PC − 56 60 2, 9 CAT.II 5 3 3 Adequate, not desired
C RS − PC − 58 60 4, 9 CAT.II 5 3 3 Roll a bit more snappy, more
prone to height loss. Not much
difference in handling
C RS − PC − 60 80 2, 3 CAT.I 7 3 3 Missed performance, overshot.
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Table C.16: Roll Step Results - Pilot D
Pilot Case No. Speed Cse., CONF. Pred. HQR PIO APC Comments
D RS − PD − 6 80 1, 1 NO 6 3 3 Not sure whether in adequate,
bit off, later rolling wings level.
Model feels quite good, still
learning
D RS − PD − 7 80 1, 1 NO 6 2 3 Edge of adequate. Stick hitting
leg. No real oscillitory things
going on. Get some motions in
pitch
D RS − PD − 9 60 1, 1 NO 5 2 3 Too low on the second one.
First turn, bit of a pitch change.
D RS − PD − 11 60 1, 1 NO 5 2 3 Blame the motions or the pilot?
D RS − PD − 13 60 1, 3 CAT.I 7 3 3 Dont feel the model is doing
anything strange. Undesirable
motions
D RS − PD − 14 60 1, 3 CAT.I 4 1,2 1 Pilot couplings
D RS − PD − 17 60 3, 3 CAT.I 6 2 2 Have to work hard to get
through the gates. No oscilli-
tory things going on. Not ob-
vious, height control is difficult
during the turns.
D RS − PD − 19 80 1, 9 CAT.II - 4 4A Tiny oscillation, which was
damped out
D RS − PD − 20 80 1, 9 CAT.II 6 3 3 Close to adequate. Control in
roll is difficult, slight delay, bit
sluggish in roll.
D RS − PD − 22 60 1, 9 CAT.II 5 2 2 Difficult to get a feel for the
power settings. Bit high out of
the gate
D RS − PD − 24 60 3, 9 CAT.II 5 2 2 Adequate performance, doesnt
really roll through, no oscilla-
tions, undesirable motions
D RS − PD − 122 80 1, 1 NO 6 1 1
D RS − PD − 124 80 2, 1 NO 7 2 1 Going crooked through the
gates, performance compro-
mised
D RS − PD − 126 60 2, 9 CAT.II 8 4 7D Feel that there is quite a delay.
Not an oscillation going, but a
huge overshoot. Hard to catch
D RS − PD − 128 60 2, 9 CAT.II 5 1 1 Track just out of desired. Much
nicer model that the last one.
Need to work quite hard to get
through the gates
D RS − PD − 129 60 4, 9 CAT.II - - 8E Fail- abandon
D RS − PD − 130 80 4, 9 CAT.II 8 4 8D Need a lot of compensation not
to crash - used open-loop con-
trol strategy
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Table C.17: Roll Step Results - Pilot E
Pilot Case No. Speed Cse., CONF. Pred. HQR PIO APC Comments
E RS − PE − 8 80 1, 3 CAT.I 5 3 5A
E RS − PE − 11 60 3, 3 CAT.I 9 2 2 Havent got control, recover sit-
uation, failing to achieve ade-
quate. Motion not entirely re-
alistic
E RS − PE − 12 60 3, 3 CAT.I 6 3 5B
E RS − PE − 13 60 1, 3 CAT.I 5 2 3 Adequate performance, consid-
erable compensation
E RS − PE − 14 60 1, 3 CAT.I 4 2 2 First desired performance
E RS − PE − 16 60 1, 9 CAT.II 10 5 8
E RS − PE − 18 80 1, 9 CAT.II 10 5 8 Crash- stopped
E RS − PE − 19 80 1, 1 NO 4 2 2 Motions only, strong oscillitory
E RS − PE − 61 80 1, 1 NO 2 1 1 Good speed, good control re-
sponse
E RS − PE − 63 60 1, 1 NO 1 1 1 Not using pedal
E RS − PE − 64 60 3, 1 NO 3 1 1 No noticeable PIO
E RS − PE − 67 60 1, 3 CAT.I 4 2 4A Visual delay, 1-2 Hz oscillations
E RS − PE − 69 80 3, 3 CAT.I 5 3 5B Clear more severe oscillations,
both similar, still acheiving de-
sired performance.
E RS − PE − 71 60 1, 9 CAT.II 7 4 7E Only when coming out of the
loop, does the oscillation sup-
press
E RS − PE − 73 80 1, 9 CAT.II 8 4 7E
E RS − PE − 75 80 1, 3 CAT.I 4 2 4A Think achieved desired perfor-
mance, with moderate compen-
sation
E RS − PE − 77 80 1, 3 CAT.I 3 2 2
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Appendix D
PAC Correlation
The following section shows all PAC results, and the correlation with respect to pilot
subjective ratings.
D.1 Roll Step
Table D.1: Roll Step Results Correlation - Pilot A.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
RS − PA− 23 A 80 1 1 NO 3 1 YES B
RS − PA− 25 A 80 5 1 MOD. 4 1 NO C
RS − PA− 27 A 60 5 1 NO 2 1 YES B
RS − PA− 29 A 60 5 3 SEV. 9 1 NO C
RS − PA− 31 A 60 6 1 SEV. 3 1 NO C
RS − PA− 32 A 60 6 2 SEV. 9 7D YES D
RS − PA− 35 A 80 6 1 SEV. 6 2 NO C
RS − PA− 36 A 80 6 2 SEV. 8 5D YES D
RS − PA− 37 A 80 6 2 SEV. 4 1 NO C
RS − PA− 48 A 80 1 1 NO 3 1 YES B
RS − PA− 50 A 60 1 1 NO 2 1 YES B
RS − PA− 52 A 60 1 1 NO 2 1 YES B
RS − PA− 54 A 60 5 1 MOD. 4 1 NO C
RS − PA− 56 A 60 6 1 MOD. 6 5C YES D
RS − PA− 57 A 60 6 1 NO 3 1 YES B
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Table D.2: Roll Step Results Correlation - Pilot C.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
RS − PC − 30 C 80 1 1 NO 5 3 YES B
RS − PC − 33 C 60 1 1 NO 3 2 YES B
RS − PC − 36 C 60 5 1 NO 4 3 YES B
RS − PC − 39 C 60 5 3 MOD. 5 3 NO C
RS − PC − 42 C 80 6 1 SEV. 7 5A YES D
RS − PC − 45 C 60 6 3 MOD. 5 3 NO C
RS − PC − 46 C 80 6 3 SEV. 8 8E YES D
RS − PC − 49 C 80 6 3 SEV. 7 7C YES D
RS − PC − 49b C 80 1 1 NO - - YES B
RS − PC − 51 C 80 1 2 NO 5 3 YES B
RS − PC − 52 C 80 6 2 SEV. 8 7E YES D
RS − PC − 54 C 80 6 2 MOD. 5 5C YES D
RS − PC − 56 C 60 6 2 NO 5 3 YES B
RS − PC − 58 C 60 6 4 MOD. 5 3 NO C
RS − PC − 60 C 80 5 2 MOD. 7 3 NO C
RS − PC − 62 C 80 6 2 MOD. 7 5B YES D
RS − PC − 63 C 80 6 2 SEV. 8 8E YES D
RS − PC − 65 C 80 6 2 MOD. 7 6D YES D
RS − PC − 67 C 60 6 2 MOD. 5 3 NO C
RS − PC − 69 C 60 6 4 SEV. 10 9 YES D
RS − PC − 70 C 60 6 4 SEV. 7 6D YES D
RS − PC − 71 C 60 6 4 MOD. 7 5C YES D
Table D.3: Roll Step Results Correlation - Pilot D.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
RS − PD − 6 D 80 1 1 NO 6 3 YES B
RS − PD − 7 D 80 1 1 NO 6 3 YES B
RS − PD − 9 D 60 1 1 NO 5 3 YES B
RS − PD − 11 D 60 1 1 NO 5 3 YES B
RS − PD − 13 D 60 5 1 MOD. 7 3 NO C
RS − PD − 14 D 60 5 1 NO 4 1 YES B
RS − PD − 17 D 60 5 3 MOD. 6 2 NO C
RS − PD − 19 D 80 6 1 MOD. - 4A YES D
RS − PD − 20 D 80 6 1 MOD. 6 3 NO C
RS − PD − 22 D 60 6 1 MOD. 5 2 NO C
RS − PD − 24 D 60 6 3 MOD. 5 2 NO C
RS − PD − 122 D 80 1 1 NO 6 1 YES B
RS − PD − 124 D 80 1 2 NO 7 1 YES B
RS − PD − 125 D 80 6 2 SEV. - 7E YES D
RS − PD − 126 D 80 6 2 SEV. 8 7D YES D
RS − PD − 128 D 60 6 2 MOD. 5 1 NO C
RS − PD − 129 D 60 6 4 SEV. - 8E YES D
RS − PD − 130 D 60 6 4 SEV. 8 8D YES D
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Table D.4: Roll Step Results Correlation - Pilot E.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
RS − PE − 8 E 80 5 1 SEV. 5 5A YES D
RS − PE − 11 E 60 5 3 SEV. 9 2 NO C
RS − PE − 12 E 60 5 3 SEV. 6 5B YES D
RS − PE − 13 E 60 5 1 SEV. 5 3 NO C
RS − PE − 14 E 60 5 1 SEV. 4 2 NO C
RS − PE − 16 E 60 6 1 SEV. 10 8 YES D
RS − PE − 18 E 80 6 1 SEV. 10 8 YES D
RS − PE − 61 E 80 1 1 NO 2 1 YES B
RS − PE − 63 E 60 1 1 NO 1 1 YES B
RS − PE − 64 E 60 1 1 NO 3 1 YES B
RS − PE − 67 E 60 5 1 MOD. 4 4A YES D
RS − PE − 69 E 60 5 3 SEV. 5 5B YES D
RS − PE − 71 E 60 6 1 MOD. 7 7E YES D
RS − PE − 73 E 80 6 1 SEV. 8 7E YES D
D.2 Precision Hover
Table D.5: Hover Results Correlation - Pilot A.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
PHH − PA− 45 A - 5 1 NO 3 1 YES B
PHH − PA− 47 A - 2 3 NO 5 5C NO A
PHH − PA− 49 A - 0 7 YES 5 3 NO C
PHH − PA− 51 A - 5 10 MOD* 7 5B YES D
PHH − PA− 54 A - 0 1 NO 5 1 YES B
PHH − PA− 56 A - 2 7 NO 4 1 YES B
PHH − PA− 58 A - 2 1 NO 4 2 YES B
PHH − PA− 60 A - 0 10 SEV 7 7D YES D
PHH − PA− 79 A - 5 1 NO 2 1 YES B
PHH − PA− 81 A - 0 1 NO 5 1 YES B
PHH − PA− 82 A - 5 3 NO 4 2 YES B
PHH − PA− 84 A - 5 7 NO 3 1 YES B
PHH − PA− 86 A - 0 3 NO 5 2 YES B
PHH − PA− 88 A - 2 10 SEV 9 8E YES D
PHH − PA− 90 A - 5 10 MOD* 7 7C YES D
PHH − PA− 79 A - 5 1 NO 4 1 YES B
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Table D.6: Hover Results Correlation - Pilot C.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
PHH − PC − 74 C - 5 1 NO 3 1 YES B
PHH − PC − 76 C - 5 3 NO 4 2 YES B
PHH − PC − 78 C - 2 7 NO 4,5 2 YES B
PHH − PC − 80 C - 5 10 NO 5 3 YES B
PHH − PC − 82 C - 2 10 MOD 7 5C YES D
PHH − PC − 84 C - 2 1 NO 5 3 YES B
PHH − PC − 86 C - 0 3 NO 7 7C NO A
PHH−PC−106 C - 2 1 NO 5 3 YES B
PHH−PC−107 C - 0 3 MOD 7 5A YES D
PHH−PC−109 C - 0 3 NO 6 4A NO A
PHH−PC−111 C - 0 7 NO 5 4A NO A
PHH−PC−112 C - 0 10 NO 7 5B NO A
PHH−PC−113 C - 0 10 MOD 7 6C YES D
PHH−PC−115 C - 5 7 NO 3 2 YES B
PHH−PC−117 C - 2 3 NO 5 3 YES B
PHH−PC−119 C - 0 1 NO 5 3 YES B
Table D.7: Hover Results Correlation - Pilot E.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
PHH − PD − 53 D - 5 1 NO 3 1 YES B
PHH − PD − 55 D - 5 7 NO 3 1 YES B
PHH − PD − 56 D - 2 3 NO - 4C NO A
PHH − PD − 57 D - 2 3 NO 5 3 YES B
PHH − PD − 59 D - 5 10 NO 5 5B NO A
PHH − PD − 61 D - 0 7 NO 6 5B NO A
PHH − PD − 64 D - 0 10 NO 6 5C NO A
PHH − PD − 65 D - 0 10 NO 7 5D NO A
PHH − PD − 67 D - 0 3 NO 6 5B NO A
PHH − PD − 69 D - 2 7 NO 6 5B NO A
PHH − PD − 88 D - 2 1 NO 5 5B NO A
PHH − PD − 90 D - 5 3 NO 4 5B NO A
PHH − PD − 93 D - 2 10 NO 7 5B NO A
PHH − PD − 95 D - 0 10 NO 6 5C NO A
PHH−PD−101 D - 5 3 NO 4 5B NO A
PHH−PD−103 D - 0 1 NO 7 5C NO A
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Table D.8: Hover Results Correlation - Pilot E.
Case No. Pilot Speed Conf. Course PAC HQR APC Corr. Index
PHH − PE − 41 E - 5 1 NO 4,3 2 YES B
PHH − PE − 61 E - 5 1 NO 4 2 YES B
PHH − PE − 62 E - 2 7 MOD 5 5B YES D
PHH − PE − 63 E - 2 7 MOD 5 5B YES D
PHH − PE − 67 E - 0 1 NO 4 2 YES B
PHH − PE − 69 E - 5 3 NO 3,2 2 YES B
PHH − PE − 71 E - 0 3 MOD 7 7C YES D
PHH − PE − 73 E - 0 7 MOD 6 7C YES D
PHH − PE − 74 E - 2 10 MOD 7 8E YES D
PHH − PE − 76 E - 2 10 SEV 7 8 YES D
PHH − PE − 32 E - 5 1 NO 4 2 YES B
PHH − PE − 33 E - 2 1 NO 5 3 YES B
PHH − PE − 35 E - 5 7 MOD 4 2 NO C
PHH − PE − 38 E - 0 10 SEV. 7 8 YES D
PHH − PE − 39 E - 5 10 SEV. 7 8 YES D
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